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Abstract  
 
 
My thesis here is that Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh, in its development, 
suggests a logic of incarnation which carries philosophical ontology beyond 
entrenched dualisms, and offers to Christian theology a route away from 
dualistic compromises and back to its own deepest insight. 
I set out first to develop Merleau-PontyÕs fleshly ontology by tracing its 
roots in his early thought on the reversibility of perception, which installs the 
perceiver at the heart of a world with which he is engaged and on which he 
depends; this relationship is grounded in the elemental faith of perception. I 
develop this perceptual understanding with reference to eating as a mode of 
perception; hunger joins our biological needs to their imaginative develop-
ment, and Man, the hungry animal, transforms his desire, and thus his world. 
I show how dualistic ontologies are grounded in a geometrical conception 
of nature which founds a notion of God as removed from the world in the 
absolute distance of the geometer from geometry, and argue that this 
mathematisation of nature is hypostasised in the modern understanding of 
vision. I develop a counter-understanding which liberates the seer from his 
incarceration in immobility, emphasising that sight depends on movement 
and on its imbrication with the other senses, involving us in a world of 
existential significance, and suggesting a partial recovery of the extramission 
and species theories of sight. 
I then argue that nature must be understood in terms of place, rather than 
as a spatiotemporal container. There is a fundamental man-nature chiasm 
which precedes analysis. Incarnation is not an insertion into nature but a 
flowering within it of a fundamental logos. This grounds metaphysics in the 
perceived world, affirming meaning within contingency. For a Christian 
theology rooted in such a notion of incarnation, God is revealed in the depths 
of nature and history. 
ii  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
It is a central thread of this thesis that thought is essentially embodied: it 
belongs not to the inner workings of an individual mind but to a bodily 
person located in a complex web of relations, to other people, to a world, and 
to the fundamental logos of that world. To compose a list of persons without 
whom my work could not be what it is would be an unending task; but I 
would like to thank a few of whose influence I have been most keenly aware. 
My greatest debt is to my wife, Sharon, whose support for me has been 
unfailing. You have shared the discipline and the suffering of this project and 
have borne much of its strain on our life together. You deserve its rewards 
and the joy of its completion as much as I do. Thankyou. 
The prudence and generosity of Andrew and Elaine Phipps gave us both 
the freedom to spend several years in study, for which I am deeply grateful.  
I am indebted to my friend Ben Pollard, with whom I have shared the de-
light of intellectual sparring in both serious and silly modes for many years, 
and who has long appreciated and encouraged my philosophical instincts. 
Many other friends have held me up and been a source of comfort and levity 
in times when I have been most deeply lost in my work: Sam and Ronnie 
McDermid, Peter and Nancy Crooks, Laurie and Ann-Marie Ison, Max and 
Beth Edgar, Graeme and Tracy Guthrie, Lionel and Rachel Miller and Phil 
and Anna Ashford are among them. Without the detailed and focused 
conversation I have had the pleasure of sharing with Jennifer Pollard, I could 
not have learnt as much as I have about many things, not least about vision. 
I wish to thank my teacher and friend Philip Goodchild, from whom I 
have learnt so much, and who has patiently and persistently listened to me 
and questioned me, even when I have been a more-than-averagely frustrating 
student. I also owe a great deal to my student colleagues, especially to An-
thony Paul Smith, who has, with great generosity, tried to help me see what is 
of value in even my worst ideas, to Alex Andrews, who has continued to bring 
to my attention thoughts and perspectives I could not otherwise have en-
countered, and to Stuart Jesson, whose careful questioning of philosophical 
and theological ideas has often given me both pleasure and encouragement. 
Aaron Riches encouraged me at a crucial time near the beginning of this 
project, and first brought some of its central theological sources to my 
attention. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc was instrumental in introducing me 
to Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy, and has continued to help me to think 
iii 
through it in productive ways, as has Conor Cunningham, under whose 
guidance my search for the theological significance of Merleau-PontyÕs 
philosophy has been profoundly shaped. David Rowe and Rich Johnson 
provided invaluable feedback as readers of early drafts of the text. I consider 
it a privilege to have been examined by  Professors Graham Ward and John 
Milbank, who engaged seriously with the work I have done here and have 
guided me towards the intellectual challenges presented by its further devel-
opment. 
I also owe a great deal to the communities of faith who have nourished me 
for the past sixteen years. To Tim and Anna Hewitt, Marc James, Simon 
Jones, Sam Lane, Jo Morris, Graham Ord, and many others from my days at 
St. Albans Vineyard, I owe a great deal, for nurturing me and making room 
for difficult questions in my earliest steps of faith. To Nick and Cathy Gret-
ton, Lizzie and John Lacey, Jonny Norridge, Jamie Plumb, Jim and Anna 
Robinson, and to  Libby Woodward, as well as many others from my time at 
Trent Vineyard, I am indebted. To the people and priests of St. CatherineÕs, 
Arthog, and St. CynonÕs, Fairbourne, my thanks go for your love during our 
time living in the most beautiful place I have known. I have been amazed and 
humbled by the support shown to me by new friends at All Saints Worcester, 
and especially to Rich Johnson and Eoghan Heaslip, both of whom have been 
loving leaders and good friends to me in the short time I have known them, 
and whose appreciation of the value of clear thinking in the life of the king-
dom has been an enormous encouragement. My thanks go also to Peter 
Davies, to the community of Worcester Cathedral with whom I have wor-
shiped during the last year of writing this thesis, and to the monks and nuns 
of Mucknell Abbey, whose quiet peace was succour to me at a crucial point in 
its development.  
 
iv  
v 
Contents 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1 
  
Part One: Perception  
1: Merleau-PontyÕs Embodied Philosophy 
 
14 
2: ÔTaste and SeeÉÕ: Eating as Perception 
  
48 
  
Middle Part: The Crossing  
3: The Old Ontology 
 
78 
  
Part Two: Ontology  
4: ÔRestoring Sight to the BlindÕ: Towards a Renewed 
Understanding of Visual Perception 
 
104 
5: Institution and Incarnation in Merleau-PontyÕs 
Ontology 
 
158 
  
Conclusion 
 
240 
  
Bibliography 245 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Logic of 
Incarnation in 
Merleau-PontyÕs 
Ontology 
 
 
y aim in this thesis is to bring to expression the ontology which 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was developing throughout his work, 
and whose final and most complete expression comes to us in 
the unfinished work published as The Visible and the Invisible. I will argue that 
the progression of Merleau-PontyÕs thought is not well characterised by a 
turn from an early phenomenological philosophy of consciousness to a later, 
more consistent ontological philosophy of flesh. Rather, Merleau-PontyÕs 
thought follows a trajectory (within each text and in his whole corpus) to-
wards an incarnational understanding which is never brought to completion 
but which is continually reworked and refined, each time bringing to clearer 
expression something of the fundamental insight which is present from the 
beginning. 
My conviction is that Merleau-PontyÕs ontology participates in a radical 
movement of thought which seeks to liberate the thinker from dissipative 
dualisms by identifying the common source of their elements in an Ôinter-
twining,Õ that is, in a chiasmatically structured prior whole from which we 
make analytic abstractions.  In modernity these abstractions remain determi-
native for thought; they impair a synthetic, intuitive understanding of struc-
tured wholes in the very same moment that they enable an analytic, atomic 
understanding of the elements of the experienced world. The analytic func-
tion well established, we are left with a glut of problems of integration which 
characterise the weakness of modern thought: the problems of mind and 
body, form and matter, ideal and real, thought and things, freedom and 
M 
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causation, instinct and desire, animal and environment, body and world, telos 
and genesis, man and nature, and so on. 
Merleau-PontyÕs logic is ÔincarnationalÕ in the sense that it takes as its icon 
the flesh, a supposed Ôunion of oppositesÕ which, inasmuch as it succeeds in 
uniting them, announces their originary indivision and the possibility of their 
transformation. This ontological story scandalises our already-existing stories 
and our established categories, and this should come as no surprise; the clear 
separation of things, the making of these distinctions, initiated a great 
advance in human understanding of which it remains the fundamental basis. 
The search for knowledge depends on taking things apart to understand 
them. But if knowledge is not to supplant wisdom, if scientia is not to spurn 
its ancient concern with life and living, with integrating such knowledge into 
the world of thought, of values and of relationships, it must learn to put 
things back together. 
There is in Merleau-PontyÕs thought, then, a kind of methodological com-
mitment to a coherentism both narrow and broad: his fundamental impulse 
Òto understand the relations of consciousness and natureÓ1 arises from dissat-
isfaction with the chasm left between them by Cartesian thought. What 
perception furnishes us with must make sense in its own terms, and if the 
phenomenological reduction means excising what we cannot fit into a prede-
termined set of terms, then it is of no use. As Merleau-Ponty tells us in the 
introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception: ÒThe greatest lesson the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction. [É] If we 
were absolute mind, the reduction would not be problematic. But since, on 
the contrary, we are in the world, since our thoughts occur within the tempo-
ral flux they are trying to capture [É] there is no thought which embraces all 
our thought.Ó2 
                                                
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, trans. Alden L. Fisher (London: 
Methuen, 1965), 3. 
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), xv. I have here significantly modified the translation on the basis of the 
original, Phnomnologie de la perception, (Paris, Gallimard, 1945), viii. In giving page 
numbers for the Phenomenology of Perception, I have chosen to use the widely available 2002 
Routledge Classics edition of Colin SmithÕs translation. In several places, including here, 
this edition introduced errors to the text from the better, but harder to obtain, 1962 
Routledge and Kegan Paul edition, to which I have referred from time to time, as well as 
to the 1945 French edition from which I have re-translated at a few points where this is 
helpful. A very useful concordance to editions of the Phenomenology, produced by David 
Morris, is available at 
 http://alcor.concordia.ca/~davimorr/pontyprog.htm . 
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My aim, then, is also to draw out those aspects of Merleau-PontyÕs onto-
logical thought which are of interest to Christian theology. In the use of the 
notion of incarnation, in the repeated deployment of sacramental language, of 
the notion of the centrality of faith, and in a continued dialogue with Chris-
tian thinkers, Merleau-Ponty is always drawing on and reflecting on the 
Christian tradition, and to the reader sensitive to this world of thought it is 
clear that he is deeply marked by his Roman Catholic upbringing, operating 
very much within a sacramental imaginary.3 
Merleau-Ponty grew up as a Catholic and had an unusually happy child-
hood.4 He broke with Catholicism in his twenties, partly in response to the 
shelling of working-class parts of Vienna by the catholic ÔChristian SocialistÕ 
government of Engelbert Dollfuss, and he alludes to this event in the 1946 
essay translated as ÒFaith and Good Faith.Ó5 But, as Graham Ward says, Òhe 
never manages to shake off his Catholic imagination.Ó6 Merleau-PontyÕs 
thought does not by any means require a Christian commitment to make 
sense. But it does draw on a set of ideas which an understanding of Christian-
ity will help us to elucidate, and my contention will be that it is also informed 
by an essential strand of the Christian tradition, namely its incarnationalism, 
which gives the ontology which Merleau-Ponty was developing a singular 
significance for Christian thought and which demands a theological interpre-
tation. 
                                                
3 On Merleau-PontyÕs connection with Christian thought, see Richard Kearney, Anathe-
ism: Returning to God after God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), especially 
85–100, and ÒMerleau-Ponty and the Sacramentality of the FleshÓ in Merleau-Ponty at the 
Limits of Art, Religion and Perception, ed. Kascha Semonovitch and Neal DeRoo, 147-166 
(London: Continuum, 2010); Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, ÒÔLÕincarnation change toutÕ: 
Merleau-Ponty critique de la Ôthologie explicative,ÕÓ Archives de Philosophie, 71.3(2008): 
371–405;  John Milbank, ÒThe Soul of Reciprocity Part Two: Reciprocity Granted,Ó 
Modern Theology 17:4 (2001): 485–507; Andreas Nordlander, Figuring Flesh in Creation: 
Merleau-Ponty in Conversation with Philosophical Theology, Ph.D. Dissertation, Lund 
University, 2011; Richard Patrick Whaite, ÔSuspending the MaterialÕ: Materiality, Incarnation 
and the Christian Doctrine of Creation, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester, 2006. 
4 Sartre writes ÒOne day in 1947, Merleau told me that he had never recovered from an 
incomparable childhood. He had known that private world of happiness from which only 
age drives us. Pascalian from adolescence, without even having read Pascal, he experi-
enced his singular selfhood as the singularity of an adventure.Ó Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations, 
trans. Benita Eisler (New York: G Braziller, 1965), 228. 
5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ÒFaith and Good Faith,Ó in Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert 
L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1964). 
6 Graham Ward, Christ and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 71, n. 25. 
4 Introduction 
My emphasis will remain on Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy and its implica-
tions for ontology and for theology. I do not seek here to stage an encounter 
between Merleau-Ponty and theology in general or any particular theologian. 
The work of bringing Merleau-Ponty into dialogue with theology has already 
been started; for example by John Milbank in his 2001 article ÒThe Soul of 
Reciprocity,Ó and in two recent PhD theses: Richard Patrick Whaite in his 
2006 thesis Suspending the Material responds to scientific theologies and their 
approach to creation, developing an understanding of incarnation as the 
pattern for a theological account of matter, bringing Merleau-Ponty into 
dialogue with Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory 
Palamas; and Andreas Nordlander in his 2011 thesis develops an encounter 
between Merleau-Ponty and Augustine, again in terms of creation theology, 
proposing that Merleau-PontyÕs ontology can preserve human integrity whilst 
understanding humanity as part of the natural world, but finding in Merleau-
Ponty a rejection of God as transcendent creator which is countered by 
AugustineÕs philosophical theology, and particularly by an emphasis on 
creation ex nihilo, in which human beings are co-creators.7 These projects are 
of great significance in the field of the encounter between Merleau-PontyÕs 
thought and Christian theology; but I focus here on understanding and 
developing the internal logic of Merleau-PontyÕs trajectory, understanding 
him in his intellectual and religious context and attempting to tease out the 
implications of his thought with as little outside determination as possible. 
To stage an encounter would place us under the burden of focusing on how 
Merleau-PontyÕs thought differs from Christian Orthodoxy, as it surely must. 
But such an exercise can easily miss what each can learn from the other, and 
as such I intend to develop Merleau-PontyÕs thought in its theological sympa-
thies, seeking not to Christianise Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy but to draw 
out theological implications already present there. 
In addition to these few interventions, a handful of commentators on Mer-
leau-Ponty have attended to the theological dimension of his thought,8 and 
                                                
7 See footnote 3 above for references. 
8 See, for example, Albert Rabil, Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1970); John F. Bannan, ÒMerleau-Ponty on God,Ó 
International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966): 341–365; Rudolf Bernet, ÒThe Subject in 
Nature: Reflections on Merleau-PontyÕs Phenomenology of Perception,Ó trans. R.P. Buckley 
and S. Spileers, in Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective, edited by Patrick Burke and 
Jan Van Der Veken, 53–68 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993); and William 
Hamrick and Jan Van Der Veken, Nature and Logos: A Whiteheadian Key to Merleau-PontyÕs 
Fundamental Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011). 
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many more theologians have seen fit to make use of his thought in passing.9 
Although Òtheologies of the bodyÓ have abounded in recent years, and espe-
cially in the wake of Pope John Paul IIÕs 129 lectures on ÔTheology of the 
BodyÕ between September 1979 and November 1984, these have tended to 
focus not on embodiment per se but on issues associated with the human 
body, and particularly on sexuality, where Òbody theologyÓ has been a site of 
the battle between conservative approaches to sexual morality and the more 
progressive positions emerging from feminism and queer theory. Theoretical 
approaches to the body have tended to focus on the questions brought up by 
the facts of bodily difference, and so the question of the body has often been 
territorialised by identity politics. This has diverted attention away from the 
body as precisely the ground that human beings share with each other and 
with the rest of nature, and so often the question of what it is to be a body 
which is structured in this particular way, which incarnates me in the world 
and grounds my relationships to others in concrete intersubjectivity, has been 
put aside in favour of questions of difference. Such questions are important, 
but to approach questions of bodily difference without a well-founded 
understanding of embodiment in general may be to put the cart before the 
horse. I attempt here to elucidate an ontology which understands the body in 
terms of flesh; following Merleau-Ponty, we start with perception, which 
draws us into an understanding of intersubjectivity, hunger, dependence, and 
desire, clarifying an account of vision liberated from the Cartesian scopic 
regime, and ultimately determining fleshly incarnation in terms of expression, 
institution and historicity. In this way I attempt to offer an account of what 
it is to be an incarnate person by focusing on the irreducible structures of 
embodiment, which always already install us in a world of coexistence with 
others, a world in which love, hunger, suffering and transformation carry 
metaphysical significance and are not simply epiphenomenal. Thus the 
questions of the politics of the body, and the discussion of what it might 
mean for God to have assumed a body, find their much-needed systematic 
grounding in a logic of incarnation. 
There is not a ÔMerleau-Ponty and TheologyÕ industry in the way that there 
is for theological interpretations of Heidegger, or Wittgenstein, for example. 
                                                
9 See, for example, Catherine Pickstock, After Writing (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 107–116; 
Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 5; Jacques Arnould, ÒTheologi-
ans Wanted!Ó Theology and Science, 8.4 (2010), 368; Phillip Blond, ÒTheology and Percep-
tion,Ó Modern Theology 14.4 (1998), 523–34. 
 
6 Introduction 
For some time there have been occasional excursions into the field of en-
gagement between Merleau-PontyÕs thought and Christian Theology, but this 
remains a territory for the most part unexplored, and I here develop a fun-
damental route into that region on the basis of Merleau-PontyÕs thought and 
its theological resonances both latent and readily perceived.  
What, then, is the importance of Merleau-PontyÕs ontology? From the 
first, it proposes to move beyond entrenched dualisms. It is a refrain of my 
work here that we do not realise just how Cartesian we are. It is for this 
reason that I seek to develop Merleau-PontyÕs ontology: to expose our 
assumed dualisms, to call them into question, and to find ways to overcome 
them. Of course, many others have sought to do this before me. I can hardly 
hope to succeed where they have failed. But this is not a question of finding 
the solution to the problem of dualism. We are interrogating the mystery of 
the fleshly connections of man and nature, of nature and God; where a rigid 
rationalism is challenged by the reconciliation of things, dualisms are not 
simply replaced by unitive monisms; rather, thought is challenged to come to 
terms with identity within difference. As I understand it, this is the basis for 
the progression of Merleau-PontyÕs thought. Renaud Barbaras writes, ÒI am 
inclined more and more to think of Merleau-PontyÕs final philosophy as not 
having fully cast off the presuppositions of the philosophy of consciousness 
and as faltering because of a lack, rather than an excess, of radicality.Ó10 
Nevertheless Barbaras thinks it justified to keep on returning to Merleau-
PontyÕs thought; this thought proposes to help us to think our way out of a 
dualism which we are in, and not to dictate from without an entirely new on-
tology. In this sense the ontology of the flesh is the goal of our philosophical 
exercise, and is neither a complete truth already somewhere expressed nor a 
final answer to the problem of ontology awaiting its definitive expression. To 
be truly expressed, it must be lived. I attempt to show here why, and how this 
is possible, by developing the ontology of the flesh in its implications for 
theology and for the practice of Christianity. 
My anticipation is thus that Merleau-PontyÕs ontology, to find its full ex-
pression, must be brought into dialogue with the world of praxis: in the flesh, 
philosophy is related to history, to action, and to nature. I do not think, nor 
claim, that Christian theology is the only realm in which Merleau-PontyÕs 
ontology can come to a fuller expression. But there must be a field of practice 
and reflection on practice for such fuller expression to be attained, and the 
                                                
10 Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, trans. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), xxiv. 
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field of Christian life and sacramental practice is the one we have seen most 
clearly implied in his thought, and have settled on. We also see in Christian 
thought fertile ground for the development of a non-dualistic ontology. The 
religion of God incarnate, of the logos made flesh, has a long tradition of 
thinking of the intertwining of thought and action, of soul and body, of 
Heaven and Earth, of God and Man, of self and others, of nature and history. 
This tradition is sometimes covered over by the influence of a bastardised 
Neoplatonism, by simplistic thinking, by our daily failures in the difficult task 
of understanding and holding the two poles together. For this reason, if 
Christian thought can be of service to ontological philosophy by bringing 
Merleau-PontyÕs thought to clearer expression, so Merleau-PontyÕs ontology 
may be of service to Christian thought in calling it back to some of its deep-
est commitments, helping it to understand and to live the paradoxes of the 
intertwining. 
My guiding questions, then, will be: How can Merleau-PontyÕs ontology be 
developed in light of Christian life and thought? And what implications does 
this development have for philosophy and for theology? 
The contributions to knowledge which I offer here are several. First of all, 
I explicate Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh with detailed attention to its 
genesis in his understanding of perception. I emphasise the centrality of a 
fundamental perceptual faith, and show how vision is grounded in its rela-
tionship to eating: perception is essential to life as crucial for nutrition, for 
meeting our appetitive needs. But in human beings perception exceeds the 
world of needs, as appetite is transformed in hunger, which is the Ôimaginative 
development of desire.Õ 
Secondly, I offer an account of perception which affirms vision as the cen-
tral and pre-eminent sense, but also as rooted in the body and the imbrica-
tion of the senses, as dependent on a perceptual faith which is basic, thus 
moving beyond the impasses of Cartesian perspectivalism and the postmod-
ern antioculocentrism which is its inversion. On the basis of this account of 
vision I develop an understanding of transcendence as depth, which points to 
a conception of God as knowable at the same time that God must always 
elude our grasp and exceed every attempt at comprehension. 
Thirdly, I show more clearly the roots of Merleau-PontyÕs thought in an 
incarnational and sacramental logic whose source is Christian, and I develop 
the ontology of flesh with reference to this incarnational logic in theological 
thought, paying attention to sacramental practice. I show how Merleau-
PontyÕs notion of institution reveals that ontology and anthropology are 
intertwined; both a Ôphilosophy of consciousnessÕ and a Ôphilosophy of natureÕ 
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must be refused, understanding nature as ÔsoilÕ for ontological flesh. Refusing 
to reduce God to consciousness or to nature provides a corrective to Spi-
nozist pantheism and to an Idealist conception of God as penseur absolu du 
monde; this philosophical development will build towards an ontology which 
recalls Christian theology to its deepest logic, that of incarnation.  
 
In Part One I develop the groundwork for a Merleau-Pontyan ontology of 
flesh through an interrogation of perception. In the first chapter, I introduce 
Merleau-PontyÕs fundamental insight, on the basis of his thought in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, situated within and drawing on the whole current 
of his philosophy. I offer an exposition of his opposition to the atomism of 
sensationalism and to the Objective Thought of Idealism and Empiricism. I 
explain his notion of the structured Gestalt of perception and show how the 
idea of reversibility introduces the problem that the observer (scientific or 
philosophical) cannot stand outside of the world he observes. I show how the 
Cartesian problem of illusion drove a wedge between the mind and the world, 
and how a kind of perceptual faith is basic for Merleau-Ponty, a prerequisite 
for perception. This grounding of perception in life enables us to develop a 
sense of subjectivity in the midst of things, fundamentally situated with 
regard to objects and the world. The fundamental dimension of perception is 
the existential dimension of depth, and this is allied to meaning, made clearer 
by the French word that Merleau-Ponty uses, sens, which implies not only 
ÔmeaningÕ or ÔsenseÕ but also directedness and orientation. Thus perception is 
grounded in the life of the moving body. But to fully understand perception 
in its existential dimension, an account of seeing is not enough. So, in chapter 
two, I turn to the question of eating as perception to develop a thicker 
understanding of perception in general. Rather than beginning with the 
question of ÔtasteÕ and the metaphorical use of that concept in the aesthetic 
philosophy of the 18th Century, I begin with hunger, contrasting the simple 
animal appetite, whose drive maintains nutrition and growth, with hunger 
properly speaking, which is not simply appetite but also its imaginative 
development, that takes hunger beyond the simple expression of a lack or a 
need towards the expressive development of possibilities. This typifies the 
lability of human beings in which they transcend the operation of the purely 
given. I then turn to a consideration of the sense of taste as an example which 
helps us to develop an understanding of perception as contact with the world 
that does not depend on the construction of a mental theatre of representa-
tion in which the world is re-created Ôinside my head.Õ Taste thus transforms 
the Cartesian epistemological question, of how I can know that I am not 
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being deceived by an illusion, into a new form of epistemological question: 
how can I know a world of which I am only part and to which my access must 
necessarily be partial? This epistemological reformulation opens onto and is 
bound up with further questions, of the nature of subjectivity and of ontol-
ogy: what is it to be a perceiving being, incarnate in this world? The answer to 
this question begins with an anthropology of the human as a hungry being, 
that is, as dependent and desiring, as willing matter, subject to a world which 
he also transforms through his desire, charged not only with conatus and the 
instinct for survival but with an openness to his own remaking and thus to 
the transformation of the world. 
Chapter three marks a crossing point between Part One, in which I have 
laid my groundwork in an account of perception, and Part Two, in which I 
develop the ontology of flesh. I assess what I have called Ôthe old ontologyÕ of 
Descartes, paying special attention to his account of visual perception as 
presented in the Optics. That text constitutes a crucial moment in the history 
of ontology insofar as it reifies a universal geometrism into a mathematised 
conception of space, which is consummated in its imagined joining to a 
totally abstract principle of subjectivity with which it can never remain in 
contact. Mind is excluded from a mathematised nature, and the human being 
as desiring body is rent asunder. 
Part Two begins in earnest in chapter four, where I begin to develop an 
ontological alternative to the Cartesian scene on the basis of a renewed 
understanding of visual perception, which escapes the absolute distance of 
the Platonic cave, the chasm of Cartesian mathesis, and the paranoid hostility 
of SartreÕs neo-Cartesianism. Merleau-PontyÕs positive account of vision, 
especially as expressed in his late essay Eye and Mind, establishes ÔdepthÕ as the 
fundamental dimension of perceptive intertwining with the world, in which 
sight organises our perceptive knowledge, including our tactile sensations, in 
such a way that we can Ôhave the world at distanceÕ: that is, we are installed 
amongst things, in contact with them, without coinciding with them in full 
presence. As such, we perceptually interrogate and explore a world which 
massively transcends us, and sight is understood in its fundamental depend-
ence on movement and intersensoriality. The ÔthicknessÕ of the things sight 
perceives in this fuller account can reveal their meanings in our intersubjec-
tive relation to them and a richer materiality of colour and melody, not just of 
line and instantaneity, with which our engagement is necessarily simultane-
ously passive and active, that is, interrogative. This interrogation refuses an 
absolutely passive illumination of a clear and distinct vision of the world, and 
as such suggests an incarnationalism which embraces ambiguity and which 
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refuses to withdraw from that transcendence which we encounter in imma-
nence but which ultimately escapes us. 
In chapter five, my final and longest chapter, I re-install this account of vi-
sion in an ontology of flesh and draw out the implications of incarnational 
thought in both philosophical and theological terms. We develop an under-
standing of transcendence as depth rather than as height, of the logos of things 
which appears in their depths as revealing an orientation not to God con-
ceived as utterly outside, as penseur absolu du monde, nor to a pantheist God 
who is convertible with nature, but rather to a God at work within nature, 
refusing a rationalist Deism as well as a romanticist Spiritualism, and reveal-
ing God Òon the other side of things.Ó In this conception, nature is the soil of 
meaning, neither as given in pure ideality nor as constituted by a thinker, but 
as instituted by the thinking subjects which are grounded in it. I develop in 
detail Merleau-PontyÕs logic of institution as presented in his 1954–55 lectures 
on that theme, showing how the later lectures establish Nature as a ground of 
meaning which is beyond objectivity. As such a Ôphilosophy of natureÕ is as 
much a failure of ontology as a Ôphilosophy of consciousnessÕ; the ontology of 
flesh demands that both poles are understood in terms of their intertwine-
ment with one another, and I develop this incarnationalism by showing how 
Renaud Barbaras misunderstands it as the insertion of consciousness into 
nature and how Michel Henry evacuates all life from the world in a 
Manichaeism which refuses the humility of humanity. 
I then go on to develop the sacramental implications of this intertwining 
of man and nature, suggesting that an understanding of epiphany grounds the 
relation of the logic of incarnation we have been developing to the continual 
transformation of history and thus the advent of historical time: for Merleau-
Ponty, Òsensation is literally a form of communion.Ó11 A certain logos is made 
known in and through material things, which announces and to some extent 
presents a transcendent Ôbeyond.Õ We have called this beyond ÔGod,Õ but the 
question of its nature passes beyond the limits of philosophy. What Merleau-
PontyÕs incarnationalism has taught us is that the difficulty and ambiguity of 
this ÔbeyondÕ must not be neutralised by attempts to determine it beyond its 
presentations; it must not become an attempt to explain away the world, 
suffering and joy, but to look upon the truths present in them. 
Where theology has been dismissed in modern thought, it has been on the 
basis of the Ôflat,Õ objectivised ontologies which we have here called into 
question. Naturalism supplanted an explanatory theology with its inverse. An 
                                                
11 Phenomenology of Perception, 246. 
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ontology of the flesh calls into question the division between natural and 
supernatural; its sacramentality is not an assertion of the supernatural but an 
interrogation of nature which takes seriously the notion that logos appears 
within nature and thus makes a question of nature. This makes possible a 
metaphysics which is grounded in the perceived world, which affirms a reason 
which dwells in the contingency of things and does not demand a Spinozistic 
determinism nor a Leibnizian rationalism for which everything is necessarily 
as it must be. For the one who finds God made known in the flesh, in nature 
and history, sacramentality institutes and expresses GodÕs self-revelation by 
continued participation in it; a participation which not only repeats it but 
also brings it into dialogue with the world and with its own history, so that 
the Eucharist always fractures and sends out those who are gathered, so that 
mass must always also be mission. 
 
Part One: 
 
Perception 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
Merleau-PontyÕs 
Embodied 
Philosophy 
 
 
 
n this chapter I offer an exposition of the philosophy of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. I show how his developing philosophy provides an 
avenue for thinking about the human person, the world, and knowledge 
beyond fundamental (though often latent or unnoticed) dualisms in contem-
porary philosophy. Thinking with Merleau-Ponty, and an ÔembodiedÕ mode of 
philosophy of which he is a key source, we see that our understanding of 
perception is crucial for the formation of a paradigm for viewing the relation 
of the human person with the world around him: for, in perception, the 
domain of causes, of physical events, is connected to the domain of reasons, 
or mental events; things are connected to thoughts. Philosophy has tended to 
conceptualise perception as internal visual representation, making central the 
question of how an internal ÔpictureÕ of the world is formed, and how we can 
know how much and in what ways that picture is in accord with the external 
world of causes, and so asking how the individual senses are connected to one 
another. These are the classical questions of epistemology. We will see how 
Merleau-PontyÕs account of perception may dispel this picture, which, 
according to Wittgenstein, Ôheld us captive.Õ 
In the following chapter I will go on to propose a richer account of percep-
tion which will ask instead how our originary common sense of the world is 
analysed into the five individual senses, and will take the more concrete (and 
more inextricably intertwined) senses of taste, smell and touch, in their 
primordial relation to the more abstract senses, as primary. If we form our 
paradigm for perception in light of the act of eating, we can form a robust 
idea of perception beyond the epistemological picture, as the communion of 
persons with the world, which are not two basically incommensurable catego-
I 
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ries. We will see that man is from the beginning at the heart of things, not a 
spirit alien in the world but rather an incarnate, bodily subject of an objective 
world. This conception of man will lead to a reconsideration of the concept 
of nature as implied by the notion of a domain of causes, and of the concept 
of freedom as by the domain of reasons, leading to a conception of nature 
which has situated freedom at its heart, and opening onto the investigation of 
an incarnational ontology of flesh in the latter part of this thesis. 
 
Merleau-PontyÕs Gestalt Phenomenology 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty traces out a conception of 
the human subject which is opposed to the problematic and too abstract 
conceptions of human being in the philosophy of his time. He begins by 
analysing the accounts of the perception of objects offered on the one hand 
by the scientifically-minded Empiricists, and on the other by rationalist 
Intellectualists, starting with the idea of Ôsensation.Õ  
Both the realist Empiricist and the idealist Intellectualist account for the 
object in terms of its atomic components in perception — pure sensations. 
This seemingly common-sense starting point already governs the trajectory of 
such accounts in a problematic direction, by misconceiving the relationship 
of the object of perception to its subject. 
For the Empiricist, perception offers access to the world as it is, and this is 
in part because the world is composed of deterministic entities that stand in 
observable relation to one another; consciousness, then, must be another 
thing in the world, and perception a theoretically observable relation between 
things. By contrast, for the Intellectualist, we can only come to know the 
world-as-experienced, and consciousness cannot be accounted for as part of 
that world, but is the experiencer that constitutes the world as experienced. 
Nevertheless, the world as experienced is, for the Intellectualist, composed 
of determinable entities that stand in relation to one another, which is to say 
a reductive analysis of it is possible.1 
Merleau-PontyÕs dual-headed attack on these two positions focuses on 
what they share — the thought that the world, whether real or experienced, 
is analysable into determinate parts whose relation to one another can be 
reduced into determinate constituent elements. This is the significance of his 
                                                
1 I owe this formulation of the Empiricist and Intellectualist position to that given in 
lectures on Merleau-Ponty by Komarine Romdenh-Romluc at the University of Notting-
ham in the spring of 2009. 
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notion of Gestalt. In the long introduction (comprising the first four chapters) 
to Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty opposes this Gestaltist view to 
the reductive view which supposes sensations as atomistic units of perception 
and which asserts the ÔConstancy HypothesisÕ — that is, that these sensed 
units are part of a simple one-to-one correspondence between sensory stimuli 
and perceived qualities, so that a mental representation of the world is built 
up out of these atomic units, which corresponds to their stimuli. 
The notion of sensation is problematic because we perceive not just sensa-
tions, but things, persons, and, indeed, a world. These perceptions, on the 
model of Objective Thought, must be produced in some way by the combina-
tion of sensations in the space of mental representation. But if, as the realist 
might prefer to say, they are combined according to a manner determined by 
the object itself (that is, individual sensations refer to the object, and provide 
the principle according to which they are combined into the object which is 
the source of the stimulus), then the notion of ÔsensationÕ must be excluded, 
for the simple property is not sensed, but rather a thing with certain analysable 
properties is sensed — the sensations are artificial abstractions from the prior 
reality of intentional perception. 
Alternatively, if sensations are not combined in a manner given by the ob-
ject, they must be combined according to some principle internal to me, and 
there is in fact no reason to think that our perception refers to the world at 
all: I may happen to combine certain kinds of sensation in certain ways but 
there is no rule by which such combinations could be compared to real 
objects and affirmed or rejected as veridical or illusory. 
For the Empiricist, the subject must combine sensations into perceived 
objects according to a principle given by the objects themselves. Thus con-
sciousness is simply part of a causal chain, and just another thing in the world. 
It is, though, hard to see in what sense there is truly a pure and neutral 
Ôsensation,Õ in this case — it seems that perception must already have inten-
tionality, must already refer to a perceived Ôthing,Õ or else the manner in 
which sensations are combined into objects must not be according to the 
principle given by the thing itself, in which case it is hard to see how percep-
tion can refer to anything at all. For the Intellectualist, it is clear that sensa-
tions are combined according to a principle given by consciousness, which 
constitutes the world as perceived. In this case, sense experience would seem 
to be understood as a form of judgment, which erases the common-sense 
distinction between judgement and perception, making it very difficult to 
understand what it means for things to ÔseemÕ one way (as in many optical 
illusions, for example) when we in fact know that they are another way.  
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Otherwise, if perception is not already a form of judgement for the Intel-
lectualist, then their account will fall foul of the same problems as the Em-
piricist account — either perception of the object is given according to the 
object, or there is no reason to think that perception represents the real 
world at all. The second part of this faulty theorisation of perception, the 
Constancy Hypothesis, is equally easily shown to be false, according to 
Merleau-Ponty. For him, it 
 
conflicts with the data of consciousness, and the very psychologists who accept it 
recognize its purely theoretical character. For example, the intensity of a sound 
under certain circumstances lowers its [perceived] pitch; the addition of auxiliary 
lines makes two figures unequal which are objectively equal [in the Mller-Lyer il-
lusion]; a coloured area appears to be the same colour over the whole of its sur-
face, whereas the chromatic thresholds of the different parts of the retina ought to 
make it red in one place, orange somewhere else, and in certain cases colourless. 
[É] When the apparent size of an object varies with its apparent distance, or its 
apparent colour with our recollections of the object, it is recognised that Ôthe sen-
sory processes are not immune to central influences.Õ In this case, therefore, the 
ÔsensibleÕ cannot be defined as the immediate effect of an external stimulus.2 
 
Merleau-PontyÕs arguments here do not carry the force of deductive cer-
tainty. Nevertheless, they open up, in the pages that follow, a way of viewing 
the world that makes good sense of the human situation. In the preface to 
the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty has told us that 
 
It is because we are through and through compounded of relationship with the 
world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend the resul-
tant activity, to refuse it our complicity (to look at it ohne mitzumachen, as Husserl 
often says), or yet again, to put it Ôout of play.Õ Not because we reject the certain-
ties of common sense and a natural attitude to things Ñ they are, on the contrary, 
the constant theme of philosophy Ñ but because, being the supposed basis of any 
thought, they are taken for granted, and go unnoticed, and because in order to 
arouse them and bring them to view, we have to suspend for a moment our recog-
nition of them. The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by 
Eugen Fink, HusserlÕs assistant, when he spoke of ÔwonderÕ in the face of the 
world.3 
                                                
2 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 7–8. 
3 Phenomenology of Perception, xv. 
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And soon after he writes that ÒThe most important lesson which the reduc-
tion teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction.Ó As Stephen 
Priest notes,4 for Merleau-Ponty, as for many post-Husserlian phenomenolo-
gists, the reduction is no longer considered completeable. Where HusserlÕs 
reduction sometimes seems like the attainment of a certain state of mind, an 
ÔattitudeÕ which contrasts with the natural one, Merleau-PontyÕs conception 
of the reduction is a much more concrete and pragmatic one — he attempts 
to perform a reduction, by argument, on the dominant scientific rationalism 
which undermines the view of the world which looks at it in wonder.  
The criticism of the constancy hypothesis and more generally the reduc-
tion of the idea of Ôthe worldÕ opened up a phenomenal field, which now has to 
be more accurately circumscribed, and suggested the rediscovery of a direct 
experience which must, at least provisionally, be assigned its place in relation 
to scientific knowledge, psychological and philosophical reflection.5 
Merleau-PontyÕs arguments against empiricism and intellectualism are an 
attempt to dislodge the reader of the Phenomenology of Perception from this 
complacent nave realism so as to be able to confront perception as it is, 
without the artifices imposed on it by the confusion between the perception 
and the thing perceived which is revealed in the notion of Ôsensation.Õ For 
him, the idea that ÔsensationÕ as a concept is self-evident is based not on 
phenomena themselves but on Òwidely held prejudice.Ó Where we assume 
that sensations are prior, and that we know what it is to hear, to see and to 
feel, our experience of things in fact offers us first precisely things, in all their 
primordial meaningfulness as relevant to our lives as they are lived, and their 
analysis into component perceptions can be seen to be derivative.6 
For Merleau-Ponty, the basic picture of perception as constituting an inner 
mental representation of an outer world must be challenged. What if what we 
see is not a set of mental images viewed by a soul or subject which is some-
thing like a little man in my head, but is rather the world itself? Our stand-
point on the world would then not be that of an inner subject but of a body-
subject, a material subject of the world. Experience reveals that the problem 
of perception is only possible against a background of perceptual faith. And 
this structure, of the object of investigation against a background, is itself 
central to perception: for Merleau-Ponty, perception always involves a gestalt 
                                                
4 Stephen Priest, Merleau-Ponty (London: Routledge, 2003), 22.  
5 Phenomenology of Perception, 54. 
6 Phenomenology of Perception, 5. 
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or figure-ground structure.7 Hubert Dreyfus puts it thus in his introduction 
to Merleau-PontyÕs ense and Non-Sense: 
 
Merleau-Ponty starts his analysis from the Gestaltist principle that whenever I per-
ceive, I perceive a figure on a ground. A spot on a page appears to be on the page, 
i.e., the paper is perceived as present behind the spot. Whatever appears suggests 
in its very appearance something more which does not appear, which is con-
cealed. For this reason the figure can be said to have meaning since Ñ unlike a 
brute datum, and like a linguistic expression or a work of art Ñ it refers beyond 
what is immediately given. For example, when I perceive an object, such as a 
house from the front, the back is involved in this perception not merely as a possi-
ble perception which I judge could be produced if I walked around the house, nor 
as a necessary implication of the concept Òhouse.Ó Instead, the back is experi-
enced as actually co-present Ñ concealed but suggested by the appearance of the 
front.8 
 
So, as for Levinas and Heidegger, though in different ways, phenomenology 
here reaches beyond itself, toward a reality which is fuller than that we have 
immediate access to, and which ÔfulfilsÕ our perception, for the most part. 
The spacing of bodies in a world is revealed by the fact of depth in percep-
tion, the spatiality of perception, which is closely tied to movement, and 
perception as a lived act, which tends toward optimal grip on the world, or 
optimal perspective, which is always already presupposed.  
This bodily conception of the human subject is clearly set out in opposi-
tion to an analytic and atomistic conception that ultimately derives from 
Descartes. Although DescartesÕ goal is to securely ground knowledge of 
extended things, he ends up by leaving us with a deeply impoverished concep-
tion of the subject as the space of internal intellectual representation of an 
outside world, the relationship of the two being the subject of the questions 
of traditional epistemology. He leaves us with the pure subject considered as 
a res cogitans, as a thinking thing, and no longer with the human being, the 
living, reasoning material being who essentially acts in and on the world. This 
picture, with its attendant problems of the relationship between self and 
world, or between knowledge and known object, tends always to resolve the 
                                                
7 Phenomenology of Perception, 4 ff. 
8 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus, ÒTranslatorÕs Introduction,Ó in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, translated by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen 
Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), xi. 
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two terms into one or the other; that is to say, either to a materialism or to 
an idealism. To overcome the problems of the deep dualism between subject 
and object that Descartes sets up, philosophy has tended to attempt to 
translate one into the other without remainder. 
 
Reversibility and The Perceptual Faith 
The overcoming of this dualism, through an attentive investigation of 
perception, introduces a crucial implication of perception for Merleau-Ponty, 
that he later calls Ôreversibility.Õ Reversibility is first presented by Merleau-
Ponty, in its nascent form, in the Phenomenology of Perception, where he speaks 
of the alternation of the touch of two hands, of one person, touching one 
another.9 What is crucial here is that whilst objectivity and subjectivity never 
coincide, neither are they radically separated, since either hand is in principle 
both touching and touched. Mike Dillon emphasises the crucial role of this 
Òidentity-within-differenceÓ in Merleau-PontyÕs ontology.10 In The Visible and 
the Invisible Merleau-Ponty names this concept Ôreversibility,Õ and explores 
the notion further. There is a fundamental asymmetry to reversibility that is 
revealed when we take, as a further example, the hand touching the table — I 
cannot feel the table touching me in the same way that I feel my hand touch-
ing the table.11 The table is clearly not a part of my body, and neither is it 
sentient as I am. This asymmetry is extended as Merleau-Ponty applies the 
concept of reversibility to vision. Reversibility is grounded in, and character-
istic of, my body precisely to the degree that my senses are common. The 
perspective given to me in perception finds its Ôzero degreeÕ in touch, as I can 
touch what I see and vice versa. This zero degree is enabled by the fact of my 
moving around, my tactile investigation, in which changes in visual perspec-
tive accompany the exploration of touch.  
 
Every movement of my eyes Ñ even more, every displacement of my body Ñ has 
its place in the same universe that I itemize and explore with them, as, conversely, 
every vision takes place somewhere in the tactile space. There is a double and 
                                                
9 Phenomenology of Perception, 106. 
10 M.C. Dillon, Merleau-PontyÕs Ontology (2nd edition) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1997), 159. In this discussion of reversibility I follow DillonÕs argument in pp. 
157–161. 
11 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, translated by Alphonso Lingis, 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 133. 
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crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible; the 
two maps are complete, and yet they do not merge into one.12 
 
This perspectivism is closely tied to the notion, which Merleau-Ponty in-
sists on, that vision is reversible. Vision, for Merleau-Ponty, is not taken to 
be a one-way movement of light reaching our eyes. Rather, vision is consti-
tuted by our looking, by our moving around in the world that we see, rather 
than by a passive reception of data. 
 
Between my exploration and what it will teach me, between my movements and 
what I touch, there must exist some relationship by principle, some kinship, ac-
cording to which they are not only [É] vague and ephemeral deformations of the 
corporeal space, but the initiation to and opening upon a tactile world. This can 
happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from with-
out, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it takes its place among the 
things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of 
which it is also a part.13 
 
Although Merleau-Ponty seems so often to take vision as paradigmatic for 
perceptual experience, it is clear here that his model for seeing is a kind of 
Ôvisual palpation,Õ a ÔfeelingÕ of the world which gives knowledge in a way 
which is substantial, which matters. The body as ground of common sense 
gives a clearer meaning to this Ôvisual palpation,Õ which is not a mysterious 
property of sight that goes to the things themselves, but rather the fact of 
visionÕs embodiment, of its belonging to a body which moves and endures and 
finds its zero degree in touch. It seems Merleau-Ponty is trying to reveal 
vision in this way, as reversible, so that when I see, I know myself not only as 
a seer but also as visible, as seen. The embodied subject as such is grounded 
in a dualism (object/subject, seen/seer, material/mental), which it overcomes 
without reducing it to one of its terms. There is no Ôthird termÕ between 
these pairs — rather, they must be Ôsuspended.Õ If we decline to separate the 
whole into parts, the whole cannot then be accounted for (at least not by any 
method which would account for it by dividing and categorising it in any 
way). The same is true for any account which would overcome a dualism by 
simply excluding one of its terms, as in a vulgar materialism which cannot 
                                                
12 The Visible and the Invisible, 134. 
13 The Visible and the Invisible, 133. 
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speak of matter in any way which would reveal it, which would account for its 
essence, genesis, or even its existence. 
In his late, unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible, he writes: 
 
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should 
need the old term Òelement,Ó in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, 
and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-
temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of 
being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an ÒelementÓ 
of being.14  
 
Here Merleau-Ponty returns to the notion that is central to this chapter of 
his unfinished work, the notion of Ôflesh.Õ The chapter is entitled (in its 
English translation) ÒThe Intertwining — The ChiasmÓ and this elemental 
flesh is the intertwining, is the ÔcrossingÕ after which it is named. John Mil-
bank writes in Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty,  
 
The entire series of sensed things to which the body belongs forms one continuous 
surface that Merleau-Ponty (following Aristotle, though he does not say so) names 
Òflesh.Ó At the point of Òbodies,Ó flesh somehow folds back upon itself, becomes 
Òfor itselfÓ as well as Òin itself,Ó and in being able to touch itself is also able to 
touch the whole series of fleshly things. 
  However, this is no simple materialism. The flesh is as much spiritual as it is ma-
terial, because the showing of a depth of possibility that is spirit is constitutive of 
everything.15 
 
This Ôdepth of possibility,Õ which constitutes everything, is related to, 
though not limited to, the depth revealed in perception. Phenomenology 
reaches beyond itself. That is, careful attention to the phenomena reveals 
that they intimate the presence of a depth which is more than they can fully 
reveal. 
If philosophyÕs historical dualism has led gradually but inevitably to the 
disenchantment of the world, to the Ônatural attitudeÕ which conditions our 
very perception, and which the phenomenological epoch is an attempt to 
                                                
14 The Visible and the Invisible, 139. 
15 John Milbank, ÒBeauty and the Soul,Ó in John Milbank, Graham Ward, and Edith 
Wyschogrod, Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 2003), 12. 
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overcome, then Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy might be read as the movement 
of the Vorzauberung der Welt, the (re-)enchantment of the world. Merleau-
PontyÕs philosophy has restored what might seem like a more primitive view 
of the world, a view which is prior to the natural attitude (or perhaps the 
Ôscientific attitudeÕ). We are no longer ephemeral conscious subjects with 
access (as if Ôfrom aboveÕ) to an outside world. The body is no longer an 
indescribable mediator between the mental and the physical. There is no 
longer any hard divide between thought and things. Consciousness is restored 
as a characteristic of the lived world, and perception gives access to things 
which disclose themselves as both unpredictable and familiar, as stable yet in 
motion, as subject-objects.  
 
The flesh of the world is not self-sensing (se sentir) as is my flesh Ñ It is sensible 
and not sentient Ñ I call it flesh, nonetheless [É] in order to say that it is a preg-
nancy of possibles, Weltmglichkeit (the possible worlds variants of this world, the 
world beneath the singular and the plural) that it is therefore absolutely not an ob-
ject, that the blosse Sache mode of being is but a partial and second expression of 
it.16 
 
The reversibility of perception finally implies that the world itself is flesh, 
and though of course I do not expect to engage in conversation with the 
trees, such always remains within the realms of possibility. Just as I recognise 
that the organisation of this flesh is a property of the organs proper to it, I do 
not expect to be addressed by a tree, as I do not expect to be seen by a hand. 
But the organisation is never final in its arrangement, and my understanding 
of it is never complete, is never beyond the possibility of revision, and as such 
I still feel ÔseenÕ by the trees as I see them — as Dillon says, their visibility to 
me is forever linked to the possibility of my being visible to them. The 
ontology which takes perception as primary is founded on reversibility as 
characteristic of perception. 
So, the method of a philosophy which takes perception as primary leads us, 
by the reversibility of such perception, to a world in which we are involved. If 
we think our own embodied perception as flesh, the world also is flesh, 
although that is not to say that it is sentient through and through. It reveals 
us, as bodily things present to the world, as always potentially and partly 
visible, without depending on the actual presence of another seer, and with-
out reducing us to what might appear in our visibility.  
                                                
16 The Visible and the Invisible, 250. 
24 Part One: Perception 
For Merleau-Ponty the problem of illusion, the wedge that Descartes 
drives between appearance and reality, depends on a more basic affinity 
between them. It is only on the basis of further perceptions that a perception is 
found to have been illusory. Whilst the oneiric quality of a dream may not be 
immediately apparent to the dreamer, when he wakes up it is not difficult for 
him to discover the difference between the dream and his everyday life. 
Without the basic parity between the things and their appearances which 
Descartes must at once assume and call into question, there would be no 
determinable experience to speak of at all. 
For Merleau-Ponty, perception then is not a passive reception of impres-
sions whose authenticity must be tested and to some degree found wanting. 
Rather, the subject of perception is a bodily subject whose looking consti-
tutes a two-way interaction with the object and with the world in which it is 
situated. The abstract, conceptual element of perception is grounded in a 
much more basic lived engagement with the world. 
For an embodied perspective, the unity of the world cannot be an a priori 
possibility to be realised to some degree by contemplation, though this 
classical view may not be so far from the truth. Certainly the unity of the 
world cannot be constituted by something like identity with the unity of the 
transcendental world-subject, which is why this line of thought degenerates 
into the monadology of Leibniz or the reduction of selfhood to an illusory 
and conventional status in Hume, for whom the unity of the world still 
remains to be grounded. 
Rather, as embodied thought shows through these investigations, the unity 
of the world is a de facto possibility grounded in embodied life. No abstract or 
logical assurance can be given against the possibility of another, totally 
foreign world. But the body co-ordinates experience in such a way as to 
assure the unity of the world not from Ôon high,Õ in the realm of the forms, nor 
from an absolute requirement that all that is is commensurable, as in elimina-
tive materialism, but from a given position: a place within the world, by 
which a person is given to relate to a world of which they are a part but which 
is not theoretically delimitable. 
The unity of the world is grounded, then, in a sense, by what Merleau-
Ponty calls la foie perceptive, the perceptual faith. This is a concept that comes 
up repeatedly in Phenomenology of Perception, and persists throughout Merleau-
PontyÕs thought, such that in his unfinished work posthumously published as 
The isi le and the isi le, it has become the organising concept. 
In some ways the idea of the perceptual faith names an opening onto the 
givenness of things, of objects and of the world. That things are the ground of 
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our subjective, perceptive determinations of them is not something that can 
be established in the Cartesian manner. But even if the perceptual faith 
might be taken to open onto the world as a gift, it is not to be understood as  
any kind of religious faith. The perceptual faith is common, in fact though not 
by any necessity, to human beings. Even the scientific realist must start in 
perceptual faith if he is to have any world to investigate. 
The idea of perceptual faith also refers to the coherence of things, that is, 
to the possibility of the unity, of the world, the object, and of the subject. 
Even though sight discloses a visual field, and touch a tactile field, we find 
that what can be seen can in fact also be touched, and so on, so that what is 
given to the perceiver is not an arrangement of sensations making up a 
consciousness but an array of connected fields which make up a world. As 
well as being interconnected, these fields are grounded in my subjective body: 
where for the Empiricist, vision is a movement of light reaching my eyes, for 
embodied philosophy, it is constituted by our looking, by our moving around 
in the world which we see, rather than by a passive reception of data. 
So, although Merleau-Ponty very often takes vision as paradigmatic for 
perception, and offers primarily visual examples, it is clear that his under-
standing of seeing is a kind of ÔfeelingÕ of the world in a way which locates the 
seer in the world in her full bodiliness — the seer is always also a hearer and a 
toucher. Merleau-Ponty speaks in his later work of Ôvisual palpation,Õ and it is 
clear in The Visible and the Invisible that the developing ontology of flesh is 
grounded in the idea of a body-subject which depends on this perceptual 
faith in the aspects I have outlined — that its senses have a fundamental 
unity which corresponds to the unity of the world, that the senser is actually 
installed in that world and active within it, so that our motility, our moving 
around in the world, is as much a part of our vision as light or colour. 
Merleau-Ponty uses the famous example of one hand touching another to 
illustrate how the body can be both subject and object, first in Phenomenology 
of Perception, though he returns to the example in his later work. If I feel an 
object with my left hand, and then feel my left hand with my right hand, the 
hand exists both as subject and as object of tactile perception, and indeed, 
both hands and my whole tactile body are shown up as potentially both 
toucher and touched. For him, the tactile is a kind of Ôzero degreeÕ of the 
perspective given to me in vision, so just as I am both touchable and touched, 
I can in principle see what I touch and touch what I see — indeed, when 
sight offers objects that seem indeterminate or unsubstantial, the activity of 
perception is led quite soon to tactile investigation. 
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So there is a fundamental duality in the body-subject, but one in which the 
terms (object and subject, perception and action, material and mental) are 
brought together without reducing one to the other. At the point where the 
Cartesian perceptual doubt calls into question the veracity of the senses, as a 
result of DescartesÕ methodological concern to find a secure foundation on 
which to build, and in so doing tears the human subject asunder, Merleau-
PontyÕs perceptual faith re-installs the living body at the centre of philoso-
phy.  
 
  In the first part of this chapter, I have focused on expounding Merleau-
PontyÕs philosophy on the basis of the perceptual interrogations which are 
most basic to his thought, throughout the Phenomenology of Perception and 
beyond. In the latter part, I will bring Merleau-PontyÕs work more fully into 
dialogue with later thinkers, particularly Charles Taylor, Samuel Todes and 
David Morris, to expound an embodied philosophy which I take to be a 
development of Merleau-PontyÕs work, and of that stream of thought which 
found a crucial moment of its expression in his work and which continues to 
express itself and to refine its expression. I am not particularly concerned to 
ascertain whether Merleau-Ponty himself would have supported these devel-
opments, but rather to seek fidelity to the trajectory of the philosophy of 
flesh which speaks itself in his work, and for this reason will continue to 
return to his thought and to refer to him. In thus situating Merleau-PontyÕs 
thought and the trajectory of its developments by others after his death, I 
hope to prepare the way for further developments based on his account of 
perception and his later, more explicitly ontological, philosophy, in the 
second part of this thesis. 
 
Physicalist Cartesianism 
Speaking about the epistemological problem whose source is found in Des-
cartes, Charles Taylor notes that ÒDescartes is not in fashion these days. He 
is rejected as a dualist, as too rationalist, as clinging to an outmoded psychol-
ogy, and for many other reasons.Ó17 But despite this, the chasm between the 
inside and outside, between the human person and the world, is a structure 
which Ògoes on influencing much of our thought and other elements of our 
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culture, even though many of its elements are changed.Ó18 This structure, with 
which Taylor is concerned in epistemological terms, reaches much further 
than simply the domain of knowledge. Indeed, it is the centrality of this 
incommensurability of the subject with any object, and her radical removal 
from any worldly term, including her own body (which does not escape 
DescartesÕ radical doubt), which ensures the centrality of epistemology to 
contemporary philosophical projects. 
Physicalist philosophical perspectives, which have garnered favour among 
the advocates of a perspective closely aligned with the natural sciences, 
inherit this Cartesian dualism, and simply drop one side of it. So the impover-
ished view of matter which sees it simply as stuff with extension, with res 
extensa, is totalised — for the physicalist, this bare stuff is all there is. Of 
course, since the physicalist is also an embodied, thinking human subject, or, 
in other words, because the physicalist is both embedded in a physical situa-
tion and situates himself as a neutral observer of the situation, this point of 
view cannot be carried to its conclusion. In a long passage in which Merleau-
Ponty suggests a narrative of the historical encroachment of science and 
scientifically-minded philosophy into the human understanding of self and 
world, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
 
The whole concrete content of Ôpsychic statesÕ resulting, according to the laws of 
psychophysiology and psychology, from a universal determinism, was integrated 
into the in-itself. There was no longer any real for-itself other than the thought of 
the scientist which perceives the system and which alone ceases to occupy any 
place in it. Thus, while the living body became an exterior without interior, sub-
jectivity became an interior without exterior, an impartial spectator. The natural-
ism of science and the spiritualism of the universal constituting subject, to which 
reflection on science led, had this in common, that they levelled out experience: 
in face of the constituting I, the empirical selves are objects.19 
 
But if any physical effect must have a physical cause, then any ÔmentalÕ cau-
sation must really be, at bottom, physical. If thought is taken to be some-
thing categorically different from Ôbare stuff,Õ then it cannot as such cause 
anything physical, but must produce the illusion of doing so; it is simply 
epiphenomenal, a distraction from the real matter. It is clear that the Carte-
sian bias is here maintained, since the question of separating appearances 
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from realities remains foundational. This conception of the world derives 
ultimately from substance dualism. Substance, in the Cartesian sense, is what 
the physicalist refers to as matter. The physical is conceptualised on the 
model of the res extensa. Of course, the res cogitans is denied any separate 
reality; this seems to be nothing but a dualism which has sublated one of its 
terms, and it seems necessary to take up such a dualism to explain physical-
ism: all that is can be accounted for in terms of physics, including conscious-
ness (or subjectivity, thought, human persons). For Merleau-Ponty, Òthe living 
body, under these circumstances, could not escape the determinations which 
alone made the object into an object and without which it would have no 
place in the system of experience. {É] Thus, while the living body became an 
exterior without interior, subjectivity became an interior without exterior, an 
impartial spectator.Ó20 Reductive scientific perspectives hide deeply dualistic 
ontologies because lived experience offers not only things but selves, experi-
ence of our own subjectivity, as identified with, but not simply reducible to, 
our bodies. Continental philosophy has sometimes preferred to sublate the 
material term of the dualism — to deny bare stuff and think all of reality as a 
pure plane of thought. This ÔimmanentistÕ idealism falls foul of the same 
problem — it seeks to escape Cartesianism but ends up locked in a perverse 
modification of DescartesÕ problematic. 
All this is in a sense the result of the Cartesian cogito. For Merleau-Ponty, 
this movement of doubt has taken philosophy on the wrong course, and the 
remedy is in some ways an act of faith — La foie perceptive. As Taylor points 
out, the motive of the Cogito stems from the fact Òthat the foundationalist 
argument required the stabilisation of doubt in a clearly defined issue [i.e., 
the veracity of my perception and the ideas that derive from it]. We canÕt be 
left reeling under the cumulative effect of all the possible sources of error, 
where the ancients abandon us with the injunction to cease the fruitless quest 
for certain knowledge.Ó21 
DescartesÕ method of doubt leads him immediately, in the first meditation, 
to wonder if at any time he might be dreaming or, subsequently, subject to 
illusion. By proposing a purely intellectual doubt as his method, Descartes 
has already presupposed sum res cogitans; the divide between body and soul is 
present in incipient form at the very beginning of his philosophy. And there 
seems to be very little reason that can be given for this method of doubt. It is 
clear that this is a crucial moment in the divorce of philosophy from the 
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concerns of life, which sets philosophy for many centuries on a path of 
investigation that is blind to its own significance or relevance. In the hope of 
establishing knowledge in a kind of certainty which matches this purely 
intellectual conception of the subject, Descartes tells us that Òtoday I have 
expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged for myself a clear stretch of 
free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself sincerely and 
without reservation to the general demolition of my opinions.Ó22 Real life 
must not impinge on this project. But DescartesÕ failure to adequately estab-
lish knowledge against all possibility of doubt is well known. This alone might 
be enough to imply to us that knowledge is not in fact purely intellectual, and 
that abstracted from bodily life, intellectual knowledge amounts to nothing 
at all. 
For Taylor, DescartesÕ requirement for a manageable criterion for doubt, 
which arises at the birth of modern philosophy, is the source, ultimately, of 
the hard divide between the space of self-certifying thought, or reasons, and 
that of causes, of things, which is always subject to illusion. The soul/body 
divide, then, arises as an accident from methodological concerns. For him, 
Òwhat takes place is a kind of ontologizing of proper method.Ó23 Merleau-
PontyÕs re-reading of the Cogito, what he calls the tacit cogito, avoids this 
absolutising dualism. According to Taylor, the tacit cogito,  
 
that is, the fundamental dimension of our experience, which the cogito as explicit 
argument tries to articulate, is Ômyself experienced by myselfÕ [É] It is, indeed, in-
dependent of any particular thought, but it is also in its unformulated state not 
really a bit of knowledge. To become this, it must be put into words. [É] This pre-
dicament rules out absolute, that is, complete and self-evidently incorrigible 
knowledge. The nature of our opening to the world, of our contact with it, makes 
this impossible. But this contact also rules out total error. It can turn out that our 
grasp on things was wrong in this or that respect. Yet it cannot be entirely wrong, 
and for the same reason that it canÕt ever be guaranteed to be totally right. The in-
separability of inner and outer means that there is no realm of inner certainty, but 
it also means that perceiving, thinking, feeling cannot be totally severed from the 
reality it bears on.24 
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To get beyond the deep ontological divide, Taylor recognises, is to re-
engage with Òour bodily commerce with the world,Ó25 and to put this back at 
the centre of philosophy. But Taylor quite correctly observes that 
 
Our humanity also consists, however, in our ability to decenter ourselves from this 
original engaged mode; to learn to see things in a disengaged fashion, in universal 
terms, or from an alien point of view; to achieve, at least notionally, a Òview from 
nowhere.Ó Only we have to see that this disengaged mode is in an important sense 
derivative. The engaged one is prior and pervasive, as mentioned earlier. We al-
ways start off in it, and we always need it as the base from which we, from time to 
time, disengage.26 
 
As Taylor observes, the Cartesian dichotomy between what is perceived 
and what is thought is born in an attempt to find a sure epistemological 
foundation, on which certain knowledge can be built.27 But this notion that I 
can be sure of what I am thinking, whilst perception may always be subject to 
illusion, is wrong-headed. Perception is from the first only ever found to be 
illusory on the grounds of further perceptions, so its rejection as unreliable 
depends on the assumption that it is basically reliable. 
For Merleau-Ponty, this Cartesian hiatus between thoughts which are 
indubitably known and observations which must always be regarded as 
possibly illusory is responsible for the dualistic and atomistic tone of much 
contemporary thought, and the notion of sensation is one of its effects; such 
thought he refers to as ÔObjective Thought,Õ of which both Empiricism and 
Intellectualism are species.  
 
Objective Thought, as applied to the universe and not to phenomena, knows only 
alternative notions; starting from actual experience, it defines pure concepts which 
are mutually exclusive: the notion of extension, which is that of an absolute exter-
nality of one part to another and the notion of thought which is that of being 
wrapped up in himself; the notion of the vocal sign as a physical phenomenon ar-
bitrarily linked to certain thoughts, and that of meaning as a thought entirely clear 
to itself; the notion of cause as a determining factor external to its effect, and that 
of reason as a law of intrinsic constitution of the phenomenon. Now, as we have 
seen, the perception of our own body and the perception of external things pro-
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vide an example of non-positing consciousness, that is, of consciousness not in a 
possession of fully determinate objects, that of a logic lived through which cannot 
account for itself, and that of an immanent meaning which is not clear to itself and 
becomes fully aware of itself only through experiencing certain natural signs.28 
 
Though we have explained the perceptual faith in conceptual terms, I ar-
gue that the content of perceptual faith is not intellectual: it is not faith in the 
truth of a proposition or set of propositions. Although we can specify it in 
some ways, the perceptual faith has no creed. This is precisely why Descartes 
had to do away with the perceptual faith, which up until his time had been 
taken for granted: it could not offer intellectual grounds for the veracity of 
perception, and from the first moment Descartes had excluded all the aspects 
of life which could not be intellectually thematised, i.e. all that which is given 
to the embodied subject. 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
 
We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind ex-
press a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher Ñ the moment he 
opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-seated set of mute ÒopinionsÓ implicated in 
our lives.29 
 
The significance of the idea of ÔmuteÕ opinions is not that these opinions 
are unspoken; rather, it is because there is a sense in which these opinions are 
expressed, they are implicated in our lives, that there can be said to be a 
perceptual faith; there is no purely representational mental content for 
Merleau-Ponty. The perceptual faith, then, is not established by argument; 
rather it is the ground of the very possibility of argument in so far as the 
world we investigate, those with whom we might argue, and the language we 
use to do so are all inaccessible without it. It is a deeply-rooted aspect of our 
bodily engagement with the world. 
 
The Unity of Sens 
For Merleau-Ponty, to conceive of our perception as an aggregation of data 
from the various senses, so that the perceiver links the sound of a dropped 
glass shattering with its appearance, for example, in a perceptual judgement, 
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would be to make a similar mistake to that which Objective Thought makes 
when it thinks that perceptions of objects are built up from atomic sense-
data, from combining the individual patches of bright shininess into the 
visual perception of the broken glass. This is to fail to see that perception, 
grounded in embodied life, reveals to us a world in which the senses are given 
together, and in which the shards of glass look not only shiny but sharp, and 
almost weightless, and in which it is given in our perception of them that 
they would be painful if we stepped on them and should be avoided. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the unity of the senses is analogous to the unity of 
vision, which is itself given by two separate organs, the two eyes, yet is 
uncontroversially experienced as a single visual field. He gives an example in 
which if I look into the distance, something very close-up is seen double (for 
example, if whilst looking into the distance I lift my finger very close to one 
eye). If I shift my gaze to the close-up object, it comes into focus as a single 
object. But this is clearly not the operation of an intellectual judgement, since 
I can judge that there is only one finger there even when I see two. 
He says: — 
 
We pass from double vision to the single object, not through an inspection of the 
mind, but when the two eyes cease to function each on its own account and are 
used as a single organ by one single gaze. It is not the epistemological subject who 
brings about the synthesis, but the body.30 
 
In this example it is important to notice, too, that the focusing of the dou-
ble image into a single one has a deeper significance. In the diplopia, the 
juxtaposition of monocular images makes the thing look insubstantial as well 
as unclear. Though I see a rather indeterminate Ôsomething,Õ in a blurry way, 
when I lift my finger close to my eye, I also seem to see through it. When I 
bring it into focus, I perform a sort of prospective activity, and the Ôsome-
thingÕ is brought into focus as my finger. This bringing into focus is almost 
like the knowledge of the meno paradox — there is a perceptual ÔsomethingÕ 
which is ÔknownÕ indeterminately, which my further act of bringing it into 
focus aims at making determinate — though what is to be made determinate 
cannot be known prior to making it so. My perceptual act aims at something, 
though what that something is cannot be specified in advance. But despite 
this such perceptual acts can be fully satisfied — when I bring the blurry 
something into focus my perception reaches its goal, which was to reach 
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beyond the blur to the thing itself, to my finger. I achieve contact, it seems, 
with the real world. I donÕt simply line up or superimpose two competing 
images, but I proceed from these two monocular images to a grip on the 
thing itself. All this applies to the situation with the senses in general — their 
complex interplay is, in normal perception, prior to their analysis into indi-
vidual senses, although such analysis can be effected for a certain restrictive 
Ôanalytic attitude.Õ Merleau-Ponty writes of synaesthetic perception (that 
experience in which the visual is heard, the auditory felt, and so on) as the 
result of a psychological abnormality or as an effect of mescaline, saying, 
 
Synaesthetic perception is the rule, and we are unaware of it only because scien-
tific knowledge shifts the centre of gravity of experience, so that we have un-
learned how to see, hear, and generally speaking, feel, in order to deduce, from 
our bodily organization and the world as the physicist conceives it, what we are to 
see, hear, and feel.31 
 
Synaesthetic experience is a problem for the scientific attitude, which has 
to postulate some exception to the normal explanation of perception to 
account for it, whereas for his account of perception it is, in a sense, always 
already present. It is because we perceive things, and not simple sensations, 
that we can see the woolly-whiteness of the rug, hear the cold brittleness of 
the glass, and taste the warm redness of a wine. 
 
Imagination and Perception 
Samuel Todes, in his 1963 thesis published as Body and World, makes a simi-
lar argument for a new set of categories, and Todes puts his argument for-
ward in Kantian terms. For Todes, KantÕs valuable work in the Critique of  Pure 
Reason is fundamentally compromised by the problem that he ÔimaginizesÕ 
perception. Imagination, Todes observes, constitutes a world which is fun-
damentally dependent on, and wholly accessible to, the imaginer. Kant 
constructs his synthetic a priori in these terms, and as such the categories he 
offers are those of the faculty of imagination. This all fails to account for the 
human relation to the world in its deepest sense, since this relation depends 
not primarily on imaginative constitution but on perception. Unlike the 
imagined world, the perceived world is not perceived as dependent on the 
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faculty of perception; perception does not offer the world as fully disclosed or 
even as theoretically disclosable; we are subjects of a perceptual world in a 
very different way to that in which we are ÔsubjectsÕ of an imaginative world: 
perception assumes already that we are of one and the same ÔstuffÕ as the 
perceived world. Merleau-Ponty notes this in the observation that ÒCarte-
sianism, like Kantianism, would seem to have seen quite clearly that the 
problem of perception resides in its being an originating knowledge.Ó32 
For the Merleau-Ponty of The Structure of Behaviour, there is a certain in-
evitability of duality — not a substantial dualism, but a positional duality like 
that which Taylor observes in the human ability to remove oneself from 
situatedness in a certain sense, though this possibility depends on that 
situatedness. 
 
There is always a duality which reappears on one level or another: hunger or thirst 
prevents thought or feelings; the properly sexual dialectic ordinarily reveals itself 
through a passion; integration is never absolute and it always fails Ñ at a higher 
level in the writer, at a lower level in the aphasic. [É] But it is not a duality of sub-
stances; or in other words, the notions of soul and body must be relativized: there 
is the body as mass of chemical components in interaction, the body as dialectic 
of living being and its biological milieu, and the body as dialectic of social subject 
and his group; even all our habits are an impalpable body for the ego of each 
moment. Each of these degrees is soul with respect to the proceeding one, body 
with respect to the following one. The body in general is a set of paths already 
traced, of powers already constituted; the body is the acquired dialectical soil 
upon which a higher ÒformationÓ is accomplished, and the soul is the sense which 
is then established.33 
 
It seems that the fundamental duality may be expressed as that between 
nature and consciousness. This duality resists reification into a dualism of the 
Cartesian kind, or reductive resolution into an Empiricist or idealist monism, 
because I am, as an embodied being, already both of these things — both a 
conscious thing and a natural thing. So these two terms, ÔnatureÕ and Ôcon-
sciousness,Õ already describe not two opposites but two aspects of the kind of 
thing that I am. Not only this, but they also necessarily describe the kind of 
world in which I live, which is neither totally natural nor totally conscious, 
but always both of these things. The middle term between subject and world 
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in this ontology, the object, is the same — both natural and conscious, both 
material and mental, as a worldly thing and an object of my perception or 
knowledge and a more or less meaningful part of the human world. For 
Merleau-Ponty, Òthe whole question is ultimately one of understanding what, 
in ourselves and in the world, is the relation between significance and absence of 
significance.Ó34 For him, reality has a richly variegated texture with varying 
degrees of significance and insignificance, which are not grounded in the 
Sinngebung (sense-giving) of the self in a manner which attributes meaning in a 
ÔcentrifugalÕ manner purely to consciousness, nor are objects themselves, and 
the whole world, inherently sense-making. Rather, meaning and sense arise in 
the relationship of consciousness to the natural world, and such relationship 
is grounded, for the human being, in his natural and conscious body. For 
Merleau-Ponty, ÒWe say that events have a significance when they appear as 
the achievement or the expression of a single aim.Ó35 
In philosophyÕs misconstrual of the sense of things as that of an essential, 
simple unity or a pure plurality lies the inability of contemporary thought to 
think God beyond conception as a deterministic puppet-master on whom the 
sense of everything rests, or of human beings as a manifold of little such gods, 
organising the world in accord with the operation of their pure, individual 
wills in the absence of any such God, and so leading to interminable and 
inevitable conflict, as in the Hobbesian conception of man. As I attempt to 
show, Merleau-PontyÕs conception of a world open to sense-making but not 
without a fundamental sense opens the door to a logic of incarnation which 
does not reduce the created world to an idea whose workings can be read as a 
system of laws and boundary conditions, but takes seriously the embodiment 
of sense within non-sense and the recognition of an invisible logos of the visible. 
As such human beings are made free to make sense of the world in ways that 
may acknowledge the created world as the gift of God who is its source, but 
may also fail to do so. Merleau-PontyÕs conception of the world as variegated 
scene of sense and senselessness avoids kitsch utopianism on one hand, in 
which it must be asserted that all that is makes sense and is as things must be, 
and on the other a tragic nihilism which denies that there is any fundamental 
sense other than those fragments of sense which individual human beings 
make for themselves. 
Merleau-Ponty tells us that Òsignificance is revealed only if we look at 
[things] from a certain point of view, from a certain distance and in a certain 
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direction, in short only if we place, at the service of the spectacle, our collu-
sion with the world.Ó36And such Ôcollusion with the worldÕ is precisely our 
assumption (though perhaps not recognition) of a fundamental grounding of 
sense in our relationship to the world in which we live:  
 
There would in fact be no movement, and I should have no notion of it, if, in per-
ception, I did not leave the earth, as my ÔgroundÕ of all rest and motion on the 
hither side of rest and motion, because I inhabit it, and similarly there would be no 
direction without a being who inhabits the world and who, through the medium of 
his gaze, marks out the first direction as a basis for all others.37  
 
For Merleau-Ponty, then, the world, even the earth, is Òthe native abode of 
all rationality.Ó38 
In The Sense of Space, David Morris picks up on the complex interplay of 
meanings established by the polyvalence of the word sens in Merleau-PontyÕs 
French.39 In English, the word ÔsenseÕ already reflects a link between percep-
tual sensation and meaningful sense; the sense that language has is linked to 
the sense that perceptions have, and to perceive is always already to make 
sense of things. But the French sens captures these meanings as well as the 
notion of direction or orientation; a one-way street is signed Ôsens uni ue,Õ and 
Ô tre dans le au ais sensÕ is to be the wrong way round. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
sensitive body is the ground of sense, but this sense does not refer to the 
body alone but belongs to its directedness to the world. 
This duality is perhaps best thought of in terms of a depth of being — as 
the above quote from Lawlor and Toadvine shows, ÔbodyÕ and ÔsoulÕ may be 
relativised as terms whose meaning is, in a sense, Ôpositional.Õ Thought, in this 
conception, does not so much supervene on the physical as arise in its depths, 
and the two orders meet and form a continuum, but not one that can be 
meaningfully explicated in only one of its terms. The objective world, it is 
clear, is the ground of the subjective world. But it is also dependent on the 
subjective world — with no subjects, there are not things but just flux. 
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TaylorÕs exposition of HegelÕs philosophical position reveals a similar over-
coming of the subject/object dichotomy, which is also the man/nature di-
chotomy, and places this in continuity with romantic thought and with 
AristotleÕs understanding of man: 
 
Hegel restored the sense of the continuity of living things which was damaged by 
Cartesianism. But there is not just continuity between ourselves and animals; there 
is also continuity within ourselves between vital and mental functions, life and 
consciousness. On an expressivist view these cannot be separated out and attrib-
uted to two parts, or faculties, in man. Hegel agrees with Herder that we can never 
understand man as an animal with rationality added; on the contrary, he is a quite 
different kind of totality, in which the fact of reflective consciousness leaves noth-
ing else unaltered; the feelings, desires, even the instinct for self-preservation of a 
reflective being must be different from those of other animals, not to speak of his 
bearing, bodily structure, the ills he is subject to, and so on. There is no other way 
of looking at things for anyone who sees living beings as totalities.40 
 
So in Merleau-PontyÕs thought, as I read it, there remains a duality. A dual-
ism of substance it is not, but a mode of thinking which refuses to reduce the 
understanding of things to a single plane of thought. This approach stands in 
a tradition stemming from Aristotle, for whom the ontological duality is 
between Form and Matter, both of which are indispensable to the reality of 
any thing. This point of view is necessary from the standpoint of a philosophy 
which starts with consciousness. It is also necessary, as we will argue in 
chapter five, for a philosophy which starts with nature; and since philosophy 
must begin somewhere, duality is inevitable, and it is this duality which 
demands that we refuse any reduction to a pure monism. For Emmanuel 
Mounier, understanding the human person depends on this essential unity of 
the spiritual and the material in the human body:  
 
Man is a body in the same degree that he is a spirit, wholly body and wholly spirit. 
His most fundamental instincts, eating and reproduction, he has elaborated into 
the subtle arts of gastronomy and courtship.41 
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Nevertheless, in Merleau-PontyÕs early works, the spectre of dualism still 
looms large, and it is only as the fundamental intuitions progress through a 
certain dialectical development towards his later work that the full force of 
the insights already latent in them comes to expression. We will be pursuing 
that development throughout the final part of this thesis.  
The possibility of detachment, which Taylor, as we saw, recognises, and on 
which MounierÕs Ôsubtle artsÕ depend, is also recognised by Dreyfus in his 
introductory essay for TodesÕ Body and World.42 In this essay, Dreyfus recog-
nises in modern thought the same consequence as was suffered by Kant, of 
the covering-over of the centrality of the body in relating the objects of 
perception to the objects of conception, or, as Todes himself puts it, the 
ÔimaginizingÕ of perception: ÒMcDowell, like Kant, can conceive of only two 
alternatives: either perception is so radically nonconceptual as to be totally 
outside the space of reasons and therefore blind, or, if it is to enable us to 
form beliefs and make inferences, it must be as conceptual as thought it-
self.Ó43 In the end, in a philosophy that fails to correctly assess the necessity 
of the body for thought, the world must become either the blind workings of 
nature, or conscious through and through. Todes has shown, drawing on and 
developing the embodied philosophy he inherits from Merleau-Ponty, that 
objects of perception are a part of the world of the living and thinking body 
in everyday interaction, held in their orientation by the body as it holds itself 
in balance, and in significance by the bodyÕs poise to deal readily and thought-
fully with a continually changing situation, without being conceptually 
articulated or even entering reflective consciousness at all. Contra Descartes, 
almost all of what we think about we are unaware of thinking about, and we 
certainly do not think about riding a bike, cooking a meal or praying by 
formulating and manipulating concepts. A detached, spectatorial position can 
be achieved by the reflective consciousness, but this is not to be taken as 
paradigmatic for thought: it is, rather, a limit case. 
 
The Sens of Action 
On Merleau-PontyÕs analysis, as we will see, perception is always bound up 
with movement. Henri Maldiney, in an investigation of Merleau-PontyÕs 
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notion of flesh, sees in movement and perception Òone act and not two 
operations. ÔThe movement is not included in the perception as a condition-
ing factor: the perception is auto-movement.Õ The mutual imbrication of 
perception and of movement implies their Ôreciprocal dissimulation.ÕÓ44 And, 
referring to HusserlÕs famous example used to elucidate the notion of apper-
ception and the transcendence of the thing itself, he says 
 
Consisting of the simultaneity of its six sides, the cube Òitself,Ó always given in the 
sides and never seen altogether, is irreducible to all the perspectives on it. It is be-
yond all its profiles, transcending its mode of appearing; without this ÒbeyondÓ I 
would not be able to recognize it as an independent being; it would not be distin-
guished from a certain multiplicity of conscious lived experiences where it would 
figure as an index. It is therefore only for a gaze without viewpoint, Òfor an unsitu-
ated gaze, for an operation or an inspection of mind seating itself at the center of 
the cube, for a field of Being Ñ and everything one can say about the perspectives 
upon the cube do not concern it.Ó45  
 
Where for Husserl apperception gives an indication of the transcendence 
of the object — allows it to be given in a perspective as Ôthe thing itselfÕ — for 
Merleau-Ponty I am not a transcendental onlooker but a body in a fleshy 
world, and my perspective on the cube tells me as much about myself as 
about the cube, it confirms my inherence in the things, allowing it to be Òin-
itself-for-us,Ó46 as Dillon says. 
In The Incarnate Subject, a lecture course on Malebranche, Maine de Biran 
and Bergson, it becomes clear that Merleau-Ponty was profoundly influenced 
by BiranÕs work. 
 
Biran did not reduce consciousness to motility but he identified motility and con-
sciousness. The primitive fact is consciousness of an irreducible relationship be-
tween two terms irreducible themselves. It is not a consciousness becoming 
movement, but a consciousness reverberating in movements. It is neither an inte-
rior fact nor an exterior fact: it is the consciousness of self as relationship of the I to 
another term. Therefore it is not a question of an empirical philosophy which 
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would fill consciousness with muscular phenomena, but a philosophy which rec-
ognizes as fundamental a certain antithesis, the antithesis of the subject and of the 
term which bears its initiatives.47 
 
Movement and perception are contemporary with one another and neither 
grounds the other, it seems, for Merleau-Ponty. In these lectures Merleau-
Ponty cites BiranÕs work criticising Condillac, and his essentially Cartesian 
insistence on the priority of sensation. For Biran, sensation amounts to 
nothing if does not present any facts, and this is of course the motive for the 
notion of sensation, that it allows for and makes some sense of those cases in 
which what is sensed and what is later found to be the case do not coincide 
(i.e. cases of perceptual illusion). As Merleau-Ponty sees it, ÒBiran, for his 
part, starts with a thought, and in this sense he is Cartesian. [É] But begin-
ning with this notion of fact, his position deviates from DescartesÕ posi-
tion.Ó48 He cites Biran: 
 
There is a fact for us only to the degree that we have the feeling of our individual 
existence and the feeling of something, object or modification, which confirms this 
existence and is distinct or separated from it. Without this feeling of individual ex-
istence that we refer to in psychology as consciousness (conscium sui, compos 
sui), there is no fact that we can say is known, no knowledge of any sort: for a fact 
is nothing if it is not known, that is to say, if there is not an individual and perma-
nent subject who knows.49 
 
So perception, if it indeed offers facts, also refers strongly to its subject. For 
Biran and Merleau-Ponty, perception can no longer be seen as the causal 
chain which leads to a purely internal, mental event, a Ômental image,Õ which 
would seem to require an internal observer and lead to a chain of homunculi in 
an infinite regress. Neither is perception a fundamentally physical event 
which simply carries on a chain of physical causes and effects. Rather, per-
ception fundamentally refers to the perceiver, the subject of perception, as 
the subject of a world of which she is a part. There is Òa fact only for a wit-
ness,Ó Merleau-Ponty observes, and this consciousness is a Òfor-itself,Ó al-
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though for Merleau-Ponty this is Òa notion that Biran rediscovers free from 
any Hegelian influence,Ó50 which I take to mean that this consciousness is not 
at all a pure for-itself whose ipseity amounts to self-consciousness but rather a 
consciousness which is situated, which is becoming-conscious against a 
background which is biological, geographical, historical, social, and political. 
Any conscious fact, then, is a relationship rather than an event or a state. 
Again, Merleau-Ponty quotes Biran: 
 
Every fact implies necessarily within it a relationship between two terms or two 
elements which are thus given in connection, without any one of these terms be-
ing able to be conceived in itself separately. Thus the self can know itself only in 
an immediate relationship with some impression which modifies it, and, recipro-
cally, the object or whatever the mode can be conceived only under the relation-
ship to the subject which perceives or which feels. This is the origin of the very 
expressive title of primitive duality.51 
 
And for Merleau-Ponty, ÒThis duality is irreducible: Ôany evocation of the 
two elements to unity is absurd and implies a contradiction.ÕÓ52 That this is a 
move which Ôgets behindÕ the problems which we ascribe to the Cartesian 
paradigm to a way of thinking with ancient parallels may be seen in Maximus 
the Confessor: 
 
Every thought certainly expresses several or at least a duality of aspects, for it is an 
intermediary relationship between two extremes which joins together the thinker 
and the object thought of. Neither of the two can completely retain simplicity. For 
the thinker is a subject who bears the power of thinking in himself. And what is 
thought of is a subject as such or dwells in a subject, having inherent in it the ca-
pacity of being thought of, or else the essence whose faculty it is which formerly 
existed. For there is no being at all which is by itself a simple essence or thought to 
the extent of also being an undivided monad.53 
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For Samuel Todes, this reflects the classical conception, for which Òthe 
human subject had been regarded as moored in the world by his body. As a 
direct consequence of the cogito argument in which he discovered the con-
ceptual form of human necessity, Descartes cut this mooring.Ó54 
The body, then, is the principle that mediates this irreducible duality — it 
inhabits both the space of causes (in perceptive sensitivity) and of reasons (in 
active motility); it is both subject and object. These two realms can never be 
absolutely separated, precisely because the living body which we are com-
bines them and is our access to both of them. This will play out in Merleau-
PontyÕs account of perception and motility as fundamentally intertwined. As 
Stephen Priest puts it 
 
The central phenomenological ground for the rejection of the clear mental inte-
rior/physical exterior distinction is the postulation of the body-subject. Crucially, 
Òthe body of another, like my own, is not inhabited.Ó This is not just a repudiation 
of Cartesian mind-body dualism (though it is that) it is also the thesis that there is 
nothing mental that, so to speak, occupies the body. It is not as though finding out 
that and what other people think could take the form of making discoveries about 
a mind that is hidden inside a body, or hidden ÔbehindÕ the physical exterior of a 
body. 
  On the contrary, the body is a physical subject, that is, a psycho-physical whole 
that cannot be reduced to the mechanical object of materialist and behaviourist 
psychology, yet which does not resist this reduction through being ÔoccupiedÕ by a 
Cartesian consciousness.55 
 
Samuel Todes shows clearly the shortcoming of DescartesÕ method. With 
the procedure of radical doubt, he brought into question any belief that could 
be doubted, with the foundationalist motive to find a foundation for thought 
that is beyond doubt. He sought Òto discover that about the human subject 
which is required by the very attempt to reject it, and is thus invulnerable to 
the subjectÕs attempt to dispense with it intellectually.Ó56 The problem is that 
Descartes did not think to extend this procedure beyond beliefs; that is, he 
did not try to discover what else might be indispensable to the human sub-
jectÕs knowledge. ÒInstead, he concluded that whatever could be dispensed 
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with in a purely intellectual way was not philosophically necessary to the 
human subject, that it was not Ôof the essenceÕ of the human subject.Ó57 
Prior to doubt lies a perceptual faith, which crucially cannot be reduced to 
purely intellectual, conceptual content, but is rather already engaged with the 
world. This faith is not a faith in some specified conceptual content that 
resists doubt. Rather it is the Òwhat elseÓ to which Todes refers, the indis-
pensable ground of human knowledge which is not itself knowledge in the 
conceptual sense. At the very beginning of The Visible and the Invisible, Mer-
leau-Ponty offers a pointer to it, saying  
 
We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind ex-
press a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher Ñ the moment he 
opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-seated set of mute ÒopinionsÓ implicated in 
our lives.58 
 
As we have said, such a faith cannot be grounded on firm foundations, 
because it is itself the first ground of knowledge. Its necessity must refer not 
only to philosophy but to the philosopher himself, that is, in some sense, to 
life as it is lived. 
 
Conclusion 
If the body-subject is the central term for conceptualising subject and ob-
ject, and the relation between what I have called the Ôspace of causesÕ and 
that of reasons, how do we go about describing the body? Edith Stein, in the 
generation of phenomenologists before Merleau-PontyÕs, writes 
 
The distance of parts of my living body from me is completely incomparable with 
the distance of foreign physical bodies from me. The living body as a whole is at 
the zero point of orientation with all physical bodies outside of it. ÒBody spaceÓ 
[Leibraum] and Òouter spaceÓ are completely different from each other. Merely 
perceiving outwardly, I would not arrive at the living body, nor merely Òperceiving 
bodilyÓ  [leibwahrnehmend], at the outer world. But the living body is constituted 
in a two-fold manner as a sensed (bodily perceived) living body and as an out-
wardly perceived physical body of the outer world. And in this doubled givenness 
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it is experienced as the same. Therefore, it has a location in outer space and fills 
up a portion of this space.59 
 
The body which mediates to us the irreducible duality has its own duality 
which must be resolved in living itself. For Merleau-Ponty, one crucial 
element of this lies in the active nature of perception. Another line of inves-
tigation is that of the problem of depth. The perceptual faith which is impli-
cated in the notion of the body-subject grounds an existential conception of 
depth which may begin to help us to grapple with the question of what a 
body is. Merleau-Ponty explicates this in The Visible and the Invisible in a way 
that opposes it to the sceptical impulse. 
 
The illusion of illusions is to think now that to tell the truth we have never been 
certain of anything but our own acts, that from the beginning perception has been 
an inspection of the mind, and that reflection is only the perception returning to it-
self, the conversion from the knowing of the thing to a knowing of oneself of 
which the thing was made, the emergence of a ÒbindingÓ that was the bond itself. 
We think we prove this Cartesian Òspirituality,Ó this identity of space with the 
mind, by saying that it is obvious that the Òfar-offÓ object is far-off only by virtue of 
its relation with other objects Òfurther offÓ or Òless distantÓ Ñ which relation be-
longs properly to neither of them and is the immediate presence of the mind to all; 
the doctrine finally replaces our belongingness to the world with a view of the 
world from above.60 
 
This Ôview of the world from aboveÕ is precisely the view that cannot under-
stand things in their depth. In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty 
already anticipates this, drawing on his initial critique of the notion of sensa-
tion. For him, ÒTraditional ideas of perception are at one in denying that 
depth is visible.Ó61 For Berkeley, the problem is one of how depth could ever 
be given to a sight which depends on the flat projection of an image on the 
retina, and for analytical reflection, even if depth could appear, it would have 
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to be synthesised in a representation. ÒIn both cases depth is tacitly equated 
with breadt  seen rom t e side, and this is what makes it invisible.Ó62 So  
 
In order to treat depth as breadth viewed in profile, in order to arrive at a uniform 
space, the subject must leave his place, abandon his point of view on the world, 
and think himself into a sort of ubiquity. For God, who is everywhere, breadth is 
immediately equivalent to depth. Intellectualism and empiricism do not give us 
any account of the human experience of the world; they tell us what God might 
think about it.63 
 
The element of depth, which is fundamental to perception, begins to re-
veal the place of the body-subject. The body is, first of all, a kind of Ôzero 
pointÕ of the dimension of depth in which the world is revealed to us. Rather 
than as constituting an absolute divide between ÔinnerÕ and ÔouterÕ at the 
(underspecified) point of interaction between the body and the mind in the 
Cartesian paradigm, the body locates the human subject in the world at the 
nearest limit of the dimension of depth. My body locates me amongst things, 
and persons, in the world. ÒDepth is born beneath my gaze because the latter 
tries to see somet ing.Ó64 
It is striking that in Merleau-PontyÕs work on the senses he is satisfied to 
focus for the most part on sight, whilst showing how sight is closely con-
nected to touch. He rarely speaks of hearing, or of those most concrete 
senses of smell and taste. Indeed, a phenomenology of taste, even of eating, 
seems like it would provide great insight into the ontology of the body-
subject and his relation with the world. 
  There seem to be two points to be made here which arise as conse-
quences of the understanding of perception we have outlined. The first is 
that, just as what can be seen can be also be heard and touched, so it can in 
principle be eaten. ManÕs relationship with the world around him is not that 
of a passive spectator, Merleau-Ponty has shown us that it is one of active 
engagement with the world. But it is not only that — man is a hungry being, 
dependent, like the animals, on his natural environment for food, but also 
able much more radically than they to order his world toward the meeting of 
his hunger, and the hunger of others. Man is in fundamental interchange with 
the world, not just situated in it, not even just having a fundamental likeness 
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to it, but actually composed of it, and without the right kind of food he 
wastes away. 
  Secondly, this hungry being is also an endangered being — ust as to see is 
to be capable of being seen, so it must be that to eat is to be edible. The 
human being knows himself as dependent on his body for his life. hat else 
can be the significance of the fact that a body can be eaten  ell, it would 
seem that an element of normativity found in perception would come into 
play here — my own body and human bodies generally are not usually seen as 
potential food, and to see them as such would seem to be to fail to achieve a 
proper focus on them, to fail to see them as lives. 
The life of conscious bodily experience co-ordinates phenomena into a 
world in perception and action, or absorbed coping. This function of the 
body in many ways finds its epitome in the experience of eating, by which I 
mean not simply the moment of consumption but the whole set of human 
action implicated in that moment — from working the land, hunting, forag-
ing, trading, preparing, cooking, serving, tasting, digesting, and dealing with 
the resultant waste, and all of these in their complex and varied social impli-
cations. ating is intertwined in a dense complex of pro ects grounded in the 
lived body, and attention to these may help us to return attention to life as 
the interdependence of humanity and the natural world. Such relationship 
raises uestion about appetite, hunger and the nature of desire, to which we 
turn in the next chapter. 
I have argued here that Merleau-PontyÕs account of perception grounds an 
ontology which overcomes the analysis of being offered by DescartesÕ dual-
ism. This ontology holds together mind and body, and thought and matter, 
attempting to understand them on their own terms, not reducing one to the 
other, but neither fully divorcing them from one another nor making them 
radically incommensurable. This holding-together is possible precisely 
because of the centrality of the sentient, moving human body to our under-
standing, and it is as such the embodied human person who provides the 
epistemological grounds and ontological example for understanding the 
world. This attempt to overcome the traditional philosophical analysis that 
still holds so much sway makes room for a richer account of perception, to be 
developed in the next chapter. Both the negative moment (undermining 
Cartesian dualism) and the positive (laying out a constructive account of what 
there is which reconnects perception to movement and mind to matter by 
taking the body as its central term) serve to modify our conception of the 
person, and his relationship to the world of nature. Man is, by this account, 
that part of nature which most strongly displays the characteristic of lability; 
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that is, it is powerful to mould and re-shape itself and its surroundings, which 
re-shaping is always sensitive to those surroundings, but it is not strictly 
determined by them. Man is, then, naturally free, and this freedom cannot be 
understood purely in terms of the workings of nature. 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
ÔTaste and SeeÉÕ 
Eating as Perception 
 
 
 
Appetite or desire, not DNA, is the deepest principle of 
life.1 
 
 
 
n the previous chapter, I argued for an embodied account of perception 
on the basis of Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy, paying particular attention 
to the Phenomenology of Perception. In this chapter I seek to locate 
Merleau-PontyÕs account of perception in its relation to the history of phi-
losophy and to deepen our understanding of the imbrication of the senses in 
our bodily unity and dependence through an account of eating, which, as a 
central thread of human life, but one which is sometimes taken for granted in 
thought, has formed a kind of hidden, subterranean theme for philosophy. 
 
Hunger, Appetite and Imagination 
We begin our analysis of eating with an investigation into its natural pre-
liminary, hunger. I will argue here that hunger is a significant meeting-point 
of nature and culture, of thought and matter, which helps to show us what 
sort of thing a body is, and what sort of thing a person is, as well as giving us 
insight into the nature of desire and human need, of knowledge, of what kind 
of nature human persons may be thought to have, and of what human good-
ness consists in. As Raymond Tallis observes, where life is a complex and 
highly ordered state in any individual case, it must always be snatched from 
the clutches of the second law of thermodynamics: 
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At the root of hunger is the fact that living organisms are very highly ordered sys-
tems and are, consequently, improbable. They have what the physicist and 
prophet of molecular biology Erwin Schrdinger called Ònegative entropy.Ó They 
are intrinsically unstable. Their endurance, unlike that of a rock, consequently has 
to be earned: their order has to be actively maintained.2 
 
Appetite is the mechanism by which individual living things are driven to 
obtain the materials necessary for their growth and preservation. Rocks do 
not have appetites of any kind; their existence, and their Ôorder,Õ if they may 
be said to have any, is entirely the result of external forces. In the case of 
plants, very simple nutritive functions are at work. They draw nutrition from 
the soil from which they grow, without being conscious of doing so, but 
nevertheless they function in such a way as to draw out of the soil and air that 
which they need to survive, as well as drawing on the sunÕs energy for the 
necessary transformations of the raw materials of the soil and air into sugars. 
Clearly, their nutrition comes from their own work on inorganic raw materi-
als. Although plants do not have appetites properly speaking, they do have 
functions which govern how much of any given nutrient is assimilated or 
rejected, and so on. Animals do have appetites, which prompt them to find 
something to feed on, and to eat that which they are equipped to digest and 
ignore (for the most part) that which is inedible for them. Unlike plants, 
animals do not take nutrition at all times that their environment makes it 
available, and it is appetite which prompts them to return to the task of 
eating after any period of rest. 
The case is obviously somewhat different for human beings. Tallis notes 
that Òobservation of animal feeding makes it reasonable to suspect that 
human beings are the only animals who truly relish their food, although non-
human animals may feel the brief pleasure that comes from the relief of 
hunger.Ó3 A great difference lies in the fact that, for human beings, the 
greater part of their time is not taken up with eating, and indeed, ÒJust how 
far human eating is from animal feeding is illustrated by the way meals are 
often connected with breaks in work: the time and duration of meal breaks 
are the result of minute and protracted negotiations. In animals, the gather-
ing and eating of food is the work. Indeed, work is not a separate part of 
life.Ó4 There is a distinction between the production and the consumption of 
                                                
2 Raymond Tallis, Hunger (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2008), 10. 
3 Tallis, Hunger, 37. 
4 Tallis, Hunger, 22. 
50 Part One: Perception 
the food that assuages appetite in human beings which is simply not present 
amongst animals. This gap, I hope to show, is the source of our distinction 
between the pleasant and the good, amongst other things. 
 
ÒI think,Ó said the Major, taking his pipe from his mouth Òthat desire is the most 
wonderful thing in life. Anyone who can really feel it is a king and I envy nobody 
else!Ó He put back his pipe. 
ÒBut Charles!Ó she cried, ÒEvery common low man in Halifax feels nothing else!Ó 
He again took his pipe from his mouth.  
ÒThatÕs merely appetite,Ó he said.5 
 
For LawrenceÕs Major, there is a difference between ÔmereÕ appetite and 
desire properly speaking. Appetite, we may assume, is common to many 
kinds of animals and is a biological stimulus to eat which provides the animal 
with sufficient nutrition to continue its existence. uman desire is not such a 
simple biological process. If there is anything in human life that cannot be 
accounted for in purely material terms, desire must surely constitute an 
element of it. Desire is perhaps that felt gap between the situation I am in 
and a situation I would like to be in, hope to be in, and will attempt, unless 
some condition prevents it, to attain. 
For Spino a, Òthere is no difference between appetite and Desire except 
that desire is usually related to men in so far as they are conscious of their 
appetite. Therefore it can be defined as follows: desire is Ôappetite accompa-
nied by the consciousness thereof.ÕÓ6 Spino a is of course correct about this, 
but he minimises the significance of the making-conscious of appetite, so 
that he can say Ôthere is no differenceÕ but for this difference, suggesting that 
the consciousness makes no real difference. Indeed, in the definition of 
desire at the end of Part II of the Ethics, he proposes the following defini-
tion: ÒDesire is the very essence of man in so far as his essence is conceived as 
determined to any action from any given affection of itself.Ó In the explica-
tion of this definition, he relates this to the statement that Òappetite is the 
very essence of man in so far as his essence is determined to such actions as 
contribute to his preservation.Ó7 For Spino a, then, desire and appetite both 
constitute the essence of man; the idea of desire reflects the notion that what 
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is desired is determined by the manÕs affection. To understand SpinozaÕs use 
of the term ÔaffectÕ correctly, we must understand that what is ÔaffectedÕ is the 
shape taken on by a thing, the form in which it appears; desire, then, pro-
ceeds from a man as a particular form of his essence, which is to be a desir-
ing-thing. But the fact that this is the same as appetite for Spinoza shows 
that he does not consider the particular form desires take to be uncaused, 
desire does not Ôproceed fromÕ a man as a result of his whim, but rather is 
determined by his conatus, by his drive to preserve himself and increase his 
power. Claiming that appetite and desire are the same thing is consonant 
with SpinozaÕs system, which sees manÕs appetites as essentially determined. 
 
Desire is the very essence, or nature, of each individual in so far as that is con-
ceived as determined by some given state of its constitution to do something. 
Therefore according as each individual is affected from external causes with vari-
ous kinds of pleasure, pain, love, hate, etc., that is, according as his nature is con-
ditioned in various ways, so must his desire be of different kinds; and the nature of 
one desire must differ from the nature of another to the same extent as the emo-
tions, from which each single desire arises, differ amongst themselves.8 
 
In the case of animal hunger, SpinozaÕs account would seem to hold true, at 
least in outline: the animal desires to eat, and it desires to eat that which it 
requires to survive and to grow: the cow and the sheep to eat grass, the calf 
and the lamb to drink milk, and so on. This is also partly true of the human 
infant. Augustine writes of himself in this state, ÒYou granted me not to wish 
for more than you were giving, and to my nurses the desire to give me what 
you gave them.Ó9 But a long tradition has thought of mature human eating as 
somewhat different to that of animals. Jean-Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, the 
nineteenth-century French gastronome, begins his 1825 book La Physiologie du 
Got, with a series of aphorisms which are instructive here: 
 
I. The world is nothing without life, and all that lives takes nourishment. 
II. Animals feed: man eats: only the man of intellect knows how to eat. 
III. The fate of the nations depends on the way they eat.10  
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We must ask whether, if man is a natural thing, man must have a nature. 
For Aristotle, man, like everything else, has a telos, a goal, an end.  ManÕs end 
is eudaimonia, human flourishing, which is to be rational. But this is not the 
rationality of modern rationalists. Rather, it is the ordering of human life that 
most enables human life to flourish. But then, if flourishing is acting ration-
ally, and acting rationally is acting in such a way as to enable human flourish-
ing, what is the content of either? 
By contrast, for Sartre and modern existentialism, there is no human na-
ture. Our existence precedes our essence; the only human fact is that we must 
choose how to live, and there are no pre-existing criteria for our choice. 
But there is another human fact, one that transgresses the normal terms of 
philosophical inquiry. I am hungry. And what I really want to eat is a plate of 
sausages with mashed potatoes, with a thick onion gravy. That I must eat to 
live is an animal fact. My desire for some food is reducible to physical facts. 
But my desire for sausage and mash surely is more than an animal fact; it rests 
upon culture, geography, agriculture, and my personal tastes, as well as a 
certain kind of whim. Is it in my nature to desire sausage and mash? This 
seems unlikely since it is dependent on so many ÔenvironmentalÕ factors. Is 
my hunger for sausage and mash the result of my absolute freedom? This also 
seems implausible, since the hunger is driven in part by my bodily need. 
Man is a natural thing, an appetitive animal, but he also shapes nature; his 
desire is not only to fill his belly, to survive, but is also hunger for particular 
things, and of course men hunger not only for food but for so much more: for 
relationship with others, for sex, for beauty, for meaning, for God. His 
difference from the purely natural is embodied in the difference between 
appetite and desire, between a particular body and an undistinguished mass 
of stuff. The difference, it seems to me, is thought. It is manÕs nature to think, 
but how he will think is not determined by nature; rather, how he thinks 
determines nature. His patterns of thought shape his relationship to the 
world, though they are not strictly determinative of that relationship, which 
depends on features of the world as well as his own features. 
ManÕs essence is to think, and in so doing to shape himself and all of na-
ture, but what and how he thinks are not given by nature. Nevertheless, some 
patterns of thought (we often call them addictions) are destructive of manÕs 
life and diminish his capacity to think and the efficacy of that thought in 
shaping nature and his relationship to it. Other thoughts add to his ability to 
live, enrich his relationship to nature and stimulate further thoughts. 
2: Eating as Perception 53 
Both Aristotle and Sartre were right, in a sense: man has a nature, which he 
is continually making. Man is that part of nature which is self-shaping, which, 
in David MorrisÕ terminology, is labile. What kind of nature, then, must man 
make for himself? Note the question is ambiguous, and this indicates a 
broadening of the philosophical question. No longer may we ask: Does man 
have a nature? And if so, what is that nature? Rather, we ask: What part of 
nature is man? And what kind of nature should he make? Man depends on 
creation, but creation also depends on man.  
Eating amongst humans, then, differs to animal eating. Firstly, it Òowes as 
much to culture as it does to biology.Ó11 The case for human appetite is more 
complicated than that of the lamb or the cow, for humans are omnivorous 
and can eat many different things; a choice of what to eat must be made, 
subject to the constraints of what is available, what is preferred, and what is 
nutritious. This element of decision, as well as the fact that man, as Marx and 
Engels said, produces the means of his own subsistence, and so must choose 
what and where to farm, makes Gastronomy both possible and necessary, and 
so forges the distinction between animal feeding and human eating. 
Spinoza goes on to argue that Òa passive emotion ceases to be a passive 
emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it,Ó12 suggesting that 
when purely physical appetite is transformed, in man, to the conscious state 
of desire which I will call Ôhunger,Õ it does not remain unchanged. Human 
hunger is not a state that leads its subject to take food in any way possible; it 
is not simply the demand for nutrition. Rather, it lies at the core, I want to 
suggest, of what makes human beings human, and is related to the distinction 
between animal feeding and eating proper, which finds its highest expression 
in dining. Unlike the animal, for whom the specifics of eating are fixed by its 
nature, for human beings hunger can be satisfied in a plethora of ways. It is 
for this reason that we may speak of many and varied human ÔhungersÕ: to be 
sure, any human being who is without food will hunger for food. But food is 
not all he hungers for, and indeed hunger is in this sense open-ended. I 
hunger for recognition, for the esteem of others, for experience which 
transcends the ordinary, and may develop hungers for all manner of things. 
Hunger is the gap, as it were, between what and where I am and what and 
where I would like to be, and so my hunger operates within the full range of 
human possibility. Its limit is not fixed by nature but by imagination. For 
Tim Gorringe Òdesire, in our analysis, may be defined as imaginative work on 
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appetite, including the appetite for knowledge.Ó13 What Gorringe calls desire 
here is what I am calling hunger, and the use of ÔhungerÕ is important because 
it captures the thought that, although hunger is not determined by nature in 
the way that appetite is (it opens onto endless possibilities), it is nonetheless 
stimulated by a fundamental bodily need. ÔDesireÕ might be imagined to be 
the operation of a pure will, but hunger, whilst not determined, is neither 
completely voluntary. Gorringe goes on, ÒIt [desire] begins, as both Plato and 
Aristotle did, with appetites, which accounts for the energy of desire, but it 
recognises that all desire is culturally constructed, or, in my terms, is shaped 
by the imagination our culture makes possible.Ó14 
Spinoza, of course, might be thought to remain too Cartesian, accepting 
DescartesÕ division of the human being into body and soul, mind and matter, 
resolving this dualism into a monism by calling thought and matter two 
attributes of the one substance. In so doing he inverts the Cartesian picture, 
according to which the soul, which is the seat of reason, is thought of in 
terms of a pure and voluntaristic will, whose ÔdesiresÕ are free-floating, and 
must be asserted to govern animal appetites. In Spinoza there is no (or 
minimal) difference between the two. The Cartesian picture is, for the most 
part, consonant with that given by Plato, in which the rational soul is the 
essential man, and the appetites simply a temporary encumbrance of bodily 
life. 
Lisa Heldke, commenting on The Republic, writes: ÒBy carving the soul into 
reason, spirit, and appetite, Plato separates reason from all other faculties. 
And in elevating reason above the others, he makes it alone the proper 
governor of the soul. He terms bodily appetites unreasonable, and regards 
them as things to be controlled by reason.Ó15 The confusion here over 
whether appetite is a function of the body or the soul is a symptom of the 
problems with a simple dualism, and reflects the fact that hunger is always, in 
the human being, a mediation between the body and thought, and so often 
slips between the two in dualistic accounts. Plato explicitly makes the soul 
isomorphic with his ideal republic, in which reason and the philosopher-kings 
rule over the appetites and those whose work is to satisfy the appetites. This 
division may be the source of PlatoÕs proto-Puritanism, in which the demands 
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of the body are thought to contribute nothing to the formation of the mind, 
and the pleasant is thought to have nothing to do with the good. This con-
ception of the human being and of social organisation depends on agriculture 
and the division of labour in the city; for the foraging, hunter-gatherer man 
no such distinction between the pleasant and the good could hold. Plato, of 
course, also famously defines desire as a lack of the desired object. In the 
Philebus he makes this argument on the basis of the examples of thirst and 
hunger, which are clearly expressions of a lack of something (food and drink). 
But this is not all they are, and indeed the difference between the two may 
help to demonstrate this. Extreme thirst always prompts us most urgently to 
drink water, which is always what thirst lacks. There is not usually a strong 
imperative to choose what to drink. If I choose to drink other drinks, either 
it is not mainly to assuage thirst, or it is to deliver the needed substance, 
water, along with some other substances (sugars, salts, etc.) But the case with 
hunger is not the same. There is no basic food which hunger demands in the 
same way that thirst is for lack of water. I must eat a variety of things to 
achieve the best possible nutrition, and though hunger may drive me to 
certain kinds of foods (salty or sweet or fatty ones, most commonly), it also 
creates the conditions under which I may eat not to meet a specific lack, but 
rather according to my imagination and fancies. What I have called appetite 
is of course, a lack. And there is no hunger without appetite. But hunger itself 
is, in everyday experience, not only felt as lack, but as possibility; I can eat a 
whole range of things, and indeed hunger prompts me to do so. I eat not only 
what I lack, but also what I like, and the huge amount of human ingenuity 
which is invested in food preparation is not only to meet the lack expressed 
by appetite but to meet our hungers for food which stimulates, nourishes, 
and entertains. 
For Leon Kass, in his book The Hungry Soul, 
 
Lack, experienced as desire, is the spur to all aspiration, to action and awareness, 
to having a life at all. Bodies as incorruptible as diamonds, or bodies lacking in 
nothing beyond themselves, would have no impulse or orientation toward the 
world beyond their borders. Waste makes need, and need makes for everything 
higher than need. Here, in the germ of hunger, is the origin of all the appetites of 
the hungry soul.16  
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Timothy Gorringe cites Sebastian Moore, commenting on AquinasÕ syn-
thesis of the accounts of desire given by Aristotle, Augustine and the Neopla-
tonists: 
 
  Sebastian Moore puts this tradition into contemporary terms in defining desire as 
Ôwhat I really want and have always wantedÉ to be more and more myself in the 
mystery in which I amÉ Desire is love trying to happenÉ It draws into its fulfill-
ing meaning all the appetites of our physical being.Õ Agreeing with Aquinas that 
true desire always issues in union, he argues that its real opposite is egoism. ÔIt is 
because we do not understand desire but equate it with egoism, that we see the 
cross of Jesus as opposed to it. Real desire is what the cross empowers, bringing us 
to the death that its liberation entails. The death is the death of our present ego, 
whose perpetuation is the work of egoism posing as desire.Õ17 
 
This egoism is fundamental to SpinozaÕs account, and it is the fact that 
there is no possibility for overcoming the individual conatus which prevents 
him from allowing for an account of desire which moves beyond the realm of 
the quantitative, which always seeks an increase of power, to the qualitative, 
which opens on the realm of imaginative possibility rather than determined 
need. Such would require us to pass through death (figuratively speaking), to 
relinquish our desire for an increase in power, which Spinoza will not counte-
nance. This opening onto imaginative possibility, which I have argued is a 
part of human hunger properly understood, makes human life a part of nature 
which is not purely determined by nature but is determinative of nature. We 
develop cultures of eating and farming which allow the conscious shaping of 
hungers to be sedimented in unconscious structures of habit in ways that can 
be both positive and negative. The core of this conscious shaping which is 
determinative of unconscious life can be observed in a common (though not 
everyday) experience of human eating: taste can be educated, so that we may 
eat and come to enjoy things which cannot be enjoyed on first bite; we can 
have Ôacquired tastes.Õ In her Making Sense of Taste, Carolyn Korsmeyer argues 
 
The ability to educate oneÕs palate is an almost uniquely human trait. [She cites 
Brillat-SavarinÕs dictum that animals feed, but only man eats, and can dine.] Hu-
                                                
17 Gorringe, The Education of Desire, 89, citing Sebastian Moore, Jesus the Liberator of Desire 
(New York: Crossroad, 1989), 93. 
2: Eating as Perception 57 
mans are distinctive in their cultivation of taste sensations that on first experience 
are unpleasant or irritating, such as those delivered by chilli peppers.18 
 
Clearly such eating habits cannot be acquired as the result of a simple lack  
nor is the appetite that drives me to eat chillies for the first time a simple 
desire for pleasure. Rather, this hunger is a hunger for a different, more 
sophisticated hunger, a hunger for participation in a food culture and a 
gastronomic e perience that can only be achieved by the education of my 
tastes. or rringe, 
 
All high cultures recognize that the non-divine imagination needs training and ex-
ercise. This work is called education, and this introduces the normative dimension 
of desire which Plato sets out in the Symposium, and Augustine in the Confessions. 
God, or the true, good and beautiful, is what desire strains towards. Education is 
the recognition that the imagination only flourishes when it is trained, pruned, dis-
ciplined, and that it requires goals. All human cultures rest on an education of de-
sire in this sense. Jesus speaks of it as discipleship. He calls people to be disciples, 
which is to say to learn discipline. He is engaged in an education of desire.19 
 
ur conscious or imaginative relationship to our appetites leads us on from 
the appetite which leads us to fill our bellies to the general structures of 
desire which constitute our human world. or Tallis, 
 
It is because we are self-conscious that we live in, and in relation to, a world Ñ a 
human and natural world had in common Ñ and have a sense of our life course. 
Here our hungers breed and mutiply and proliferate and give rise to the dreams 
and longings that consume us. Our hungers, then, are rooted in mystery. Hunger is 
the paramount expression of the mysterious burden (or gift) of consciousness and 
the even more mysterious burden (or gift) of human consciousness.20 
 
He argues in this book that the satiety of basic human appetites opens us 
to hunger in a broader sense. But this desire remains hunger since it is driven, 
at some level, by human needs, worked and shaped by conscious life. Tallis 
speaks of the Ôsecond hunger,Õ the hunger that drives hedonism, as derived 
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from a Ôhunger for hungerÕ which arises when primary hungers, what I have 
called appetites, are met. This, it seems, is a specifically human phenomenon. 
To have enough to meet my need is somehow not enough. We cultivate new 
hungers to drive us, ÔwantsÕ which far exceed our needs. This hunger for 
enjoyment, for diversion, is a result of the interplay of appetite and imagina-
tion in human beings, a result of our being thinking and bodily things. This of 
course demands that we attend not only to our desires but also to their 
effects: are the things we hunger for giving us the things we really hunger for, 
and what is the difference? How can we tell? In a brief attempt to justify his 
project, Tallis writes: ÒMaking human hunger less obvious than it seems and 
following its metamorphoses in those who live above subsistence level seems 
justified if it promotes the kind of reflection that could slow the bonfire of 
consumption that occupies us for most of our waking hours.Ó21 And it would 
seem that ultimately philosophy may constitute an extension of our Ôimagina-
tive work on appetite,Õ asking whether what we seem to hunger for is what we 
really hunger for. 
 
Hungers, we have said, are Ôimaginative work on appetites.Õ It seems, 
though, that we can reflect on our hungers and find that we have hungered 
for the wrong things; what we hunger for does not ultimately satisfy. The 
conscious development of appetite constituted by hunger, though it frees us 
from the purely determined patterns of eating characteristic of animals, 
remains tethered to a biological and ecological reality, and this despite the 
fact that our investigation of hunger has suggested that there is no simple 
ÔrightÕ object of hunger.  
If we understand hunger as an intentional state, then we must say that 
when we receive what we hunger for, that hunger is satisfied. But perhaps the 
underlying appetite is not satisfied. This is not to suggest that human hungers 
are superfluous, and the important thing is to meet human appetites, to 
provide as many people as possible with the means to subsistence. Rather, it 
is to say that the expression of the essentially human lies in the cultivation 
and satisfaction of hungers that go beyond the essential — the development 
of art, love, politics, culture, philosophy, and so on. But for these hungers to 
be satisfied for anything more than a brief moment, their satisfaction must be 
compatible with the satisfaction of our fundamental appetites. So we must 
allow that the Ôimaginative work on appetiteÕ that constitutes true hunger can 
operate in such a way that the hunger is no longer truly in accord with the 
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appetite it develops; where our ÔrationalÕ appetites lead us to eat, for the most 
part, what is good for us, in the context of a food culture which is breaking 
down, our choices are driven by a culture which is orientated towards the 
hunger not only of some individuals for profit, but also the pathological 
hunger built into the economic system, the system which we have developed 
for the meeting of hungers, for the pure increase of profit, rather than my 
own appetite for nutrition, in such a way that I end up hungering for (and 
eating) food which does not nutrify me, which makes me unwell. 
The human situation, in which appetites are imaginatively developed into 
hungers, leads to a further appetitive dysfunction: unlike the animals, whose 
appetites are simple and strongly related to a set of environmental sources of 
their fulfilment, the human being is not tightly integrated into a natural 
situation which provides the means for his desires to be met; as we have said, 
following Marx and Engels, humanity produces the means of its own subsis-
tence, and can hunger for all kinds of possibilities which are not easily actual-
ised. Very commonly, one human beingÕs various hungers are disparate and 
conflicting, and he is neither able to satisfy them all nor to resolve them. 
Augustine identifies this in writing of his situation as an adolescent: ÒYou 
gathered me together from the state of disintegration in which I had been 
fruitlessly divided. I turned from unity in you to be lost in multiplicity.Ó22 For 
Augustine, of course, the true object of our desires is God, so he writes later 
of his time as a student ÒMy hunger was internal, deprived of inward food, 
that is of you yourself, my God. But that was not the kind of hunger I felt. I 
was without any desire for incorruptible nourishment, not because I was 
replete with it, but the emptier I was, the more unappetizing such food 
became. So my soul was in rotten health.Ó23 
AugustineÕs thought highlights a problem with the thought that there is a 
difference between what we think we hunger for and what we truly hunger 
for: How should we tell? How can we know the difference between what we 
want and what is truly good for us, the true object of our distorted hungers? 
Can this come only after a kind of religious conversion, or from the perspec-
tive an individual has on their life in their old age? 
We turn, then, to an investigation of the matter of taste and human knowl-
edge, before we go on to probe further the question of whether there is a 
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a Ôhuman natureÕ and finally to ask whether the idea of food that is good for 
us might tell us anything about what is good in a more general sense. 
 
Taste and Perception 
As we come to the question of taste, we must note that, despite there be-
ing a dearth of philosophical material dealing with the sense of taste properly 
speaking, philosophical aesthetics has long made use of the word ÔtasteÕ to 
refer to something rather different: — a sensibility with regards to aesthetic 
experiences which cannot reasonably be called into question on philosophical 
grounds. It is on the basis of this metaphorical use of the word taste that it is 
said that de gustibus non disputandam est. 
Taste, for ume, is the aesthetic variant of opinion, which arises from 
sentiment. So he writes, in his essay ÒOf the Standard of Taste,Ó 
 
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which con-
templates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may 
even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual 
ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of 
others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to 
pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to the disposition of 
the organs, the same object may be both sweet and bitter; and the proverb has 
justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes.24 
 
For ume, then, taste is a matter of sentiment, in regards to aesthetic 
objects just as much as to food. It is clear that there is much agreement on 
what is sweet and what is bitter, and that we would normally think that sugar 
really is sweet and quinine really is bitter, though our preferences for them 
may vary. ume goes on to acknowledge that many matters of ÔtasteÕ do not 
really allow of disagreement. evertheless, he maintains that since there is no 
accessible standard or measure against which tastes are to be compared, they 
are a matter of sentiment alone, and he holds that the same is true for moral-
ity. Any broad agreement is down to uniformity of sentiment, not to the 
existence of an external standard. 
umeÕs use of the term comes within the context of the emergence of 
aesthetics as a distinct philosophical discipline in eighteenth-century Europe, 
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in which this source of judgments about beauty is not always considered to be 
purely sentimental; Taste is Òconceived as a sensitivity to fine distinctions 
and an ability to discern beautyÓ25 and as such Ògood tasteÓ could be the 
ability to see real beauty for some thinkers. 
This difference over whether or not matters of taste can be measured by 
some standard will have some bearing on our discussion of tastes properly 
speaking, but nevertheless, the discussion here referred to is not about the 
sense of taste, but about taste in a metaphorical sense. 
 
The literal sense of taste has rarely caught the attention of philosophers except in-
sofar as it provides the metaphor for aesthetic sensitivity.26 
 
One of the reasons I wish to focus on taste is that it may help us to get 
past the Cartesian conception of perception located in a mental theatre of 
representation. For DescartesÕ consideration of perception, which, as we have 
said, makes visual perception, and especially optical illusion,  paradigmatic, 
the question is whether I can be sure that what I think I see is what I really 
do see; this is a question of the correspondence between an internal mental 
object and an external one. The problem with any such account is that it fails 
to properly think the subject. It defers the question of subjectivity by asking 
whether the internal picture matches the external one. Merleau-PontyÕs 
account of perception is an attempt to get beyond this, to do away with the 
Cartesian conception of the mind as a theatre of representation. 
In vision, we tend to think that my seeing occurs Ôin my headÕ — some-
where behind my eyes, where two optical images are combined into one 
Ôsense.Õ This is based on a reliable scientific account of the physiology of 
seeing: light is reflected by objects, and some of that light reaches our eyes, 
where it is projected onto our retinas and there transformed into electrical 
signals conducted by the optic nerve to the brain. So my perception of an 
object and the object itself are divorced from one another in space. 
A similar physiological account might be given of touch or taste. But where 
do these senses reside? Physiologically, of course, they become Ôelectrical 
activityÕ only in the nervous system and the brain. But this does not necessar-
ily close the philosophical question — where is my sense of touch? It is clear 
that an everyday account would locate touch in the part of the body which 
touches, pain in the part which is damaged, and taste in the mouth and on 
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the tongue. There is no sensation of touch without a touched object, nor any 
taste without some thing to be tasted. Though I may see a mirage, I cannot 
drink from one. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as it were. 
This is the significance of the question about whether taste can be illusory: 
whilst the distance between perceiver and perceived allows for visual and 
auditory hallucination, it seems as though tastes cannot be hallucinated. We 
may dream of visions and sounds, perhaps even faintly of smells, but no-one, I 
submit, dreams the full experience of eating, tasting, satisfying hunger and 
feeling full. One might dream a taste-experience in a comparable way that 
one might imagine a taste-experience, but this is always discernibly different 
to the actual experience of eating food. 
This is not to argue that taste experiences are self-verifying, as some might 
argue in the case, for example, of religious experiences. This idea of self-
verification again presupposes that the epistemological question is about 
whether what is Ôinside my headÕ matches what is really out there. The reason 
taste experiences cannot be illusory is not that they have some quality which 
could only have come from an outside object which grounds the taste percep-
tion. It is rather that taste opens up the question of subjectivity. I can taste 
something because I am part of a world which is in principle tasteable, 
because I am eating something. The end of the taste experience comes in the 
waning of hunger and the feeling of having eaten, or being full. 
That hunger which is both a biological and a conscious state in the embod-
ied human being is assuaged in the act of eating, and this intertwining of 
psychic and physical states grounds us in a world which must be the source of 
our sustenance; though imagination plays its part in the genesis of hunger, 
and is a crucial driver of the activity which we engage in to meet our hungers, 
they cannot be fulfilled by imagination alone. 
Touch and taste, as such, are located not at a distance from their object, 
but rather in direct contact with their object. Things touched and tasted are 
not elements in a mental theatre of representation but rather objects in 
contact with me their subject, grounded in a world that cannot be an illusion, 
because I am in it. 
To exclude the possibility of gustatory illusion is not to discount the possi-
bility that tastes may be dependent on subjective conditions, and not just on 
the properties of the sensed object. I have already mentioned that the way 
things taste (particularly whether or not they are appetising, whether or not 
they taste good) can depend on my desires, physical conditions, and beliefs. 
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence reveals that pregnant women often report 
extreme (sometimes debilitating) intensification of the sense of taste. This 
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acuity of taste can make possible taste experiences which are usually impossi-
ble; nevertheless there is no illusion involved; what is tasted is not in the 
imagination, but in the foodstuff. 
This line of thinking begins to show how taste differs from visual (and 
other kinds of ) perception, in that it does not proffer concepts to conscious-
ness so readily. I can fit taste experiences to concepts (say, I taste carrot in a 
soup and recognise it as such) but I need not do so. Indeed, much of the 
work of developing one s ability to taste involves learning the concepts that 
allow one to identify features of a food (or wine) which would otherwise go 
unrecognised. 
 
The paradigmatic example of vision, in which Descartes looks at an inani-
mate object on his desk (the piece of wax) or out of his window (the tower), 
fails to properly account for visual perception at all. It isolates a moment of 
visual perception, abstracts it from time, movement and bodily action, and as 
such cannot even really account for perspective (which depends on move-
ment and our understanding of ourselves as embodied perceivers located in a 
relationship to what we see) or depth. I do not wish to argue that vision is a 
bad paradigm or exemplar for understanding human perception. That is not 
at all the case. Rather, the problem with DescartesÕ philosophical investiga-
tion of perception, a problem which has persisted in philosophy at least since 
PlatoÕs allegory of the cave, is that it fails to make sense of sight. We have 
made provisional arguments that sight itself is reversible; that the one who 
sees must also be potentially see-able. DescartesÕ example flattens vision out, 
abstracts it from human movement, from time and change, putting a theo-
retical pane of glass between seer and seen. It thus fixes the object and the 
subject of vision in separate realms, disallowing the possibility that the 
subject might be also the object of some other perception, and that the seen 
object is also a subject. 
So our investigation of the nature of taste is not an attempt to correct the 
philosophical bias towards vision by means of a counter-emphasis. Rather I 
hope to show that prevailing accounts of perception are based on a misunder-
standing of vision. It may be the case that these misunderstandings bring 
about examples of visual perception forced into the mould they make for it; 
that the popular reception of this errant account of perception has lead to 
the attempt to reduce perception to something which matches this account 
in embodied life. The ubiquity of television, the rapid growth of the internet, 
the whole cultural edifice which Guy Debord denounced as the ÔSociety of 
the Spectacle,Õ may in fact be an attempt to produce a kind of life which 
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corresponds to the theory played out on a grand scale, to install the (some-
times literal) pane of glass into the perceptive situation which philosophy 
anticipated. 
Vision, as Merleau-Ponty showed us, depends on the bodily subject who 
sees. Illusion is recognised as such by the continued investigation of percep-
tion; when we are unsure of what we see, we look again, we continue looking, 
we move in relation to our object, and so on. We do not aggregate a series of 
perceptual scenes any more than we do a variety of discrete ÔsensationsÕ — 
rather, visual perception is bound to the human body, the passage of time and 
movement. Comparison with the example of taste-perception makes this 
explicit. Taste is patently not completely separate from the other senses. We 
know that if a taster puts a peg over his nose, or has a cold, his ability to 
taste, and so the way things taste, is affected, sometimes quite dramatically. We 
know that the smell of freshly-baked bread, or the sight of a beautifully ripe 
apple, can arouse hunger which itself transforms the experience of taste. 
Further, we know that our sense of taste demands that we touch some object 
to offer any experience at all, that we must eat to taste. 
Eating obviously brings about a certain kind of relationship between the 
perceived object and myself — I cannot eat an object without removing it 
from the world, without destroying it. Not only do I destroy it, I also admit it 
to become part of me, to be broken down, partly assimilated, and partly 
rejected during its short sojourn within the confines of my body. The sub-
ject/object relationship can only be established here at the moment it is also 
undermined. In eating something I admit both my independence from it (I 
am free to eat it or not, it exists outside of me) while establishing my depend-
ence on it (once I ingest it, it starts to become material nourishment for my 
body). 
 
For Descartes, thinking from his paradigmatic optical illusion, perception 
is taken to accurately represent the world in a limited way, under certain 
conditions. When perception leads us to form clear and distinct ideas, he 
argues, it must be that those ideas correspond to some outer reality. If we 
were to replace the optical illusion with an example from the sensorial world 
of eating, the results would be different. I cannot be deceived by my sense of 
taste insofar as it does not offer ÔrepresentationsÕ of the world to conscious-
ness; rather taste sensations always seem to me a result of my interactions 
with the world. Taste sensations are less likely to lead me to confuse the 
world as it appears to me with the world as it really is. As Descartes saw, the 
world as it appears to me is not the same as the world as it is. But the confu-
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sion which arises with the example of visual illusion is that some part of my 
perception (that which is clear and distinct) represents the world to me 
accurately, gives me access to the world as it really is. The other parts of 
perception, those elements which are clouded by subjectivity, are to be 
mistrusted, and avoided altogether for philosophical purposes. 
Descartes failed to see that the world always appears under an aspect. No 
perception could represent the world as it is without including the fact of the 
perceiver; the world always appears as the world as it appears to me. It is not the 
case that some part of my perception represents the world accurately, but 
rather that my perception accurately represents some part of the world, 
which is always grounded in that part of the world which I am, my body. 
Martin Jay draws out LevinasÕ understanding of Merleau-Ponty on this point:  
 
ÒAs Merleau-Ponty has shown,Ó Levinas wrote, Òthe I that constitutes the world 
comes up against a sphere in which it is by its very flesh implicated; it is impli-
cated in what it otherwise would have constituted and so is implicated in the 
world.Ó27  
 
LevinasÕ observation of Merleau-PontyÕs thought here is the same insight 
that eating offers, and which we continually repeat in our daily lives, if uncon-
sciously. I constitute the world — that is to say, it is in my seeing that bare 
stuff is made into Ôthings,Õ it is in human reason that what there is becomes 
nature, a nature which is always to some degree the recipient of grace since it 
only is what it is because of the working of reason. That there is a world for 
me depends on my being able to perceive a world; in this sense I constitute a 
world which depends on me. The same is true, and explicitly so, when we 
think about taste. This leaf of rosemary only, in a sense, tastes of rosemary 
because I eat it. Of course, left uneaten, it remains the kind of thing which 
will taste of rosemary if eaten, but there would seem to be little sense in 
saying that that which is untasted nevertheless has a taste. But all this is 
subject to an inversion: for the ÔIÕ that constitutes things, the tongue that 
tastes the rosemary taste, is located amongst those things, is nourished by the 
rosemary already eaten. The I which constitutes the world is already part of 
that world, so there can be no absolute priority of the subject. If the world is 
in a sense mind-dependent (as the taste of rosemary depends on my experi-
ence of the taste), nevertheless the mind is world-dependent (as the nourish-
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ment eating gives me is a precondition for further nourishment, further taste 
experiences, and all of my continued conscious bodily life, which intertwines 
mind and world, intelligibility and materiality.) 
This tension is not resolved, and in the end the problem lies with LevinasÕ 
dependence on the notion of constitution. In the final chapter I will develop 
a logic of institution which will help us to move beyond this problem; for now 
the tension remains. 
 
Eating and Ontology 
For Plato, the true good of the soulÕs ascent from the body must be sharply 
distinguished from the false ÔgoodÕ of bodily pleasure. But this already pre-
cludes taking a position which understands the human being as an integrated 
whole, which understands the soul, as Aristotle does, as the form of the 
animal, which is intrinsically related to matter, which brings life through a 
certain kind of organisation, and which understands that life depends on the 
maintenance of this order, which occurs in nutrition. 
The reified and pure subject of much philosophy fails to understand 
subjectivity because it extracts it from relation, and subjectivity must always 
be to be the subject of something, some object, just as objectivity must be to be 
the object for some subject, and not purely a mute thing. This reification of 
the subject (as res extensa or the immortal soul) allows for the ossification of 
the lived world of objects into the inert and ÔobjectiveÕ universe of scientism 
which must always fail to account for the human subject at its centre. 
 
We have largely adopted the view of nature associated with modern natural sci-
ence. The nature we think we know through modern science is not the nature we 
know through ordinary experience Ñ or at least not through experience that was 
ordinary before it was overwhelmed by the technological transformation of the 
world.28 
 
But this is not to reverse an inert realism into idealism. For Levinas, 
 
Eating, for example, is to be sure not reducible to the chemistry of alimentation. 
But eating also does not reduce itself to the set of gustative, olfactory, kinesthetic, 
and other sensations that would constitute the consciousness of eating. This sink-
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ing of oneÕs teeth into the things which the act of eating involves above all meas-
ures the surplus of the reality of the aliment over every represented reality, a sur-
plus that is not quantitative, but is the way the I, the absolute commencement, is 
suspended on the non-I. [É] To be sure, in the satisfaction of need the alienness of 
the world that founds me loses its alterity: in satiety the real I sank my teeth into is 
assimilated, the forces that were in the other become my forces, become me (and 
every satisfaction of need is in some respect nourishment).29 
 
This point may be developed with an example. In an article entitled ÔTaste, 
Gastronomic Expertise, and Objectivity,Õ Michael Shaffer asks whether there 
is any objective difference in tasting ability between Gastronomic ÔexpertsÕ 
and those of us who defer to their apparently superior opinions. To do so he 
distinguishes between two kinds of taste, ÔDirect tasteÕ and ÔReflective taste.Õ 
He makes the distinction by referring to a description of a cheese in a repu-
table tasting guide. Such words in the description as Ôsour,Õ Ôsweet,Õ and ÔsaltyÕ 
are considered examples of ÔDirect taste.Õ The apparently more descriptive 
elements such as Ôdistinctive [É] wine-like aroma with a touch of the farm-
yardÓ and ÒLemons and leaf mold remain in the lingering  flavorÓ are taken to 
be examples of Reflective tasting, in which the gastronome applies what 
Shaffer concludes is her real expertise of articulating sensate experiences. 
This distinction, it is quite clear, does not correspond to any real distinction, 
but depends on drawing an arbitrary line between various levels of conceptu-
alisation in the language which describes taste. Shaffer identifies as the ÔDirectÕ 
and, he will claim, ÔobjectiveÕ aspects of tasting those for which it is claimed 
the tongue has receptors (sweet, sour, salty) and excludes as subjective all the 
aspects of description whose language demonstrates that they depend on a 
degree of conceptualisation.30 
 
Shaffer is drawing here, perhaps, on Brillat-Savarin, who divides direct taste 
sensations from complete perceptions: 
 
I consider it certain that taste gives rise to sensations of three distinct orders, 
namely, direct sensation, complete sensation, and considered sensation. 
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The direct sensation is the first impression arising out of the immediate ac-
tion of the organs of the mouth, while the substance to be tasted is still resting on 
the front part of the tongue. 
The complete sensation is composed of the first impression, and the im-
pression which follows when the food leaves its initial position and passes to the 
back of the mouth, assailing the whole organ with its taste and perfume. Lastly, the 
considered sensation is the judgement passed by the brain on the impressions 
transmitted to it by the organ.31 
 
But Shaffer solidifies the divide between sensation and perception by re-
ducing the three stages to two. Brillat-SavarinÕs Ôdirect sensationÕ is not the 
atomistic notion of which Shaffer makes use, and which Merleau-Ponty 
opposes as meaningless. The taste sensation in its totality has, for Brillat-
Savarin, a temporal aspect; it takes time to taste things, as we commonly 
acknowledge when we speak of a Ôburnt aftertasteÕ or of a wineÕs Ôfinish.Õ 
Brillat-SavarinÕs three stages present a developmental account of taste sensa-
tion, rather than a bifurcation of tastes into simple physical and complex 
mental elements. Shaffer labours under an illusion that there is a strict divide 
between those aspects of perception which may be understood in causal 
terms, which correspond to what Merleau-Ponty calls sensation, and those 
which are more psychic, calling that which can be causally explained Ôobjec-
tiveÕ and that which cannot Ôsubjective.Õ 
The need to make the distinction between subjective and objective aspects 
of taste is derived from a short passage in HumeÕs essay ÔOf the Standard of 
Taste,Õ cited earlier. For Shaffer, the claimed expertise of the gastronome 
must be suspected, since there is no reason to believe that he has any excep-
tional ability to taste things in physiological terms. The gastronomeÕs taste-
experience, he seems to suggest, is no different to that of the ordinary man; 
his position as an ÔexpertÕ is maintained by a confidence trick. We could 
objectively determine whether something is sweet or sour, but in the case of a 
disagreement over whether it tastes Ôfarmyard-yÕ or has a hint of pineapple or 
lemon, there is no way to resolve the dispute. De gustibus non disputandum est. 
Unfortunately, Shaffer has not seen fit to cite Hume further on in the 
aforementioned essay, in which he acknowledges that though he can find no 
ÔobjectiveÕ basis for taste, ÒWhoever would assert an equality of genius and 
elegance between an Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be 
thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-
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hill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. 32 y 
insisting on ÔobjectiveÕ aspects of taste, Shaffer removes the Ôreal sweetÕ and 
Ôreal bitterÕ from the domain of human experience, and reduces them to 
certain chemical processes occurring on the tongue. ut this precisely fails to 
account for how there can be any such thing as gastronomic expertise, and 
why it would be any use. As any person who has taken a wine tasting course, 
or even spent time attending to tastes, for example while learning to cook, 
knows, people can learn to taste better. As Merleau-Ponty has shown us, 
perception depends on the intentional perceiverÕs engagement with the 
world; what I taste depends not on a physiological transaction but on my 
engagement with the world. 
In a sense ShafferÕs reduction to physiological elements, though it looks 
like the exact opposite of idealism, amounts to the same thing — everyday 
human experience is denied in favour of an abstraction that is only accessible 
to the few. undamental reality is located at the atomic level rather than in 
the world of the forms, but the effect is the same. That perception can tell us 
what the world is really like is denied. 
Though we do not seek to invert the hierarchy of the senses, or to over-
throw it, we must ask what affect the division of the senses from one another 
has had on the accounts philosophy has given of perception. What would be 
the case, we have asked, if escartes had meditated on his piece of wax a 
little longer, asking not only what it would tell him about substance and 
properties, but also what it would tell him about objectivity and subjectivity  
What if he had located his epistemological foundation not in thinking but in 
eating  Of course when we are dealing with visual perception scepticism has 
great power, since anyone can experience visual illusion, or misjudgement. 
t what about when we ea  Is there any such thing as a gustatory illusion  
 
We have argued that taste, though in some ways rightly located towards 
the bottom of a Ôhierarchy of the senses,Õ is deeply important in forming our 
understanding of the nature of the world and our relation to it. Importantly, 
the senses are only artificially divided from one another, and usually operate 
in a kind of unity in human life and experience.  
Maine de iran, in his discussion of the influence of habit on thought, re-
marks that 
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The organs of touch and sight are essentially connected with each other through 
natural relations of motility and it is on this that the perfect coincidence and recip-
rocal transformation of their impressions especially depend. From the primary and 
uninterrupted co-operation of the two perceptions, visual and tactile, results a 
third which contains both, but which is neither one nor the other by itself.  For 
certainly (whatever idea one can have in other respects of the characteristic func-
tions of sight) we do not see as if we were not accustomed to touch and we do not 
touch as if we had never seen.33 
 
The fact that Ôcommon senseÕ relates all the senses to one another makes 
the operation of taste as a sense highly important in our self-understanding, 
because sensual objects, which can be seen and heard, can also be not only 
touched but tasted, eaten. This analysis opens up to us something of the 
truth of human life, that it is intertwined with and part of a natural world 
without which it cannot subsist, but which it has the power to organise and 
manipulate. 
Against the scientistic consensus, we are seeking to understand human 
subjectivity in its relationship to the world of nature, and to understand 
nature in the light of what it is to be human. or Aristotle, man is the Ôra-
tional animalÕ; but that is not to say that he is just an animal with rationality 
added. Indeed, this phrase may be better translated as the Ôspeaking animal.Õ 
hat is distinctively human is not the operation of an autonomous will, but 
rather the imaginative development that is at work on his appetite. ManÕs 
desire is articulated, and, in the process, transformed. or ass it is the 
multiple activities of the mouth — speaking, ingesting, tasting — that are 
truly emblematic of the peculiarly human; the conjunction of the functions of 
articulate reasoning and nourishing in one organ is a sign of their possible 
interaction, as well as a reminder that the rational remains precariously 
animal. 3
 
If man is the speaking animal, he is also the hungry animal; and hunger, the 
subjective articulation of appetite, is connected to speech by more than just 
the organ with which both are associated. Both demand that we understand 
the freedom of the human being. The notion of freedom is complex, and I 
introduce it here on the understanding that it is not yet fully understood. 
ass explains that  
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Freedom (and the human difference) is demonstrable in diet. Whereas instinct 
guides the senses of animals generally to ÒchooseÓ Ñ which is to say, to take Ñ 
foods that are salutary and to ÒrejectÓ Ñ which is to say, to leave Ñ foods that are 
not, the human imagination presents to the will as attractive foods (and quantities 
of food) neither naturally (that is, instinctively) desired nor healthy.35 
  
Later in the book, Kass quotes Kant at length in a footnote. Kant discusses 
the meaning of Genesis 3 in his ÔConjectural Beginning of Human HistoryÕ: 
 
So long as inexperienced man obeyed this call of nature all was well with him. But 
soon reason began to stir. A sense different from that to which instinct was tied Ñ 
the sense, say, of sight Ñ presented other food than that normally consumed as 
similar to it; and reason, instituting a comparison, sought to enlarge its knowledge 
of foodstuffs beyond the bounds of instinctual knowledge (3:6). This experiment 
might, with good luck, have ended well, even though instinct did not advise it, as 
long as it was at least not contrary to instinct. But reason has this peculiarity that, 
aided by the imagination, it can create artificial desires which are not only unsup-
ported by natural instinct but actually contrary to it. These desires, in the begin-
ning called concupiscence, gradually generate a whole host of unnecessary and 
indeed unnatural inclinations called luxuriousness. The original occasion for de-
serting natural instinct may have been trifling. But this was manÕs first attempt to 
become conscious of his reason as a power which can extend itself beyond the 
limits to which all animals are confined. As such its effect was very important and 
indeed decisive for his future way of life. Thus the occasion may have been merely 
the external appearance of a fruit which tempted because of its similarity to tasty 
fruits of which man had already partaken. In addition there may have been the ex-
ample of an animal which consumed it because, for it, it was naturally fit for con-
sumption, while on the contrary, being harmful for man, it was consequently 
resisted by manÕs instinct. Even so, this was a sufficient occasion for reason to do 
violence to the voice of nature (3:1) and, its protest notwithstanding, to make the 
first attempt at a free choice; an attempt which, being the first, probably did not 
have the expected result. But however insignificant the damage done, it sufficed to 
open manÕs eyes (3:7). He discovered in himself a power of choosing for himself a 
way of life, of not being bound without alternative to a single way, like the ani-
mals. Perhaps the discovery of this advantage created a moment of delight. But of 
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necessity, anxiety and alarm as to how he was to deal with this newly discovered 
power quickly followed; for man was a being who did not know either the secret 
properties or the remote effects of anything. He stood, as it were, at the brink of an 
abyss. Until that moment instinct had directed him toward specific objects of de-
sire. But from these there now opened up an infinity of such objects, and he did 
not yet know how to choose between them. On the other hand, it was impossible 
for him to return to the state of servitude (i.e., to subjection to instinct) from the 
state of freedom, once he had tasted the latter.36 
 
antÕs story here, which understands the narrative of the fall in nesis 3 
as being about the movement from manÕs being governed by instinct to his 
full freedom, is a brilliant reading of the te t, which makes sense of the 
notion that prehistoric man could bring on himself, by the alteration of his 
habitual action, a freedom to which his descendants would be permanently 
bound, in so doing bringing about a deep alteration in the life of his species. 
But he makes a mistake, and it is a strange mistake to make in a discussion of 
eating. ant sees that man becomes free, even that he becomes somehow 
inevitably free, but he makes this freedom absolute, without observing that 
man remains bound by his physical nature, by the hunger which is so impli-
cated in his coming to freedom, and to the facticity of his condition, of which 
freedom becomes an inevitable part. 
reedom must always be understood in relation to the bodily necessity that 
makes it possible, which grounds it and guides it. This is not an absolute 
freedom, a antian autonomy. gain evinas e presses something of this 
understanding  —  
 
Through labor and possession the alterity of nutriments enters into the same. [É] 
The body is a permanent contestation of the prerogative attributed to conscious-
ness of Ògiving meaningÓ to each thing; it lives as this contestation. The world I 
live in is not simply the counterpart or the contemporary of thought and its consti-
tutive freedom, but a conditioning and an antecedence. The world I constitute 
nourishes me and bathes me. It is aliment and ÒmediumÓ [ÒmilieuÓ]. The inten-
tionality aiming at the exterior [É] somehow comes from the point to which it 
goes, recognizing itself past in its future, lives from what it thinks.37 
                                                
36 Immanuel ant, ÒConjectural Beginning of Human History,Ó trans. Emil Fackenheim, 
in Kant On History, ed. Lwis hite Beck (Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 55–56, cited 
in ass, The Hungry Soul, 210. 
37 Lvinas, Totality and Infinity, 129. 
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This freedom within limits, the necessity of eating, and the freedom to 
choose what one eats, makes the hungry animal necessarily an ethical animal. 
 
Eating and Human Nature 
We return, then, to Aristotle. AristotleÕs philosophical anthropology is 
grounded in his metaphysics of form and material, and in the De Anima 
(which forms, for him, the introduction to a course of biological study), he 
gives an account of the soul which is both non-dualistic and non-reductive; 
for Aristotle the soul is the principle of life in the animal, that which ani-
mates; it is not a substance in the sense that the res cogitans is a substance, 
rather it is a kind of organisation which is theoretically separable from the 
matter it actually organises whilst depending on that matter. 
Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, Aristotle calls matter potentiality, 
and form actuality.38 That is, it is not the case that the form of a thing, its 
idea or essence, is a potential reality which must be actualised by attaching 
itself or being attached to a specific piece of matter. Rather, matter is poten-
tiality, the site of true potency, which is to be actualised by attaining to 
organisation, to more sophisticated levels of organisation. Although Aristotle 
thinks that Òit is of the actuality that they [that is, unity and being] are most 
properly said,Ó39 clearly his metaphysics shows that this formal actuality is 
deeply intertwined with the matter which gives it potency: Òso just as pupil 
and sight are the eye, so, in our case, soul and body are the animal. It is quite 
clear then that the soul is not separable from the body, or that some parts of 
it are not, if it is in its nature to have parts.Ó40 
What Aristotle takes to be essential to the soul and definitive of it is pre-
sented in various ways as the argument of the De Anima progresses, although 
Aristotle always thinks of it in terms of faculties, that is, of properties of an 
animal which differentiate it from things without an animal soul, and without 
life in general. In the second chapter of the first book he says Òthat which is 
ensouled is held to be different from that which is unsouled above all in two 
ways, in producing movement and in perceiving. These two are pretty much 
                                                
38 Aristotle, De Anima (On The Soul), trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 
1986), 156 (412a). 
39 De Anima, 157 (412b). 
40 De Anima, 158 (413a). 
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the things that we have received from earlier thinkers as main characteristics 
of the soul.Ó41 
Just a few pages later, these two things have been expanded to three — 
Òthe soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the 
production of movement, perception and incorporeality.Ó42 By the end of the 
first book, the list has been expanded into a more complex arrangement with 
six faculties arranged in two groups: Ònow the soul comprises cognition, 
perception and belief-states. It also comprises appetite, wishing and the 
desire-states in general. It is the source of locomotion for animals, as also of 
growth, flourishing and decay.Ó43 I take the final sentence here to be an 
exposition of the first two, that is, I read Aristotle as saying that the soul has 
two classes of faculties; the inward-directed faculties of thinking, perceiving 
and knowledge, and the outward-directed faculties of simple appetite, imagi-
native desire (ÒwishingÓ) and Òdesire states in generalÓ (which might leave 
room for some other kind of outward-directed states), and that these two 
groups of states, roughly thinking and desire, together are productive of 
movement and change. 
At this point Aristotle has dropped the earlier specification that the soul is 
Ôincorporeal,Õ which was mentioned in his discussion of previous accounts of 
the soul, and drawn directly from them, presumably because it does not tell 
us very much. Soon after, in book 2, Aristotle enumerates the list of the 
faculties again differently — Òthe soul is the principle of these things that we 
have mentioned and is defined by these things, the nutritive, perceptive and 
intellective faculties and movement.Ó44 Here he recognises (and he soon after 
goes on to develop the point) that anything which lives must have the capa-
bility to nutrify itself, which is to say to bring foreign matter under the 
influence of its organising principle, so that the soul, and the body which it 
makes possible, persist whilst their essential matter changes. Only a few lines 
later Aristotle claims that Òwhere there is perception there is also pleasure 
and pain, and where there are these, of necessity also appetite.Ó45 And soon 
after, Aristotle makes the four faculties five: 
 
                                                
41 De Anima, 132 (403b). 
42 De Anima, 136 (405b). 
43 De Anima, 152–3 (411a). 
44 De Anima, 160 (413b). 
45 De Anima, 160 (413b). 
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The faculties we spoke of were the nutritive, perceptive, desiderative, locomotive, 
and intellective, plants having only the nutritive, other living things both this and 
the perceptive. But if they have the perceptive faculty they have also that of de-
sire.46 
 
The way in which Aristotle enumerates the faculties continues to develop, 
and we shall not follow it any further, for we can see, at this point, why this is 
so. The faculties, though they name different aspects of the living being, are 
complexly related to one another. Aristotle claims that there can be no 
perception without that perception also engendering desire; one might object 
to this by citing examples where there would seem to be a kind of perception 
without desire, such as those of ÔsensitiveÕ plants like the venus fly-trap or of 
simple light-sensitive organisms, but it would seem rather that ÔperceptionÕ 
names a kind of sensitivity which carries within it a kind of judgment, and 
which therefore is necessarily marked by pleasure and pain, and so appetite 
might plausibly be a corollary of perception properly speaking which would 
mark the difference between it and simple sensation. (This is not to suggest 
that there is clear distinction between things with and without the power of 
appetite, any more than there is between things with the power only of 
sensation and those that properly perceive, in certain boundary cases). 
The faculties are enumerated in a fluid way by Aristotle because there are 
ÔfuzzyÕ boundaries between them; appetite (of the kind I have called ÔhungerÕ) 
is a form of desire which has nutrition amongst its goals (although nutrition 
may well not be the only or even the primary goal), which depends on loco-
motion for the ability to find and take food, which itself depends on percep-
tion and intellection, and so on, and some forms of appetite might serve the 
goal of nutrition in such an automatic and plant-like way as to be almost 
totally indistinguishable from it. Since nutrition is the one faculty common to 
all living things, including the plants, it might be seen to be the end of all the 
other faculties: nutrition is served by appetite and locomotion (to desire and 
get the needed food), which are themselves informed by perception, intellec-
tion, and in the long term aided by imagination, which allows people to find 
new ways of feeding themselves. But at the same time, the need for nutrition 
is itself a means to the end of the exercise of all the other faculties, which 
only together make us what we are. 
So, to re-introduce the term Ôhunger,Õ as we understood it earlier, hunger 
might be seen to be essential to the human being insofar as it involves and 
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depends on all that is fundamental to his existence, whether unique to the 
human animal or shared with the other animals. The goal of such hunger is 
life, in the sense of the preservation of meaningful organisations of matter in 
biological individuals, but also extending to the sense of the full expression of 
the essentially human through the exercise of the faculties. In this sense, 
then, we may think of the human being as the hungry animal: — humankind is 
always concerned with biological necessity; he must eat to live. But, more 
than that, he eats not only as one who affects the world around him by being 
more or less successful at surviving, reproducing, hunting, and so on. As we 
have said, following Marx and Engels, man produces the means of his own 
subsistence. Man makes his food, in so doing transforming the world.  
Where natural systems, which rarely attain to the ecological ideal of bal-
ance, are in near-constant flux, such change is governed not by a creative will 
but by the success or otherwise of the various species which comprise it at 
doing whatever it is that they do, guided by instinct. Men must also succeed 
in surviving, but what it is that they do is not given to them in so clear a way; 
they must decide what and how to eat, and their means of feeding themselves 
inevitably bear on the whole of the natural system of which they are a part. 
As the hungry animal, man is given responsibility not only for himself, but, in 
a sense, for all of nature, at least in so far as he is able to transform it, and in 
fact does so. 
 
Middle Part: 
 
The 
Crossing 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Old Ontology 
 
 
Our goal is to understand the relations of consciousness 
and nature: organic, psychological or even social. By 
nature we understand here a multiplicity of events ex-
ternal to each other and bound together by relations of 
causality.1 
 
 
n Part One, I developed an embodied account of perception on the 
basis of Merleau-PontyÕs thought in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
deepened through an investigation of eating as a mode of perception, 
situating an embodied understanding of perception in the history of philoso-
phy with reference to eating as a hidden theme of philosophical reflection. In 
Part Two, we will seek to bring the non-dualistic ontology which this account 
of perception implies to clearer expression. The present chapter forms a 
crossing-point between the two parts, in which we interrogate the old, 
Cartesian ontology and its problems, seeking to clarify the questions on 
which an alternative ontology must be brought to bear. 
When Merleau-Ponty died unexpectedly in 1961, he left on his desk a copy 
of DescartesÕ Optics, a text to which he often returned. He had written notes 
on it in September and November 1959,2 and had dealt with it at length in Eye 
and Mind, his last writing published during his lifetime. Here he condemns it 
for the effects it has had on contemporary thought, saying Òit is the breviary 
of a thought that wants no longer to abide in the visible and so decides to 
construct the visible according to a model-in-thought. It is worthwhile to 
                                                
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, trans. Alden L. Fisher (London: 
Methuen, 1965), 3. 
2 The Visible and the Invisible, 210, 217. 
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remember this attempt and its failure.Ó3 As Martin Jay suggests,4 Descartes is 
often considered to be the founding father of the visual paradigm of modern 
philosophy: precisely because he was no longer willing to Ôabide in the visual,Õ 
as Merleau-Ponty puts it, he must establish contact between the mind and 
the visual world by making the visual abide in him; that is to say, he develops 
a notion of representation which attempts to cross the dualist chasm. This is 
not to say that the Cartesian ontology, of the separation of mental substance 
from extended substance, which bequeaths to modern philosophy all the 
problems of finding a bridge between the two (in the problems of epistemol-
ogy, of knowledge and illusion, of representation, of freedom and determina-
tion, of mechanism and vitalism) is totally new; rather, it makes concrete a 
new form of visual dominance which goes back to Homer and the Stoics, was 
present in Augustine, which began to turn in a new direction in the middle 
ages as the early mediaeval imbrication of the senses gave way to an external-
ised account of vision, which found a crucial visual formation in the renais-
sance invention of perspective, and which reached its philosophical zenith 
some time later in DescartesÕ formulation. For Rodolphe Gasch, 
 
Although it is true that the Augustinian notion of reditus in se ipsum Ñ a return 
upon and into oneself constituting the medium of philosophy Ñ prefigures the 
concept of reflection, the philosophy of reflection is generally considered to have 
begun with DescartesÕ prima philosophia. There are good reasons for this assump-
tion, for in Descartes the scholastic idea of the reditus undergoes an epoch-making 
transformation, whereby reflection, instead of being merely the medium of meta-
physics, becomes its very foundation. With Cartesian thought, the self-certainty of 
the thinking subject Ñ a certainty apodictically found in the cogito me cogitare Ñ 
becomes the unshakeable ground of philosophy itself.5 
 
Catherine Pickstock writes that DescartesÕ Òdeparture from the pre-Scotist 
notion of being as something with unknowable and unanalysable depth, 
inaugurates the ÔobjectÕ as a phenomenon.Ó6 In this reduction of the thickness 
                                                
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ÒEye and Mind,Ó trans. Carleton Dallery, in The Primacy of 
Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 169. 
4 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 70. 
5 Rodolphe Gasch, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 17. 
6 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), 63. 
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of experience to the pure surface of a geometrical conception of the world, 
because it must locate within that world the reality of a human perceiver and 
their subjective experience, a reality which is fundamentally inimical to 
geometrical description, Òthere arises [É] an epistemological circuit whereby 
knowledge is based entirely on objects, whose ÒbeingÓ does not exceed the 
extent to which they are known. Representation is now prior to ontology.Ó7 
For Descartes, this geometrisation of external nature is established as an 
implication of the discovery of and progress in Òthe inventions which serve to 
augmentÓ the power of sight, which are Òamong the most useful that there 
can be.Ó8 The discovery that light could be manipulated by lenses, that this 
could aid sight and correct it in its deficiencies, and that these lenses were 
discovered to be amenable to geometrical description and governed by 
geometrical laws made it seem clear that the operations of light are reducible 
to mathematics. Descartes makes an analogy through another form of a 
perception, with a blind man holding a stick.9 And though this analogy could 
possibly have been used to re-install vision in the circuit of the body and of 
action, to build a sense of Òvisual palpation,Ó the opposite was in fact the case. 
In fact the man with the stick, the body, the eye and the whole of nature 
(which thus required to have all psychic reality excised from it) were in this 
moment reduced to geometry. This finally confirmed GalileoÕs claim that 
Òthis grand book the universeÉis written in the language of mathematics, and 
its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which 
it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one 
wanders about in a dark labyrinth,Ó10 and received mutual confirmation from 
it. As we see in the quote at the head of this chapter, Merleau-Ponty assumed 
the same conception of nature at the beginning of his first major work, The 
Structure of Behaviour. Nature is understood as an extended multiplicity of 
events, partes extra partes, in the phrase that Merleau-Ponty later comes to 
use. The big question of Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy, then, that of the 
relations of consciousness and nature, is determined in terms of a pre-existing 
understanding of nature as essentially geometrical. This thought of nature, of 
course, though it gained dominance in modern philosophy, was not really new 
                                                
7 Pickstock, After Writing, 63. 
8 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry and Meteorology, trans. Paul J. Olscamp 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 65 (Optics I). 
9 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry and Meteorology, 66–68 (Optics I). 
10 Galileo Galilei, cited in David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in 
a More-Than-Human World (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 32. 
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even with alileo  as David Abram notices, it goes back at least as far as 
Euclid. 
his Euclidean geometry, though, was soon to be called into uestion by 
Merleau-Ponty, in particular as he came under the influence of the thought 
of Husserl and took seriously HusserlÕs conception of the risis of the 
sciences. For Husserl, particularly in his text On the Origin of Geometry, to 
which we will return, the lilean revolution, which began the reduction of 
nature to geometrical space and its simple contents, had forgotten that 
geometry was grounded in an ideal abstraction from nature, produced by the 
human mind, and came to be held up as what was true in itself. As Albert 
abil puts it,  
 
Galileo completed this revolutionary change by mathematizing all of nature, rele-
gating the Lebenswelt so completely to the status of subjective appearance that the 
relation of knowledge of nature understood mathematically to men who live in the 
Lebenswelt became a problem. In short, the world was so objectified that subjec-
tivity was completely lost. Galileo set the stage for the attempt, first made by Spi-
noza, to construct an ontology on the basis of geometry.12 
 
Descartes simply carried this analysis to its logical next step by realising 
the necessary separation of the psychical and the physical, because the 
construction of mathematical nature depends on an abstraction from the 
lived consciousness of things which is performed inside consciousness, and 
even when the abstraction of geometry is forgotten, there must be some 
geometer before whose mind the geometrical world is held. For abil, ÒDes-
cartesÕ epoch was not radical enough: he suspended the physical world but not 
the psychical soul. he result was that the soul was placed in the body as a 
reality distinct from it, but just as abstract.Ó his dualism failed, as it inevi-
tably must, to bridge the infinite chasm between the two realities, and  
philosophy turned to the strategy of eliminating one of the two by reducing it 
to the other  this lead to the empiricism and intellectualism which Merleau-
Ponty opposes from the first. he dominance of scientific naturalism which, 
for Husserl, occasioned the recognition of a crisis in science and in philoso-
phy, had led to what one commentator calls Òa nihilistic conception of 
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reason,Ó14 unable to approach questions of value, and, we would add, unable 
to think questions of situation, of freedom, and of relation: this is because 
the mathematisation of nature, by its insistence that one point in space is 
homogenous with but absolutely external to another, thinks that one point of 
observation is identical to another, that the observer always looks on dispas-
sionately from an absolute distance, unable to form a notion of the mind 
among things because it is always governed by the contradictions of thinking 
of geometrical things as held in the mind as well as existing in the pure space 
of physics, outside of every inside, and holding this together with the two 
realities considered as parallel but separate. 
 
Exterior nature is then reduced, according to Descartes, to extension. Extension 
possesses two characteristics: it is indefinitely visible, and to the extent that we can 
speak of points of extension, we must consider them as non-substitutable for one 
another; that is, each has its own locality. Each part is nothing other than its alter-
ity in relation to the others. Hence, the result is that each part is a plenitude of be-
ing. In effect, each point being nothing other than its alterity, extension is the same 
in all of its points, with neither heavens nor reliefs. Extension is everywhere 
equally full, because it is equally empty. It is only what it is. That is why the exte-
rior world will be wholly actual: there is no place for a difference between actual 
beings and possible beings, nor for a reshaping of the past or an anticipation of the 
future. There is neither more nor less in its simultaneous parts, any more than in its 
unfolding across time. By being placed in the point of view, we understand that 
conservation is implied in creation. The laws according to which the World is 
conserved are inscribed in its structure: as soon as it is created, extension is neces-
sary.15 
 
This Cartesian conception of nature as extension not only reinforces a 
visual understanding of nature, but also develops into a geometrical under-
standing of vision. This extensive, geometrical understanding tends towards a 
conception of sight as passive and surveying, precisely because it does not 
know how the mind is installed in the world; it has made of this question an 
                                                
14 Charles S. Brown, ÒThe Real and the Good,Ó in Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth 
Itself, ed. Ted Toadvine and Charles S. Brown, (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2003), 7. 
15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collge de France, trans. Robert 
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insoluble problem by defining nature in terms which already exclude the 
mind. Despite DescartesÕ insistence on their intimate connection,16 the 
subject, in the Cartesian conception of vision, always ends up looking from a 
distance. 
 
The Dominance of Linear Perspective 
The mathematised conception of nature fed back in to and reinforced the 
certain kind of visual understanding of nature which had brought it to birth, 
making manÕs place in the world paradigmatically that of a visual perceiver. 
We can see this happening, quite clearly in DescartesÕ Optics, which (as the 
very word ÔopticsÕ suggests) explains vision in terms of a set of geometrical 
operations on light, that are ultimately ÔperceivedÕ by an eye which is mod-
elled on the camera. As Hwa Yol Jung has it, ÒThis reductive abstraction is a 
Cartesian trap in which everything is streamlined to edify the epistemological 
Panopticon of the cogito which, by being mesmerised by the eye, is turned 
into a scopic regime and ocularcentric machine.Ó17 The Cartesian Ôscopic 
regimeÕ has roots more widely spread than GalileoÕs mathematisation of 
nature, though; the dominance of linear perspective had begun in the Middle 
Ages. Suzannah Biernoff, in her work Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages, 
notes that 
 
ﬃ would not be an exaggeration to say that geometrical ÔperspectiveÕ Ñ from per-
spicere, to survey or scrutinise, to investigate thoroughly, to Ô!ee throughÕ Ñ be-
came the metadiscourse of the later Middle Ages. As David "#ndberg observes, 
because Òoptics could reveal the essential nature of material reality, of cognition, 
and indeed of $od himself, its pursuit became not only legitimate, but obligatory.Ó 
                                                
16 ÒNature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am 
not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship, but that I am very closely 
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Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 56 (Meditation 6, 81). 
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Nature,Ó Merleau-Ponty and Environmental Philosophy: Dwelling On the Landscapes of Thought, 
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More than just an object of study, perspectiva was a way of seeing Ñ and know-
ing Ñ with certainty (perspicue means Ôwith clarity of perceptionÕ).18 
 
This optics, crucially, was not an attempt to understand sight in its relation 
to bodies as they move around the world, to take seriously the importance of 
the location of the viewer in the formulation of perspective. Rather, it 
pretended to understand the nature not only of material reality but of God; 
that is to say, that perspective gives us an ideal of knowledge in which every-
thing is in its place, viewed by a neutral and absolute observer. As Biernoff 
tells us, for observers such as Umberto Eco the development of the scopic 
regime was overwhelmingly positive; it is a move away from a fundamentally 
neurotic conception of the world. For Eco, what is missing in the pre-
renaissance understanding Òwas any conception, however slight, that nature 
had a structure of itself and was intelligible in itself.Ó19 Perspectivism consti-
tuted a move away from a symbolism which was the rejection of concrete 
reality, and of the attempt to understand nature in its own terms, preferring 
to understand it in terms of Òa supernatural world of order and unity.Ó20 This 
claim is in the last instance a historical one which is not of primary concern 
here. But it seems problematic, in that the use of the idea of Ôthe supernatu-
ralÕ is anachronistic and perhaps already begs the question: by excluding the 
dimensions of depth and meaning from a picture of nature, Eco relegates 
them to the Ôsupernatural.Õ But before the advent of a mathematised ontology 
which called ÔnatureÕ only that which could be understood on a geometrical 
model, there was no ÔsupernaturalÕ in this sense: there were hidden and 
poorly-understood aspects of reality, whose connections to the observed 
world we cannot fathom, as there still are. The notion of the supernatural 
which Eco rejects depends on a geometrical conception of nature, and so is 
unlikely to make sense of the medieval understanding. 
My work here will be to present a case against EcoÕs claim. I will not ex-
pend great energy in an attempt to establish that a geometrical-perspectival 
account of nature is incomplete, although it should become obvious as we 
progress that such is the case. Rather, I will focus our attention on establish-
ing that a different, nongeometrical account of nature is more plausible. I 
                                                
18 Suzannah Biernoff, Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 68, citing David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler 
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have nothing at stake in defending the worldview of the Middle Ages  but 
this worldview may to some degree agree with the ontology I will develop as 
an account of nature. Su annah Biernoff seems to think so, claiming that 
 
Of modern theorists, Maurice Merleau-PontyÕs insistence on the mindÕs incarna-
tion (in a generalized ÔfleshÕ that exceeds individual bodies), and his metaphor of 
perceptual intertwining perhaps brings us closest to the reciprocal, corporeal flux 
of mediaeval vision.21 
 
And this, for Merleau-Ponty, does not mean a return to the obfuscatory 
theologyÕ which renders the Mediaeval thought of nature inaccessible to 
most. 
 
We could believe that the universe of facticity appeared at the moment theology 
was excluded from science. Yet this is not at all the case. There are theological 
perspectives that include facticity, and there are non-theological thought [sic] that 
do not have the feeling for it: ÒI do not need the hypothesis of God to explain the 
universe,Ó Laplace will say, but this is in no way decisive. The very concept of Na-
ture, such as it is often allowed by scientists, belongs to a conception that is en-
tirely theological in its infrastructure.22 
 
Indeed, in these 1956–57 lectures on Nature, Merleau-Ponty makes the 
striking claim, of LaplaceÕs idea of nature (and in particular his causalism) that 
Òat bottom, this conception is a theological affirmation, the affirmation of a 
view of totality capable of subtending all evolution of the world. 23 This is 
Laplace who, in his oft-cited reply to NapoleonÕs question about what place 
d held in his system, claimed ÒI have no need of that hypothesis.  Laplace 
proposed a thoroughgoing causalism, such that if one knew the position and 
motion of every atom at a given point in time, one would know the whole 
history and future of the world. But this conception is essentially the ultimate 
formulation of a certain kind of dogma, and it is not a dogma that is able to 
stand any longer. ÒThe determinist conception of intraworldy necessity is 
synonymous with Cartesian ontology, condemned by modern science. 2% 
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Science and the Observer 
For Merleau-Ponty, 
 
To suppose Nature as being one sole truth is to posit a spectator for which this 
unique truth exists. Evidently, for Laplace, it is a matter of the mind of the scientist. 
But in making this argument, he defines thereby the ideal of knowing more than 
the mind of the knower. In fact, by positing such a natural being, such a thought 
posits a nature as kosmotheoros.25 
 
 
The separation of the lived world from an idealised, mathematised nature 
transforms the scope of knowledge. Where knowledge had been based on 
what could be observed of the in-principle finite world in which we live, as 
knowledge became assimilated to mathematics it became possible to think of 
Ôgrand theoriesÕ whose applicability is inexhaustible; everything became 
subsumed to the universal knowledge of geometry, and rather than knowl-
edge of things being predicated on what is, being became predicated on what 
could be known: possibility came to be understood not as determined in terms 
of the limits of the world in which we live, but as logical possibility, as con-
ceivability and calculability, and reinforced a promethean science to which it 
was linked. For Carolyn Merchant, 
 
The BaconianÐCartesianÐNewtonian project is premised on the power of technol-
ogy to subdue and dominate nature, on the certainty of mathematical law, and on 
the unification of natural laws into a single framework of explanation. Just as the 
alchemists had tried to speed up natureÕs labour through human intervention in 
the transformation of base metals into gold, so science and technology as the way 
to control nature and hence recover the right to the garden given to the first par-
ents. ÔMan by the fall, fell at the same time from his state of innocency and from 
his dominion over creation. Both of these losses can in this life be in some part re-
paired; the former by religion and faith; the latter by arts and science.Õ Humans, he 
asserted, could Ôrecover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine be-
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quest,Õ and should endeavour Ôto establish and extend the power and dominion of 
the human race itself over the [entire] universe.Õ26 
 
There is no doubt that a mathematised conception of nature enabled great 
progress to be made in the sciences. Taking measurable extension as basic to 
the real made solving the problems of measurable extension possible in a new 
way: so it is that Galileo was able, by abstracting himself from his earthly 
position, to show that earth is revolving, in orbit around the sun, and orbited 
by its moon, and so on for the other known planets. The importance of this 
discovery and the scientific development in which it plays its part is not to be 
underestimated. But the success of this way of looking at the world has led to 
an unhinged commitment to it that can get in the way of human engagement 
with the world. Max Picard complains that 
 
in science today there is no real meeting between man and the object of his inves-
tigation. [É] Formerly the encounter between man and the object was an event: it 
was like a dialogue between man and the object under investigation. The object 
was given into manÕs care and keeping, and through the personal meeting with 
man the object became more and man became more because through the meeting 
he had helped the object to become more than it was before the meeting.27 
 
This encounter, which Picard sees as desirable, in fact gets in the way of 
modern science since it undermines the division between neutral, mathema-
tisable nature and the meaningfulness of human life. Fundamentally, it 
undermines the Cartesian distinction. As we will discuss later, Einsteinian 
relativity tried to think the relationship between the observer and the ob-
served, and of course modern physics depends on thinking this relation. But, 
as Merleau-Ponty claims, Einstein does not go the whole way, he does not yet 
reinstall the thinker as a body in the lived world; even after Einstein, science 
still tends to think of the world as present to an absolute observer who is 
outside of it. 
In HusserlÕs notion of the ÔCrisis of the European Sciences,Õ the crisis is 
essentially this: that we are no longer able to think our situation, our situat-
edness amongst the things. HusserlÕs original project was that of seeking a 
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rigorous, scientific grounding for philosophy, and his understanding of this 
project developed in such a way that he no longer understood the extant 
sciences to be a sufficient model for philosophy; for they themselves were not 
rigorously grounded in that phenomenal experience of our relation to the 
world. Whilst Merleau-Ponty was sympathetic to judgments against Des-
cartesÕ philosophy, and especially those Husserl makes in the Crisis: 
  
The complexity of his position would be underestimated if he were to be classified 
as unequivocally critical of Descartes or as sharing HusserlÕs attachment to a spe-
cifically European destiny. [...] It is the Cartesian legacy that is primarily blamed 
here for having become a straight jacket that closed off DescartesÕs originally more 
open questioning. Descartes himself is credited with being a more complex and 
ambiguous thinker who was torn between radical doubt and edifying certainty.28 
 
This whole notion of Nature as pure externality excludes from itself no-
tions that do not fit its requirements for clear and distinct perception and 
measurability. So, as we will see, mind must be totally abstracted from Na-
ture, and the connection between the two becomes the philosophical prob-
lem. Further, God, as Absolute Mind or as incarnate transcendence, must be 
excluded from the workings of the world (though a God may be postulated as 
its original source) except where no better explanation can be found; that is, 
God is pushed into the ÔgapsÕ in human knowledge; God becomes the best 
available hypothesis for the explanation of certain phenomena. God is also 
the only solution to the epistemological problem, the last and only bulwark 
against scepticism; in this role God really must be held apart from man in a 
kind of dogmatic deism; if this God were to surprise us, to step out of the 
determinations that epistemology lays down for him, a chaos of knowledge 
and all manner of trouble would result. 
This is what Pickstock calls Òontology prised away from theology.Ó29 But by 
ÔtheologyÕ Pickstock means here something like ÔChristian Orthodoxy,Õ and it 
will be crucial to understand that, though Pickstock is right that there are 
very deep ontological implications of the rejection of mediaeval theology, the 
new situation does not leave ontology devoid of theology. It may, as we have 
suggested, derive its theology from its ontology rather than starting with 
theology, just as DescartesÕ philosophy requires a certain kind of God, to play 
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a role that only a god can fill, that of guaranteeing his epistemology. The 
reality is likely that neither one nor the other is prior, but that this ontologi-
cal change comes hand in hand with a theological development. What is 
Ôprised awayÕ is the robust conception which the Middle Ages had of human 
beingsÕ rich, sensual entwining in a world which exceeds them. The discovery 
of a geometrical conception of the world, which we have suggested comes 
partly through the discovery of optical technology, forces a question on us: If 
nature is essentially mathematical, am I? If nature works like a mechanism, 
am I also fundamentally mechanical? The mediaeval conception of the 
sensual imbrication of self, body and world was, at least in part, linked to a 
theology which took seriously the doctrine of Incarnation and the concept of 
incarnation. For Merleau-Ponty 
 
Descartes comes to conceive this type of extension by a method of purification, 
which is a step toward an essence. He undoes the unreflected communion with 
the World by striving to discern Òobjective realityÓ and to reduce it to what it can 
signify when we think it clearly and distinctly.30 
 
Science (and indeed the whole of humanity) is now faced with pressing 
questions about the effects of human behaviour on our ecosystem, and the 
repercussions of those effects on forms of life including our own make the 
problem of the relationship between the observer and the observed world in 
science more urgent than ever. The objectivist conception of nature is not 
serving us well, and there is sudden shift in emphasis to an arena in which our 
science finds itself unable to maintain a neutral distance from its object, since 
its object (the climate, how it is changing, and how such changes affect life on 
earth) determines the future of humanity, and not only that, but also oneÕs 
own future and that of oneÕs children. For Ted Toadvine, Òscientific natural-
ism is an insufficient basis for thinking the human relation with nature, as it 
relies on an ontology of positive beings that exist partes extra partes,Ó and 
moves towards systems theory do not do away with that assumption. ÒThe 
naturalistic tendencies of ÔenvironmentalÕ thought are therefore metaphysical 
in HeideggerÕs sense, adopting a standpoint outside the phusis they purport to 
describe, and treating nature, the human subject, and their relations in terms 
of presence and availability — ultimately in terms of Bestand, Ôstanding re-
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serve.ÕÓ31 The limited understanding of environmental thought, which rests on 
the flattened, mathematical ontology which finds concrete formulation in 
DescartesÕ thought, Òreveals the need for a richer, multifaceted philosophical 
investigation of nature, one that includes its ontological, epistemological, 
aesthetic, and theological dimensions, and that also appreciates the inter-
twining of the history of philosophical reflection on nature with the concept 
of nature itself.Ó32 
The limitations of the old, problematic conception of nature are beginning 
to be addressed by Husserl in the Crisis, but as the quote at the beginning of 
this section suggests, Merleau-Ponty needs more than the extant phenome-
nology of his time to overcome it. As David wood sees, ÒPhenomenology was 
born out of resistance to the threat of naturalism.Ó But to be able to think 
nature anew, Òit must either rescue nature itself from naturalism, or work out 
a new relationship to what it had perceived as the danger of naturalism. Or 
both.Ó33 
For this investigation, the method of phenomenology alone will not suf-
fice, and it is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty, as his thought progresses 
towards its final, ontological mode, draws on the thought of Bergson and 
Whitehead in particular. PhenomenologyÕs method of epoch, of reduction, 
and its commitment to intentionality are crucial, but the study of phenomena 
demands an understanding of its (bodily) situation, and it is here that Mer-
leau-Ponty is influenced by BergsonÕs method of intuition. Bergson contrasts 
the analytic method of science to the intuitive method of what he calls 
metaphysics. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, he contrasts the absolute with 
the infinite, an analytical concept with which it has become confused. For 
him, 
 
An absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within 
the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by 
which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is 
unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the op-
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eration which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements 
common both to it and other objects.34 
 
This intuitive method thus takes seriously the notion that there is more to 
be understood than the unfolding of some preestablished way of things in 
time, whether according to mechanistic law or to a finalistic pre-established 
harmony of things. As Thomas Goudge puts it, Òif things are merely realizing 
a program previously arranged, no creativity and therefore no genuine change 
are occurring. In that case, Ôtime is useless.ÕÓ35 
 
The Exclusion of Mind from Nature 
The geometrical-perspectival conception of nature, we have said, made 
possible modern science in all its success. And it now grounds the attempts 
of some brain science to identify the physical bases of consciousness, not 
solely as that which makes consciousness possible, but as that to which 
consciousness can, finally, be reduced. If the mind just is the brain then 
thoughts just are physical events, and the Cartesian enigma, the problem of 
how mental substance can interact with physical substance, can be dissolved. 
Unfortunately it is not clear that this will be possible; not because it is too 
difficult, but because it would seem that there is more to thought than 
physical events, even if it can be explained entirely in terms of them. 
To describe thoughts in terms of electro-chemical interactions will be to 
miss what is important about them, i.e., to fail to really describe thoughts. To 
explain to someone how their behaviour is absolutely mechanistically deter-
mined, or probabilistically determined, in virtue of its being part of a very 
complex determinate physical mechanism or of some kind of quantum 
system, will not do away with the necessity of their choosing. Whatever 
consciousness looks like from the Ôoutside,Õ it will still have an inside which 
cannot be captured in the same way. In an essay on Merleau-PontyÕs relation-
ship to the thought of Gilbert Ryle, Gabrielle Bennet Jackson writes, 
 
Gilbert Ryle is credited with identifying and opposing Ôthe Dogma of the Ghost in 
the Machine.Õ But Ryle was not just interested in exorcising the Ghost. He was 
also occupied in dismantling the Machine. [É] Ryle simply was not interested in 
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defending the claim that all statements about the mind are translateable into 
statements about mechanical bodily behaviour. Indeed, he rejected this claim out-
right. ÔIf my argument is successful,Õ he wrote, Ôthe hallowed contrast between 
*+nd and *atter will be dissipated, but dissipated not by either of the equally hal-
lowed absorptions of *ind by *atter or of *atter by *ind, but in quite a different 
way..36 
  
This is in part due to the fact that thought deals with structured patterns 
of part and whole which cannot be adequately accounted for by a three-
dimensional geometry. Merleau-Ponty takes up this idea in his early work, 
drawing on the thought of the gestalt psychologists: As Ted Toadvine has it, 
Òthe position established in The Structure of Behaviour is foundational because 
it aims to reconcile mind and natureÓ and so to move from the purely tran-
scendental Husserlian philosophy to a philosophy which is reinstalled in the 
body and the lived world Òby starting from the holistic and meaningful 
configurations already encountered in the perceptual world.Ó Merleau-
PontyÕs notion of Structure is the necessary ground for the possibility of 
ÔbehaviourÕ which cannot be determined in any simple way, which must in 
some sense organise itself. ÒStructure characterizes the natural world as a self-
organizing system of ÔgestaltsÕ — embodied and meaningful relational con-
figurations or structures. Physical matter, organic life, and conscious minds 
are increasingly complex strata of such gestalts.Ó37 This helps to explain the 
necessity, for Merleau-Ponty, of thinking the perceived world not as distin-
guished from the world as it is but as grounding any idea we might have of the 
world as it is: Òthe function, Ôfigure and ground,Õ has a meaning only in the 
perceived world: it is there that we learn what it is to be a figure and what it 
is to be a ground. The perceived would be explicable by the perceived itself, 
and not by psychological processes.Ó Reducing perception to atomic physical 
sensations will fail to get to grips with perception as a structured phenome-
non at all.  
 
O/ the basis of a word as a physical phenomenon, as an ensemble of vibrations in 
the air, no physiological phenomenon capable of serving as a substrate for the si4-
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nification of the word could be described in the brain; for we have seen that, in 
audition and also in speaking, a word as an ensemble of motor or afferent excita-
tions presupposes a word as a melodic structure and this latter presupposes a sen-
tence as a unity of signification.38 
 
The idea of a melody is often used to explain this Gestalt notion. As Arne 
Naess puts it, ÒWhatever the part of the melody that is heard, the particular 
character of the whole influences the experience of the part.Ó A melody is not 
made up of parts, just as a perception is not made up of atomic sensations. ÒA 
ÔpartÕ of a gestalt is more than a part. That is, if we listen to a part of an 
unknown melody the experience is different from listening to that part when 
the melody is known.Ó39 
The melody example is helpful insofar as it introduces the dimension of 
time, in the sense that BergsonÕs thought demanded: time as felt dure rather 
than as space stretched out along a line. EuclidÕs geometry, of course, was not 
concerned to deal with time but only with space. Galileo, however, in plot-
ting the paths of the planets around the sun had to conceive of a time that 
was absolute and linear, like a fourth dimension of Euclidean geometry. No 
longer was this notion of time tied to the time of the earth as structured by 
years, seasons, day and night, but rather was stretched out as an Ôempty 
container,Õ like EuclidÕs space, in the unstructured time of the sun which 
relativises the structured times of the motions of the planets. This notion of 
time, and of the universe working as a great machine or a celestial clock, 
occasions the development of geometrism into mechanism. 
As we moved from a picture of the world constructed and operating ac-
cording to the unchanging laws of a God or gods to one based on the ability 
of humans to construct self-regulating systems in the form of machines, the 
ÔgeometricÕ view of the physical world as a pure for-itself, divided from an in-
itself which is totally alien to nature, develops into the ÔmechanisticÕ view 
which seeks to explain the apparent appearance of the for-itself (as subjectiv-
ity, desire, freedom, intentionality, and purpose) in terms of the in-itself: 
what looks like something alien to the Ônatural worldÕ of particles in motion is 
in fact just a very complicated machine which is ultimately reducible to them. 
In this way I understand mechanism as a development of geometrism which 
presents fundamentally the same problems (though they may be superficially 
different). David Abram argues that it was Descartes who firmly established 
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in modern thought the notion that material reality could be spoken of in 
strictly mechanical terms, building on GalileoÕs abstraction of physicality 
from all subjective experience.69 Merleau- onty himself says that Òwhen we 
think of space, we think of an intellectual unity (cf. Geometry, 163 ); when we 
see it, we find ourselves faced with juxtaposed parts. The mode of action in 
this real extension can only be movement; hence artesian mechanism. 41 
Merleau- onty goes on to make a distinction between the mathematical and 
mechanical conceptions of nature whose continuity we have here been 
emphasising  
 
Spinoza, on the contrary, does not recognize this opposition between real exten-
sion and extension in thought. The relation between the two terms is a wholly dif-
ferent relation; an intrinsic relation, a correlation between the idea and its ideatum 
(idat). The idea of intelligible space and the idea of perceived space are separated 
only by a difference of more or less finite ideation. Likewise, mechanism is also 
not found in Spinoza: mathematics envelops all. Physical actions are no longer re-
duced to the transports of movement, but rather to intelligible relations. The possi-
ble and the actual are equivalent.42 
 
The mechanical notion of nature, it seems clear, lies behind that mpiri-
cist realism which Merleau- onty rejected along with a rationalist intellectu-
alism which would seem to derive from that mathematised notion of nature 
which paved the way for mechanism. Thus though their philosophical out-
workings might be different, they stem from the same root, and, as we saw in 
the first chapter, they share the same fundamental problems. 
 
In The Structure of Behaviour, animality constitutes for Merleau- nty a 
level of being which exceeds the purely physical. This is not to say that it is 
non-physical; it is closer to AristotleÕs understanding of the animal as posses-
sor of an Ôanimal soulÕ which is not a substance but its Ôprinciple of lifeÕ. An 
animal, unlike the non-living, displays behaviour properly speaking. To say 
that the animal behaves is to say that what it does is not to be understood in 
terms of mechanical cause and effect but rather in vital terms; what it does is 
not simply obey the laws of physics but rather obey some kind of internal law. 
n his first major work, Merleau- onty gives an extended analysis of reflex 
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behaviours in humans and animals, showing how reflexes which seem to be 
explained by a theory of pre-established correlations, on a mechanistic model, 
between stimulus and response,43 in fact respond to and are conditioned by 
global elements as well as by immediate stimuli. In this way experimental 
results problematise the mechanistic understanding of reflexes.  
Merleau-Ponty uses Gestalt theory to develop an understanding of reflex 
behaviours as a basic case of behaviour properly speaking, which responds to 
its environment, its milieu, in a manner which is not mechanistic but which 
takes account of the animalÕs total situation, relating this to the notion of 
Umwelt in the proto-ecologist Jacob von Uexkll. Merleau-Ponty gives many 
examples, just one is that of a person whose reflex response to a jarring mis-
step varies according to whether he is walking uphill or downhill: If I mis-
step, for example I catch my foot on root, while walking uphill, Òthe flexor 
muscles of the foot are suddenly relaxed and the organism reacts by accentu-
ating this relaxation, which will liberate my foot.Ó But the reflex response is 
different when I am walking down a hill. ÒIf [É] I miss my step while coming 
down a mountain and my heel strikes the ground sharply before the sole of 
the foot, the flexor muscles are once again relaxed suddenly, but the organism 
reacts instantly by a contraction.Ó44 
The variation in response is conditioned by what Kurt Goldstein calls Òthe 
holistic utilization of stimuli,Ó45 and the response is conditioned by the 
meaning of the situation to the organism. Merleau-Ponty deals with manifold 
examples, many of them quite complex, in the first two sections of Structure, 
on ÒReflex BehaviourÓ and ÒHigher Forms of Behaviour,Ó which demonstrate 
animal behaviour of this kind: what Merleau-Ponty calls behaviour is pre-
cisely this kind of action which responds to a total situation understood as a 
structured relation between the animal and his environment. In his late 
lectures on Nature, Merleau-PontyÕs thought is still determined by this 
structured behaviour; there he writes ÒThe body belongs to a dynamic of 
behaviour. Behaviour is sunk into corporeity. The organism does not exist as 
a thing endowed with absolute properties, as fragments of Cartesian space.Ó46 
This understanding of behaviour must totally escape the geometrical concep-
tion of nature.  
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Merleau-PontyÕs use of the word behaviour is a response to the behaviour-
ism which held sway amongst many psychologists in his time, and which 
continues to do so. According to Albert Rabil, ÒIf the adequacy of a scientific 
theory depends on its ability to account for the phenomena, then behaviour-
ism fails,Ó47 because, as Merleau-Ponty has shown, it cannot account for the 
changing reactions according to global, structural conditions at the level of 
the organism and because the notion of ÔstimulusÕ itself cannot be adequately 
defined without reference to the organismÕs structured relation to its Umwelt. 
In MidgleyÕs striking phrase, the division between behaviourism and intro-
spectionism in psychology has reduced that field Òto the state in which the 
study of teapots would be if one half of the people engaged in it were sworn 
as a matter of professional pride never to mention the inside of a teapot, 
while the other half were just as unwilling ever to mention the outside.Ó48 
And as Rabil is keen to make clear, this dispute is not simply a methodo-
logical one. It is a philosophical matter with roots that go back at least as far 
as Plato, which seeks to isolate a simply-defined domain of the ÔrealÕ which 
escapes the complexity and ambiguity of our primary intuitions.  
 
The problem is to give a philosophical explanation of the structure of behaviour 
which will not be subject to the criticisms that can be brought against idealism 
and materialism. =>at is necessary for this task is an ?enlarged reason@ which can 
deal with the lived world without reducing it to mind or matter, without bifurcatB
ing it, and without declaring it unintelligible.49 
 
In many ways Merleau-PontyÕs use of the notion of Umwelt (which derives 
from the thought of von Uexkll, via Husserl) is as the correlate of the notion 
of behaviour. His project in The Structure of Behaviour involves showing that 
reflex actions are not purely mechanistically determined. They can no longer 
be thought to belong purely to the order of the in-itself. But neither are they 
of the order of the for-itself: they are not the result of acts of will nor of 
freedom on any normal understanding of that word; neither are they com-
pelled or determined. They belong to the order of the living being acting in 
response to its world; not its blo!e Sachen physical surroundings but its Um-
welt, its environment. 
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So behaviour is not a result of consciousness or of thinking, of the cognitive 
order, but of the vital order of animality. This order will ground the mental 
and bind it to the physical order, but behaviour, as Hamrick and van der 
Veken observe, does not depend on consciousness.50 
 
Gestalt Ontology & Human 
Exceptionalism 
Arne Naess, in his short article ÒReflections on Gestalt Ontology,Ó notes 
that Òthinking in terms of gestalt ontology implies rejection of at least one 
central part of Gestalt Psychology, but certainly not all.Ó51 He notes that 
Husserl almost entirely rejected Gestalt Psychology, and certainly Merleau-
Ponty criticises the movement for, in the words of Forrest Williams, Òfailing 
to live up to their own findings [É] he in effect accused them [in The Structure 
of Behaviour] of running with the hares of Gestalt theory while hunting with 
the hounds of Cartesian dualism.Ó52 That is to say, they were willing to 
investigate the operations of the mind in gestalt terms but not to apply these 
terms to their understanding of the Ôreal worldÕ: they confine structure to the 
mind and expel it from nature. 
 
The Ògestalt ontologyÓ proposed in Structure anticipates later systems-theoretical 
descriptions of nature by treating physical, vital, and mental structures as nested 
sets of holistic relations. Eet gestalts in Qerleau-VXZty[s sense are irreducible to 
systems in the realist
[
s sense of this term, no matter how holistic or relational, be-
cause the gestalts of which reality is composed are essentially perceptual. \ature 
at its most fundamental level is meaningful and e]^eriential; its structures manifest 
the kind of unity and coherence that characteri_es perceptual wholes.`a 
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This claim, made by Ted Toadvine, might initially seem confusing: on the 
one hand, gestalts are not systems in the realistÕs sense, they are structures of 
perception. Yet nature itself is fundamentally characterised by these struc-
tures. We would normally think that perception belongs in the mind, and not 
in the extended reality of nature. But this reveals that we are still too Carte-
sian. For Merleau-Ponty, the perceived world is basic, the fundament from 
which extended nature must be abstracted. And the perceived world is 
always-already structured. Toadvine goes on, 
 
According to Merleau-PontyÕs analysis, vital form is more than simply a complex 
physical system because it introduces original and irreducible properties inexpli-
cable at the physical level. [É] Consequently, the organism is oriented toward a 
ÒmilieuÓ or ÒenvironmentÓ distinct from the world described by physics.54 
 
Toadvine goes on to spell out that just as the vital order cannot be reduced 
to the physical order, so for Merleau-Ponty in The Structure of Behaviour, the 
human order cannot be reduced to the vital. 
 
On the one hand, the description of the vital level allows us to reconceive the 
emergence of human consciousness from a level of perceptual involvement within 
which it remains oriented toward the physiognomies and sensible configurations 
of the world, rather than the ÔtrueÕ objects of the scientific realist. But the specifi-
cally human dialectic transcends this Ôlived consciousness.Õ55 
 
In the previous chapter we proposed that we might consider the human 
being as Ôthe hungry animalÕ. Do we need to look for the difference between 
human beings and other animals, and other forms of life? In part, as Teilhard 
de Chardin suggests, we do need to understand humanity in its difference 
from other animals, because we are human. And on the face of things, hu-
mans seem to play a different role on the life of the planet than do most 
other animals. 
But does Merleau-PontyÕs distinction between the ÔvitalÕ and the ÔhumanÕ in 
The Structure of Behaviour betray his anti-dualistic motivation and constitute a 
problematic exceptionalism? It is a good start, at least, to acknowledge that 
humans are animals and that their humanity is not divorced from their 
animality, as Merleau-Ponty does. And we may think that his use of the term 
                                                
54 Toadvine, Merleau-PontyÕs Philosophy of Nature, 82. 
55 Toadvine, Merleau-PontyÕs Philosophy of Nature, 82–3. 
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ÔhumanÕ to name the highest order of being is incidental; it is an order which 
we encounter in other human beings, and there is nothing in principle which 
would prevent us from acknowledging it in other beings if we were to find it 
in them. Further, as Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy develops he ceases to use 
the term ÔhumanÕ to describe the order of thought, as his complex reflections 
on animality in the lectures on nature show. Nevertheless, there remains a 
structural difference between some human behaviour and common animal 
behaviour, of which we may sensibly try to give an account. Midgley suggests 
that Òinstead of a single distinguishing mark for man, we look rather for a 
knot of general structural properties.Ó56 Indeed, to think about nature is to 
demand that we be able to give an account of our difference from it. As Kate 
Soper puts it 
 
all ecological injunctions Ñ whether to sacrifice our own interests to those of na-
ture, or to preserve nature in the interests of our future well being, to keep our 
hands off it, or to harness it in sustainable ways, to appreciate the threat we pose 
to nature or to recognize our kinship with it Ñ are clearly rooted in the idea of 
human distinctiveness. For insofar as the appeal is to humanity to alter its ways, it 
presupposes our possession of capacities by which we are singled out from other 
living creatures and inorganic matter.57 
 
For animals, their engagement with the world is determined by a relatively 
fixed orientation to their environment which is for the most part given by the 
demands of their species. These demands may be labile at an evolutionary 
level; indeed they must be so if one species is to emerge from another. But 
this lability belongs to the animal in its lived dialectic with its Umwelt and to 
the interaction of animal and world in a way that is very different from 
human lability. Animals are not, for the most part, labile at the lived level. 
This need not be a matter of absolutes, and indeed later, as the implications 
of Merleau-PontyÕs thought on this matter are being worked out more fully in 
the notes for the lectures on Nature, Merleau-Ponty will take the view that 
animality does attain this lived lability, precisely where we see what is prop-
erly human prefigured in animality. He writes of Òstrange anticipations or 
caricatures of the human in the animal,Ó as the human body emerges Òas 
different from the animal, not by the addition of reason, but [É] in the 
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Ineinander with the animal [É] just as higher life appeared as singular points 
of physical Nature.Ó58 So Òwe must say: Animality and human being are given 
only together, within a whole of Being that would have been visible ahead of 
time in the first animal had there been someone to read it.Ó59 
On Hamrick and van der VekenÕs understanding, Merleau-Ponty needs, if 
he is to establish a new ontology, to achieve a Òdouble overcoming,Ó doing 
away with the philosophy of consciousness which is still suggested by his 
earlier thought, and overthrowing Òthe Galilean–Cartesian concept of Nature 
that, as he stated in his first nature course, Òstill overhangs contemporary 
ideas about Nature,Ó60 and which we all too often fail to notice in their 
privileged position, still highly determinative of our thought. Merleau-Ponty 
addresses both these problems in the terms of his continued development of 
a new understanding of perception, one that continues to privilege vision but 
which does so in order to overturn the Cartesian scopic regime. We will turn, 
in the following chapter, to interrogate and to develop a Merleau-Pontyan 
understanding of vision, as a route towards this Ôdouble overcoming.Õ This will 
lay the ground for the positive development of the ontology of flesh, which is 
brought to expression in the human orientation to the virtual: Òhumans have 
the capacity to vary their points of view and adopt an orientation toward the 
virtual as such, toward the Ôstructure of structureÕ itself,Ó61 writes Toadvine, 
and this orientation to the virtual, which arises from and is prefigured in 
perception, reorientates life towards a single, ÔtrueÕ world of intercorporeality, 
reconfiguring the physical through expression and desire. For Merleau-Ponty, 
in the notes for his Nature lectures, Òthe human body is symbolism — not in 
the superficial sense, i.e., where a representative term takes the place of 
another, — but in the fundamental sense of: expressive of another. Percep-
tion and movement symbolize.Ó62 But this symbolism leads us not into a 
world of thought determined by symbols, not into intertextuality, but into 
History, where my own body in its historicity rejoins nature, and sediments 
there its operations of expression and desire, to find itself necessarily in-
volved in the world of praxis and of politics, as Merleau-Ponty had already 
anticipated in 1947: 
                                                
58 Nature, 214. 
59 Nature, 271. 
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What accounts for there being a human history is that man is a being who exter-
nalizes himself, who needs others and nature to fulfill himself, who individualizes 
himself by appropriating certain goods and thereby enters into conflict with other 
men.63 
                                                
63 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror: The Communist Problem, trans. John 
OÕNeill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 102. 
Part Two: 
 
Ontology 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ÔRestoring sight 
to the BlindÕ: 
Towards a renewed 
understanding of 
visual perception 
 
 
We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: 
formulae of this kind express a faith common to the 
natural man and the philosopher Ñ the moment he 
opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-seated set of mute 
ÔopinionsÕ implicated in our lives. But what is strange 
about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into the-
ses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this we, 
what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into 
a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions.1 
 
 
he old ontology (which is characteristic of the ÔObjective ThoughtÕ 
against which Merleau-Ponty argues in The Phenomenology of Percep-
tion) tends to think of nature as Ôpure externalityÕ which stands in 
contrast to the pure internality of subjectivity. This contrast is expressed in 
the dominance of linear perspective in image-making. This perspectiva artifici-
alis in turn reinforces an understanding of seeing as something like looking 
through a window; as static, passive, distanced, and separated from the other 
senses. We have seen, in the first chapter, how Merleau-Ponty challenges the 
objectivist notion of perception through the notion of reversibility, which 
extends from its conspicuous role in the sense of touch to a subtler but 
equally important place in the sense of sight. I have spoken of the perceptual 
                                                
1 The Visible and the Invisible, 3. 
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faith which is necessary for perception to serve as a ground of knowledge. 
We have then thought through the notion of perception on the basis of the 
sense of taste and eating more generally, rather than the sense of sight which 
philosophy has traditionally made paradigmatic for perception. I questioned 
there the notion of the hierarchy of the senses and suggested briefly that the 
senses might be best understood in their relation to one another, referring to 
Merleau-PontyÕs thought that the separated senses are abstractions from a 
primary synaesthesia. In this chapter I will attempt to synthesise a new 
model of vision that will help us to develop an ontology of flesh on the basis 
of Merleau-PontyÕs thought, and in the next I will develop this ontology in 
terms of Merleau-PontyÕs notion of institution and the logic of incarnation 
implied in this ontology. 
 
Sight in the Cave 
Martin Jay observes that our ordinary language is deeply marked by meta-
phors of vision, and that our cultural understanding of vision is entwined with 
a philosophical construction, which thus affects human history in its unfold-
ing. Religious understandings, from primitive sun-worship to sophisticated 
metaphors of light in developed theologies, are closely related to our thinking 
about sight.2 Manichaean Gnosticism and Zoroastrian dualism strongly divide 
the light of the sacred from the corrupt and sometimes evil heaviness of the 
material world; the popular quasi-Christian eschatology of contemporary  
capitalism views heaven as a bright, weightless world of pure light opposed to 
the darkness and suffering of bodily life.3 The spiritual truth-seeker is some-
times viewed as the bearer of a third sight, the seeing of the Ôeye of the soul,Õ 
and this can (as, we shall see, in Plato) be contrasted to the frailty of bodily 
sight, or (as, for example, in Augustine) be seen as higher than but continuous 
with bodily sight,4 or, more strongly (as in St. John of DamascusÕ On the 
                                                
2 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 12–14. 
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Hope (London: SPCK, 2007), 24: Heaven Òis somewhere you believe in [É] itÕs a beautiful 
place where you can sit on soft clouds and talk to other people who are there. At night 
you can sit next to the stars, which are the brightest of anywhere in the universe.Ó 
4 For Augustine, Òcorporeal vision is ordered to the spiritual, and the spiritual to the 
intellectual.Ó The Literal Meaning of Genesis (De Genesi ad Litteram), trans. J. H Taylor (New 
York, 1982), book 12, ch. 8.20, cited in Janet Soskice, ÒSight and Vision in Medieval 
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Divine Images) as the completion and fulfilment of bodily sight, which is not 
conceived as lower than but as a necessary precursor to spiritual sight.5 
Nevertheless, suspicions of terrestrial sight have often dominated religious 
movements, as in the Islamic rejection of figural representation, amongst the 
Byzantine iconoclasts with whom John of Damascus argues, and motivating 
the Beeldenstorm of the Reformation. 
For Janet Soskice, JayÕs implicit claim that the Christian tradition is for the 
most part antiocular or antioculocentric is hard to resolve with the beauty of 
Medieval cathedrals, whose architecture so powerfully leads the eye, as well as 
with Byzantine icons, early Renaissance painting, and so on.6 There has been 
great variety in attitudes to vision within Christianity and in religious tradi-
tions more generally, and no ÒmonolithicÓ position can be taken for granted, 
although it is clear that orthodoxy affirms the place of vision as at the very 
least instrumental for knowledge of God and knowledge of the world. Soskice 
rightly claims that we can certainly say that patristic and medieval aesthetics 
were driven by theological concerns and in this regard are very different from 
modern understandings of vision, in crucial ways. The overlapping concerns 
of humanist science, protestant iconoclasm and puritan nonconformism, in 
Britain especially, were bound up with the rise of deism, which conceived of 
God as distant from the world, as the one who views the world from a pure 
outside, rather than being incarnated in it, and of human rationality as 
belonging to a Cartesian soul whose relation to the world is contingent, 
rather than to an essentially corporeal, sensual human body. Soskice observes, 
Ònot surprisingly, man was soon to discover that he could dispense with the 
divine hypothesis and do his ÔGodÕs-eye-viewingÕ for himself. This doctrine is 
perhaps the early modern theological background of the gaze.Ó7 To this topic 
of the gaze as the normative model for vision, and its alternative, the glance, 
we shall return later.  
Jay is also uncompromising in his insistence on the importance of under-
standing the metaphor of sight for philosophy in general. ÒThe development 
of Western philosophy cannot be understood,Ó for him, Òwithout attending 
                                                                                                                           
Christian Thought,Ó in Vision in Context: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Sight, 
edited by Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay (New York: Routledge, 1996), 34. 
5 ÒWe are led to the understanding of divine and immaterial things by using material 
imagesÓ St. John of Damascus, On the Divine Images: Three Apologies Against those who attack 
the Divine Images, trans. David Anderson (New York: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 1980) 
35. 
6 Soskice, ÒSight and Vision,Ó 36. 
7 Soskice, ÒSight and Vision,Ó 37. 
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to its habitual dependence on visual metaphors of one sort or another.Ó8 The 
shadows in PlatoÕs cave, AugustineÕs divine light, DescartesÕ need for ideas 
which are clear and distinct before a steadfast mental gaze, and indeed the 
very notion of enlightenment, depend on a privileging of the eye above the 
other organs of sense. ÒWhether in terms of speculation, observation, or 
revelatory illumination, Western philosophy has tended to accept without 
question the traditional sensual hierarchy.Ó9 
Hans Jonas emphasises, with Merleau-Ponty and so many other recent 
thinkers on vision, the importance of movement for sight: 
 
What is obvious in the case of touch, seems at first inapplicable to the case of 
sight: that its cognitive feat should depend on movement. bor was not the point of 
our essay precisely that sight is the sense of the passive observer par excellencec 
dhjt to look at things, at the world at large, is compatible with a state of complete 
rest, which even seems the optimal condition for visual attention and contempla-
tionc Was not even the whole opposition of Òtheory versus practice,Ó and hence of 
the vita contemplativa versus the vita activa, derived from this very aspect of vi-
sion
c
dhis still stands. ket we should not be able to ÒseeÓ if we had not previously 
moved. We should, e.g., not see the world arranged in depth, stretching away 
from us indefinitely, if we were not more than seeing creatures: if we were not 
creatures that also can move into space and have done so in the past.no 
 
This begins to show us the problem with one of the oldest metaphors in 
philosophy, that of PlatoÕs Cave, from The Re ublic.  This allegory comes at 
the end of a trio of examples Plato gives to demonstrate how the ideal ÔGoodÕ 
relates to the government of his Republic. The first example is the Simile of 
the Sun, which already conceives sight under a certain passive conception and 
understands knowledge of the good under an analogy with it. In the Visible 
world, the Sun is the source of light and of growth, making visible sensible 
objects and thus making possible visual perception, the exercise of the faculty 
of sight. Similarly, in the world of the Platonic Forms, the Good is the source 
of reality and truth, making intelligible the objects of thought and thus 
making possible knowledge, the exercise of the faculty of knowing.11 
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Plato follows this with the analogy of the Divided Line, in which reality is 
divided again into the two orders of visibility and intelligibility. The visible 
order is subdivided into two further orders: the order of illusions, reflections 
and shadows, and that of physical objects. PlatoÕs extreme rationalism is 
highlighted by his ascribing the world of physical objects (and, in the later 
Timaeus, the physical sciences12) to the domain of belief (pistis), as opposed to 
the (uncritical) reasoning of mathematical knowledge (dianoia) and the full 
knowledge of the forms (noesis) which, though attained by the use of assump-
tions, does not depend on them and is able to revise all true knowledge (of 
the forms) by derivation from knowledge of the highest principle, the Good. 
After these two preparatory examples we get to the famous allegory of the 
Cave, in which prisoners have been secured immobile since childhood, able 
only to see a wall onto which are cast the shadows of puppets moved around 
by persons behind them, by the light of a fire they are unable to see. They 
would believe that these shadows and their accompanying noises would seem 
fully real to these prisoners who knew nothing else. And if one of the prison-
ers were released, he would shrink from the light of the fire and of the out-
side sun, and, if he were forced nevertheless to continue, the things he saw 
would at first seem fantastical to him. Eventually Òhe would come to the 
conclusion that it is the sun that produces the changing seasons and years and 
controls everything in the visible world, and is in a sense responsible for 
everything that he and his fellow-prisoners used to see.Ó13 If he were to return 
to the cave he would find himself unable to see, and the other prisoners 
would think that his visit to the upper regions had ruined his sight, and would 
resist if anyone tried to make them go up there. 
The elegance of this allegory has led to its becoming one of the best known 
in the history of philosophy, and it has acquired a force greater than that 
given to many arguments, in spite of the fact that it is not an argument but a 
story; and its force is limited by some basic problems. As we hope to make 
clear, the ÔsightÕ of those bound in the cave has somehow become the model 
on which philosophers understand sight, that of a passive viewer unable to 
move, looking at a depthless image and somehow having to reconstruct from 
this a whole world. But the inhabitants of PlatoÕs cave cannot truly be living 
beings; they do not eat, and were they to eat they would not think of the 
world of shadows as a greater reality than the world of tastes. If there were no 
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further contrivance to prevent them from seeing their food in the dim light 
of the fire, then they would know the difference between the tangible world 
to which their food belonged and the specular world of the shadows. And as 
Slavoj !i"ek notes in The Parallax View 
 
There is a deeper problem here [É] which could be best put in HegelÕs terms. We 
can, of course, start with the naive notion of people perceiving true reality from a 
limited/distorted perspective, and thus constructing in their imagination false idols 
which they mistake for the real thing; the problem with this naive notion is that it 
reserves for us the external position of a neutral observer who can, from his safe 
place, compare true reality with its distorted mis(perception). What gets lost here is 
that all of us are these people in the cave Ñ so how can we, immersed in the 
caveÕs spectacle, step onto our own shoulder, as it were, and gain insight into true 
reality?14 
 
The bifurcations of the dividing line are based on a model of things which 
can only be presumptuously conceived. The analogy of the light we see, and 
its source in the sun, is needed to get there, only to be discarded as the 
ÔbeliefÕ of inferior knowledge of physical things compared to the true knowl-
edge of the contemplation of the forms. And this model of sight as the purely 
passive reception of the sunÕs light is problematic. 
David Morris, in The Sense of Space, describes an artwork, Atlan by James 
Turrell, seen in 1986 in the Muse dÕart contemporain de Montral. In a 
darkened room, the viewer sees a rectangle of blue light on the wall, which 
looks like that light cast by a projector without any input, as if there is some 
technical problem or a projected video has ended. He wonders what he is 
really supposed to be seeing. 
 
The whole experience is obscure, ambiguous, and vague. So you wander around. 
You discover there is no projector playing the beam. As you move, you perceive 
that the rectangle doesnÕt sit right; there is something strange, disturbing about it. I 
would put it this way: your movement provokes a queasy question as to the being 
of the rectangle, it directly provokes ontological unease. Eventually, you discover 
there is neither a flat rectangle nor a wall behind it: there is a rectangular hole in 
the wall, and behind it a ganzfeld, a uniformly lit room (in this case lit with ultra-
violet light). Where you perceived a flat rectangle, there is nothing.15 
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For Morris, this example shows us how in normal perception, we have a 
sense of the inexhaustibility of things, the fact that they transcend any 
perspective we have on them, and its connection with the inexhaustibility of 
the places in which we have our perceptions of things, that they constantly 
change as we move about in relation to them through the available space. 
By contrast, we could say that the Platonic prisoners in the cave do not 
have an experience of sight at all; there is no ÔplaceÕ available to them but only 
the confusion of a pure and passive reception of sense-data based on light 
entering the eyes. 
 
Sight as Representation 
Visual perception has been understood, at least since PlatoÕs cave, on the 
model of representation. The shadows on the cave wall of the analogy are 
soon redoubled as the inner representation of outer things. The information 
carried by light enters the eyes, but must be reconstructed in some way, by 
the soul, the mind or the brain, into something inside which is knowable. On 
this model, the inner reconstruction of something outer is the very meaning of 
perception. What would it be to deny this? If perception is not inner represen-
tation, what can it be? 
Although this issue is not directly addressed in the Phenomenology of Percep-
tion, the critique that Merleau-Ponty gives there of the intellectualist and 
Empiricist accounts of perception does imply a challenge to representational-
ism. As we saw in our first chapter, Merleau-Ponty argued there that percep-
tion cannot be an aggregation of sense-data, because if those sense data are 
reconstructed according to a model given by the perceptual object, then it is 
that model and not the sense-data which is the basis of the perception. And if 
they are not reconstructed according to a pattern given by the object but 
rather according to a pattern conceived in the perceiverÕs mind, then it is 
hard to see that what is happening is truly perception rather than imaginative 
reconstruction. This confusion between perception and imagination, which 
Todes saw in Kant, is what must be picked apart. 
Sight is strictly bound up, for Merleau-Ponty, with the existential dimen-
sion: ÒI have only to see something to know how to reach it and deal with it, 
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even if  do not know how this happens in the nervous machine.Ó19 My seeing 
is intertwined with action in such a way that Òmy mobile body makes a 
difference in the visible world, being a part of it; that is why  can steer 
through the visible.Ó But by the same token, vision is attached to movement 
and determined by action; it is not a purely passive process. Ò e see only 
what we look at. hat would vision be without eye movement Ó But if it is 
correct to say that it is not purely passive, how does the active element in 
perception contribute to it  oes it not falsify what is seen, introducing 
distortion into sight  Merleau-Ponty asks Òhow could the movement of the 
eyes bring things together if the movement were blind  f it were only reflex  
f it did not have its antennae, it clairvoyance  f vision were not prefigured 
in it Ó20 hat can it mean, then, for vision to be prefigured in sight  
For Merleau-Ponty in Ò ye and Mind,Ó it is still the case that Òthe enigma 
is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen.Ó21 The self who sees is not 
transparent, like the self who thinks or who imagines. ndeed, this difference 
between perception and imagining is crucial for TodesÕ account of what is 
wrong with the Kantian model of perception, in which conceptual categories 
must be applied to the data of sense; he calls this KantÕs Ôimagin ingÕ of 
perception. The imagination itself does not wander around among the 
imaginationÕs contents; the faculty of the imagination is the world to which 
imagined ob ects belong. But not so perceived things; they do not belong to 
perception but to a perceived world in which the perceiver and his faculty of 
perception are implicated and themselves appear.  
 
Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of 
the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, 
it holds things in a circle around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of it-
self; they are incrusted into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is 
made of the same stuff as the body.22 
 
e have imagined vision as if it were the operation of a mechanical device, 
as if the eye were an analogue of the camera. But the camera only transforms 
light from one mode into another; to understand the mechanics of seeing, 
and of light, as escartes so lucidly does in his Optics, is by no means to 
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account for seeing. This is not so for painting, and Merleau-Ponty makes a 
case for this in Eye and Mind. The painter Òis obliged to admit that objects 
before him pass into himÓ; painting presupposes having seen and made sense 
of the world (although in no sense having an ÔexplanationÕ of the world or an 
answer to its questions.) The world that the painter paints is a purely visible 
world, in which, nevertheless, the invisible appears: that is to say, the painter 
makes an image but the image is not just paint or light but also meaning. 
ÒPainting awakens and carries to its highest pitch a delirium which is vision 
itself, for to see is to have at a distance,Ó23 and while photography and the 
optical model of seeing it is built on can reveal the mechanics of light, can 
explain how the lens gathers the light from a distance into a single plane, and 
collapsing the distance, it can do nothing to explain what it means to have the 
object of sight. The seer grasps the world in its relation to himself, drinks in 
that world but affects it, moves around in it, shapes it, and changes it. The 
operation of seeing is much closer to that of painting than to that of a cam-
era. This is not to disparage photography, for the photographer is more than 
a camera, and often shapes his image in an art similar to the painterÕs; as 
many a photographer can tell you, the hardest photograph to take can be the 
one in which things are made to appear as they really look, in spite of the 
camera. 
So it is that, like a ghostly photograph, vision admits essence and existence, 
imaginary and real, visible and invisible, mixed up and sometimes dream-like. 
DescartesÕ Optics/Dioptric (the name of the text has been translated in both 
ways) is an attempt to unmix them, to meet DescartesÕ epistemological 
requirement of Ôclear and distinctÕ vision. As we have mentioned, this book 
was found open on Merleau-PontyÕs desk after he died unexpectedly in 1961. 
In his essay published a year earlier, he had written Òit is worthwhile to 
remember this attempt and its failure.Ó Of course, to call the optics a failure is 
not uncontentious; it is the earliest full statement of the theory of refraction, 
and as such was important in the early days of the construction of micro-
scopes, telescopes and corrective lenses. What Merleau-Ponty means is that 
while it may help us to find technical solutions to optical problems, it fails to 
help us understand what it is to see. DescartesÕ theories of reflection and 
refraction as explained in the optics are explained in terms of the imagined 
action of a small ball thrown at a hard surface or puncturing through a thin 
cloth. This makes light an Òaction by contactÓ and dispels Òthe whole problem 
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of visionÓ by doing away with Òaction at a distance.Ó24 So, Merleau-Ponty says, 
ÒA Cartesian does not see himself in the mirror; he sees a dummy, an Òout-
side,Ó which, he has every reason to believe, other people see in the very same 
way but which, no more for himself than for others, is not a body in the 
flesh.Ó25 The last lens in the optics of sight is there, the retina, the mechanical 
subject of vision, but no seer can appear since there is no real sight. It is clear 
that understanding the mechanics of sight will not and cannot lead us to 
make sense of what it is to see. 
With regard to representation, it is to DescartesÕ credit that, though he has 
no theory of how mechanical vision in the domain of res extensa becomes 
psychological sight in the domain of res cogitans, he denies that the action of 
light produces an inner mental representation of what is seen. Where Kepler 
and Leonardo knew that the workings of the eye as understood would pro-
duce an inverted image on the back of the retina, they assumed that there 
must be some mechanism by which the image was reinverted, since we see 
things the Ôright way up.Õ Kepler also assumed that there must be some 
mechanism by which the two retinal images are combined, in the brain, into a 
single mental image. Descartes recognised the problem with this view, 
writing ÒIt is necessary to beware of assuming that in order to sense, the 
mind needs to perceive certain images transmitted by the objects to the 
brain, as our philosophers commonly suppose,Ó which images, we philoso-
phers assume, must resemble the objects which they stand for, though we 
cannot understand how such resemblances would persist through the change 
from object in the world to object in the brain.  
 
And they have had no other reason for positing them except that, observing that a 
picture can easily stimulate our minds to conceive the object painted there, it 
seemed to them that in the same way, the mind should be stimulated by little pic-
tures which form in our head to conceive of those objects that touch our senses; 
instead, we should consider that there are many other things besides pictures 
which can stimulate our thought, such as, for example, signs and words, which do 
not in any way resemble the things which they signify.26 
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And it would seem that, whilst Merleau-Ponty uses DescartesÕ geometrism 
as a foil, and finds problems in his account of vision which ultimately stem 
from his metaphysics, we see here the brilliant Cartesian insights which kept 
driving Merleau-Ponty back to him: whilst there is no composite inner 
mental picture which the soul sees, Òrather, [É] it is the movements of which 
the picture is composed which, acting immediately on our mind inasmuch as 
it is united to our body, are so established by nature as to make it have such 
perceptions.Ó27 Descartes sees the problem with the homunculus theory 
which just repeats the problem of perception Ôinside the mind.Õ For him the 
inverted retinal image is not a problem, since we do not ÔseeÕ the retinal 
image, it is just a link in the mechanical-causal chain which transmits visual 
sense from world to mind. As regards the problem of the synthesis of the two 
retinal Ôimages,Õ Descartes recognises this also as a false problem deriving 
from the mistake of thinking that the retinal ÔimagesÕ are pictures which we 
see; we do not think it a problem if I touch something on my right with my 
right hand and something on my left with my left hand (or vice versa), nor 
indeed do we normally think that we need an explanation of why I do not 
seem to perceive two different objects if I touch the same thing with both 
hands.  
Later on Merleau-Ponty explains Òmy act of perception, in its unsophisti-
cated form, does not bring about this synthesis,Ó that is, the synthesis that 
perceptual experience presupposes,  
 
it takes advantage of work already done, of a general synthesis constituted once 
and for all, and this is what I mean when I say that I perceive with my body or my 
senses, since my body and my sense are precisely that familiarity with the world 
born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge.28 
 
This is easier to grasp with regards to tactile perception because we do not 
there have to deal with the complication of our tendency to think of percep-
tion as forming an Ôinner image,Õ as we do with visual perception. There is no 
mechanism by which the two retinal images are combined into a single 
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mental image; rather, my lived body is the incarnate principle of their joint 
and several access to the world. 
The denial of an inner visual representation seems to require a 
reformulation of certain visual problems. Alva No, in Action in Perception, 
takes up the example of perspective deformations, for example in the case 
that we see a plate from the side as elliptical, but we immediately interpret it 
as round. The image of the circular plate seen as comparable to a two-
dimensional ellipsis he calls the perspectival shape of the plate, in contrast to 
its actual shape, and, under normal circumstances, its perceived shape. For 
No we perceive the plate as round because we understand the transforma-
tions the perspectival shape undergoes as we move around the object. We 
have an implicit grasp of the Òsensorimotor profileÓ of the plate.29 So seeing 
the plate as round depends on the tacit knowledge that, looked at from a 
certain perspective, it is round. But this would seem to leave us with a prob-
lem, since all elliptical things will look circular from two perspectives, just as 
all rectangular things will look square from two perspectives; but some things 
look circular and some things look elliptical but not circular. Why? There 
must be some kind normative perspective that determines them, but where 
could such norms derive from? Not simply from our moving around an object 
but from our use of it. A plate is circular not just from the perspective of 
being directly above it when it is on the table, but also from the ÔperspectiveÕ 
of eating from it. 
The reason we have to learn to see things as appearing deformed, and the 
reason the formulation of linear perspective was such a momentous turning 
point in the history of art, is because things do not appear to us as deformed, 
but as a certain shape; as circular, in the case of the plate. We can, under 
poor conditions for seeing things, misrecognise their shapes; more often we 
see them indistinctly and either they are ignored or are perceived in a ques-
tioning way as a thing about which we are unsure. We only know that an 
illusion has occurred when we see a thing in a new light, from a perspective 
that gives the object a new shape because we can identify a new norm for its 
shape. The perspective deformations of linear perspective are an abstraction 
from this prior form of perception. The look of things, which No is happy to 
attribute to perspective, is not inexhaustibly variable but rather stable, and so 
is related (as we will see, and as etymology would suggest) to the Aristotelian 
notion of visible species. 
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No uses J.J. GibsonÕs notion of perceptual invariants to explain the differ-
ence between the perceived thing and its perspectival ÔlookÕ: 
 
As you move around a rectangular table, you perceive its varying trapezoidal per-
spectival shape. The perspectival shape varies as your spatial relation to the table 
varies. In this pattern of variation, however, there is invariance. Mathematically 
what is invariant is the relationship between the four angles and the four sides and 
their proportions. This invariance corresponds to the actual shape of the table. Ac-
tive exploration of the occlusion structure presents you with the actual shape of 
the table. The invariant structure of reality unfolds in the active exploration of ap-
pearances. 
 
For No, this position helps us to see that whilst phenomenalism is wrong, 
it gets a certain amount right about sense perception — that there is a 
difference between the ÔdataÕ our senses receive and what we perceive.  It 
seems that No is reluctant to accept the consequences to which his Ôenac-
tiveÕ view of perception seems to lead; he must allow for some objective 
account of the ÔlookÕ of things because his thought is still committed to a 
certain kind of objectivism, a naturalism that preserves the remnants of 
Cartesian dualism. The natural consequence of the fact that we see things and 
not images, that perception offers not atomic sense data but a world, which is 
independent of any judgment or synthesis of the contents of perception, 
would challenge this naturalism by suggesting that the meaningful contents of 
perception are really there in the world and not simply produced in my head. 
He struggles to hold together the claim that what he calls Ôlooks,Õ perspectival 
appropriations of objects, are Òobjective, environmental properties,Ó though 
dependent on the relations of light, object and perceiving body, with the 
claim that Òwhat is encountered in perception is not sensational qualities or 
sense data, but rather the world.Ó30 
This claim seems problematic. First, as I have already argued, a given 
ÔshapeÕ understood as an invariant structure which is perceived as a certain set 
of sensorimotor possibilities, insofar as its perspectival shape (or P-shape) will 
vary in certain understood ways as we move around it, is not experienced as a 
set of perspectives but as a shape. What is it about the circular plate that 
makes its shape normatively understood as specifically circular rather than as 
broadly elliptical and subject to a certain set of perspectival deformations? It 
would seem that the plateÕs circularity is something to do with its being 
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functionally or existentially circular; that is, that when eating from it, it takes 
up a circular part of the space of the table with which you are reckoning in 
using motor skills to get food from the table into your mouth. But how is the 
knowledge that the flattened, ÔroundÕ P-shape of the plate is normative 
related to our sensorimotor knowledge that links that P-shape with the other 
possible, elliptical P-shapes? Perhaps by the knowledge that if it does not 
look round, I am not close enough to it to eat from it. The normativity of 
ÔcircularÕ as the shape of the plate depends on more than the variation of the 
P-shape; from NoÕs perspective the shape which is taken as normative would 
seem to be conventional or arbitrary. But I want to argue that the plate really 
is round, and this is a property not of the way we usually use it but of the 
plate itself. For this to be the case, there must be something more than an 
invariance to the plate, there is an invariance which is specified in some way, 
which has a sens in the full set of implications of that French word; it has a 
kind of material meaning, an orientation. The set of perspectival shapes that 
can present the plate in thought are not primary; indeed, I want to argue, 
they do not present the plate at all, but it presents them. We see the plate as a 
circular thing without difficulty; seeing it as elliptical must be learnt. 
 
SartreÕs Look 
Peter de Bolla, in an article on visuality in Lacan, shows how LacanÕs ac-
count of the gaze is directly influenced by that of Sartre. For him, ÒThe gaze, 
as conceived by Sartre, is the gaze by which I am surprised — surprised in so 
far as it changes all the perspectives, the lines of force, of my world, orders it, 
from the point of nothingness where I am.Ó31 But Lacan rejects this phe-
nomenological analysis. For Sartre, subjectivity is thought of in terms of a 
single point of ÔnothingnessÕ in which is contained our absolute freedom, and 
this Ôfor-itselfÕ is installed among the Ôin-itselfÕ world of things as an alien in a 
foreign land. This makes the encounter with the ÔlookÕ of another strange, 
since Òthrough the look I experience the Other concretely as a free, con-
scious subject who causes there to be a world by temporalizing himself 
                                                
31 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p.84, cited in Peter de Bolla, ÒThe Visibility of Visual-
ity,Ó in Vision in Context: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Sight, edited by Teresa 
Brennan and Martin Jay, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 66. 
118 Part Two: Ontology 
 
toward his own possibilities.Ó32 She and I both are absolute nothingnesses in a 
world of positivity, but SartreÕs conception of subjectivity is strangely solip-
sistic, so that I cannot recognise the Other as a subject who mirrors my own 
subjectivity. The Other appears as a limit, so that when I feel myself looked 
at, as the object of anotherÕs gaze, I feel myself objectified, as identified, for 
the looker, with an object, my body, which, in SartreÕs philosophy, has very 
little to do with the real self of subjectivity. As objectified in this way I feel 
shame, for Sartre; recognising the Other as subject reduces me to an object 
before their subjectivity.33  
Lacan uses three diagrams, which de Bolla cites and which I have repro-
duced here. 
This first image is a model of 
the relationship constituted by 
the gaze which objectifies things, 
and it is in many ways familiar; it 
corresponds to the basis of Leon 
Battista AlbertiÕs formulation of 
linear perspective, in which the 
image reproduces at one remove 
the pattern of light as it would converge on a single geometrical point. Lacan 
notes that, on this understanding of vision as the operation of a monocular 
gaze, the subject is Ôvanished away,Õ and this would seem cognate with SartreÕs 
Cartesian reduction of the subject to a singular point of nothingness. 
Stephen Melville argues that this Sartrean conception of vision is the same 
as that which Frederic Jameson condemns as Òessentially pornographic,Ó34 
which is to say that, as in SartreÕs example of the voyeur looking through the 
keyhole, the looker is understood as absolutely outside the scene he looks at 
on this model. Although the sexual dimension of perception should not be 
given priority here, we want to say that in contrast to SartreÕs pornographic 
or onanistic voyeurism, Merleau-PontyÕs idea of vision will be more full-
bloodedly sexy.  The one I look at is a ÔthickÕ subject, desirable precisely 
because she escapes me, because she is not reducible to an object but consti-
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tutes a second person. This Thou, in the best case, in mutual recognition 
confirms my bodily existence as an expressive realisation of an ÔI,Õ though 
there is not full coincidence between our subjectivities, because expression is 
not transparent. In sexuality I relate to the other as another subject-object or 
body-subject; but this does Ònot mean that the body is the transparent 
integument of Spirit.Ó35 So it is that there  
 
is no doubt at all that we must recognize in modesty, desire and love in general a 
metaphysical significance, which means that they are incomprehensible if man is 
treated as a machine governed by natural laws, or even as Ôa bundle of instincts,Õ 
and that they are relevant to man as a consciousness and as a freedom.36 
 
SartreÕs Òobsessive hostility to visionÓ37 makes a positive metaphysics of 
intersubjectivity absolutely impossible; his narcissistic account of Ôthe lookÕ 
excludes the possibility of love in favour of a solipsistic kind of desire, making 
for a Òproblematic epistemologyÓ which is bound up, as we are seeing, with 
Òthe hegemony of space over timeÓ and with the domination of nature, as Jay 
has it, producing Òprofoundly disturbing intersubjective relations and the 
construction of a dangerously inauthentic version of the self.Ó38 
The second Lacanian image is 
the inverse of the first, and repre-
sents the Sartrean shameful sub-
ject, the object of the gaze 
observed from a single point in 
space to which his fullness feels 
reduced, not to an intention or to 
an awareness but to a simple Ôpoint 
of light.Õ It will be noted here that this Sartrean agon of the gaze is a trans-
formation into visual terms of the Hegelian narrative of Master and Slave. It 
is Hegel who calls the Òdisparity [É] between the ÔIÕ and the substance which 
is its objectÓ the negative,39 providing the basis for SartreÕs understanding of 
subjectivity as nothingness. For HegelÕs dialectic, the synthesis of recognition, 
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which must be the ground of self-consciousness, begins with the conflict that 
occurs when  
 
self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. 
This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other 
being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the 
other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self.40 
 
If the first image portrays the perspectival reduction of the world to a ge-
ometry characteristic of Idealism, the second portrays the same reduction as 
it occurs in Empiricism, in which seeing is reduced to operations on rays of 
light brought to a point. The Ôscreen,Õ Lacan insists, is the only way the 
subject can appear as a picture, and this structurally mirrors the EmpiricistsÕ 
mistake of thinking that the worldÕs appearance on a screen of some kind 
(the painting, the retina, the Ôinner representationÕ) helps us to understand 
what it is to see. LacanÕs third image combines these two and displays a 
thicker conception of subjectivity, no longer oscillating between two unstable 
states but combining the two as seer-seen, subject-object. This conception is 
better, but it does 
not do away with the 
logic of nothingness 
which Sartre inher-
ited from Hegel: the 
self is now seen as 
filling a space 
between the noth-
ingness of freedom 
and the pure positivity of the object, but still the conception of sight as a 
reduction to a single point remains. The spreading-out of sight, between the 
two eyes, across time, in a moving body, engaged with its objects in a bodily 
relation that exceeds visual apprehension, is still missing. 
The links between a geometrical ontology and the optical understanding of 
sight are becoming more obvious. SartreÕs account of the look also begins to 
reveal to us the location of these difficult conceptions of things in relation to 
a theological position, an understanding of God that similarly removes all 
thickness and dissolves an incarnational understanding into total transcen-
dence. For Sartre, shame depends on the encounter with the Other as objec-
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tifying subject, but this subject can appear as a Òthey,Ó and if I posit an 
eternal ÔtheyÕ ÒI thereby posit the eternity of my being-as-object and so 
perpetuate my shame. This is shame before God; that is, the recognition of 
my being-an-object before a subject which can never become an object.Ó41 
SartreÕs theology locates God as the absolute observer before whom the 
believer is an object with regards to the absolute. ÒI posit my being-an-object-
for-God as more real than my For-itself; I exist alienated and I cause myself 
to learn from outside what I must be. This is the origin of fear before God.Ó42 
Indeed, Sartre calls the existence of the Other Òmy original fall,Ó43 as if it were 
just this other with whom my freedom must contend that stops me from 
being a God. 
Melville, too points up the implicit theology of SartreÕs position, in which 
the big-ÔOÕ Other is the only true Òfirst person,Ó is Òhe who sees without being 
seenÓ and before whom Òall others are merely others with a small Ôo.ÕÓ44 Every 
second-person relation is denied, there is only subject and object of the gaze, 
no intersubjectivity, and the God in whom Sartre disbelieves is conceived as 
ultimate voyeur, looking through a keyhole into a dirty world, but not suscep-
tible to being discovered as are those upon whom he looks. As John Berger 
has it, the invention of (artificial) perspective centres the world around the 
single, immovable eye and so ÒThe visible world is arranged for the spectator 
as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God.Ó45 For Martin Jay,  
 
If the beholder was now the privileged center of perspectival vision, it is important 
to underline that his viewpoint was just that: a monocular, unblinking fixed eye 
(or, more precisely, abstract point), rather than the two active, stereoscopic eyes of 
embodied actual vision, which give us the experience of depth perception. This 
assumption led to a visual practice in which the living bodies of both the painter 
and the viewer were bracketed, at least tendentially, in favor of an eternalized eye 
above temporal duration.46 
 
The conception of sight has, in many different ways, sought to bridge the 
gap between the mind and the world by collapsing light into an absolute, 
geometrical point which crosses between the worlds of mind and nature. As 
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is possible in LacanÕs diagram, this pointÕs unintelligibility it resolved by 
thinking it as an illusory mirror image  the mind is brought to a point on the 
surface of the mirror  and the ÔnatureÕ which seems to appear on the other 
side is in fact just a reflection of the mind, for Idealism, and vice versa for 
Empiricism. The dualism is collapsed into a monism in which it is claimed 
that only one side of the mirror image (whichever side I think of as the side I 
am on, depending whether I think of my experience of the world or the 
world I experience as primary) is Ôreally there.Õ It is this confusion which a 
conception of vision drawing on the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
escape. 
On JayÕs account, Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy, like SartreÕs, is preoccupied 
with vision. But unlike SartreÕs, rather than accepting an account of emascu-
lated vision that condemns humanity to imprisonment in his individuality, 
Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy suggests and to some degree develops avenues 
for understanding vision which escape the Cartesian scopic regime. In JayÕs 
critique of anti-oculocentrism in twentieth century French thought, Merleau-
Ponty is the sole figure who provides a way forward from this wholesale 
rejection of the importance of vision. Merleau-PontyÕs version of phenome-
nology may Òplausibly be called a heroic attempt to reaffirm the nobility of 
vision on new and firmer grounds than those provided by the discredited 
Cartesian perspectivalist tradition.Ósu 
 
Descartes and the Optics 
DescartesÕ assessment of pictures in the Optics is based on consideration of 
copper plate etchings, which by their nature can only present geometrical 
line, without colour, texture, or shade. Merleau-Ponty criticises him for 
understanding etchings on the model of language. For Descartes, though an 
etching may represent things, it does not resemble them. ÒIt is only a bit of 
ink put down here and there on the paper.Ósv Perspective deformations 
preserve the differences from the scene itself which make an engraving a 
representative image and not a resemblance. Merleau-Ponty tells us this 
because  
 
What interests us in these famous analyses is that they make us aware of the fact 
that any theory of painting is a metaphysics. Descartes does not say much about 
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painting, and one might think it unfair on our part to make an issue out of a few 
pages on copper engravings. And yet even if he speaks of them only in passing, 
that in itself is significant. Painting for him is not a central operation contributing 
to the definition of our access to Being; it is a mode or a variant of thinking, where 
thinking is canonically defined according to intellectual possession and evidence. 
It is this option that is expressed within the little he does say, and a closer study of 
painting would lead to another philosophy.49 
 
How, exactly, is a theory of painting a metaphysics? Merleau-Ponty expli-
cates this point in dialogue with DescartesÕ views on depth. Descartes deals 
with copper engravings, which involve no colour, but only line, the outline or 
envelope of things, and this implies already an ontology like that of modern 
scientism, for which colour is not a real property of things but only a feature 
of our perception of them. The only primary properties are those of exten-
sion. ÒIf he had examined that other, deeper, opening upon things given us by 
secondary qualities, especially color, then [É] he would have found himself 
faced with the problem of a conceptless universality and a conceptless open-
ing upon things.Ó For Descartes, the perspective offered by this outline is the 
essence of the image: it makes us see a space where there is none. But with-
out any understanding of lived space, this can only be a mathematical space, 
an arrangement of points in pure emptiness. The image effaces itself, de-
materialises itself in order to construct a ÔrationalÕ space which enforces a 
depthless and emasculated notion of reason. In Erwin PanofskyÕs essay on 
that Linear Perspective which reached its full development in the renais-
sance, he writes, 
 
In order to guarantee a fully rational Ñ that is, infinite, unchanging and homoge-
neous Ñ space, this Òcentral perspectiveÓ makes two tacit but essential assump-
tions: first, that we see with a single and immobile eye, and second, that the planar 
cross section of the visual pyramid can pass for an adequate reproduction of our 
optical image. In fact these two premises are rather bold abstractions from reality, 
if by ÒrealityÓ we mean the actual subjective optical impression.50  
 
We must notice that when Merleau-Ponty speaks of a theory of painting, 
he is not speaking of an aesthetics in the straightforward sense of an analysis 
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or exegesis of paintings or of images generally. He is talking about a theory of 
the act of painting, an understanding of what it is that the painter does. This, 
crucially, introduces the expressive element of the painterÕs art to our think-
ing. No clarifies this for us in Chapter 5 of ction in erception when he 
comments that RuskinÕs understanding of the act of painting as a recovery of 
the Òinnocence o  the e eÓ is mistaken if it is taken to mean that painting means 
reproducing a childish vision: representing things in their innocence, as we 
have said in commenting on NoÕs position, is indeed a difficult art to learn, 
is Òto view it with great sophistication, stepping back from the way we 
naturally view it when we take our experience at face value.Ó51 For No, the 
aim of phenomenology is to Òcatch experience in the act of making the world 
available,Ó and this is close to what Merleau-Ponty seeks to do in his later 
work. This means showing the world as it appears, in contrast to the childÕs 
picture, which simply displays the world as it seems to the child. But because 
No so reifies appearance (particularly in the form of his Ôperspectival proper-
tiesÕ) his account of the success of cubism seems awkward. By contrast, 
Merleau-Ponty takes the painting of Czanne as paradigmatic. 
In ÔCezanneÕs Doubt,Õ Merleau-Ponty argues that, having broken with the 
impressionists, Czanne wanted to Òreturn to the objectÓ without letting go 
of the Impressionist commitment Òwhich takes nature as its model,Ó that is, 
to representing sensation rather than si ht. CzanneÕs painting does not, 
though, show how our true perceptions of things emerge from perspectival 
sensations, as No would have to say. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the distor-
tions of CzanneÕs work between 1870 and 1890, saying Òcups and saucers on 
a table seen from the side should be elliptical, but Czanne paints the two 
ends of the ellipse swollen and expanded.Ó52 But these distortions are an 
inevitable product of what Czanne is trying to do: — he paints things as 
they look (the plate as circular) but at the same time in a comprehensibly 
ÔvisualÕ arrangement (unlike the childÕs painting or some primitive kinds of 
representation), and what he captures is not just sensations concrescing into 
an object but also the perceived object fracturing into multiple presentations, 
breaking down into the perspectival representations of it which are charac-
teristic of our human mode of perception, which make it not just an object 
for consciousness but also a thing in a shared world. He shows primitive 
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perception struggling to keep hold of the lived thing in spite of an intellectu-
alised conception of its own operation. 
Merleau-Ponty criticises DescartesÕ idea that the dimension of depth is 
derived from the other two dimensions of height and width, which are 
arrayed in front of us, and from whose occlusions and deformations we 
extract depth information. There is, for Descartes, no reality in depth under-
stood as a structure deriving from my situation in the world; ÒGod, who is 
everywhere — could penetrate [thingsÕ] Òhiding placeÓ and see them openly 
deployed.Ó53 
Again in ÔEye and Mind,Õ the later essay in which Merleau-Ponty returns to 
the themes dealt with in ÔCzanneÕs Doubt,Õ this conception of space Òwith-
out hiding places,Ó is criticised. What I have called a geometrical conception  
of space Merleau-Ponty calls Òidentity of Being,Ó a space which Òin each of its 
points is only what it is,Ó which Òunderlies the analysis of copper engrav-
ings.Ó54 On this understanding, space is an absolute in-itself, everywhere equal 
and measurable, Òits dimensions, for example, are interchangeable.Ó The 
conception of space, here, is an ontology which Òbuilds certain properties of 
beings into a structure of Being.Ó And Merleau-Ponty applauds this Cartesian 
conception for what it denies: ÒDescartesÕ space is true over against a too 
empirical thought which dares not construct.Ó55 The idealised, geometrical 
conception of space was necessary, he says, to break with the brute concep-
tion of space in Empiricism, to assert that space is ordered and not simply 
Ôthere.Õ 
 
This done, we were enabled eventually to find out the limits of construction, to 
understand that space does not have three dimensions or more or fewer, as an 
animal has either four or two feet, and to understand that the three dimensions are 
taken by different systems of measurement from a single dimensionality, a poly-
morphous Being, which justifies all without being fully expressed by any.56 
 
The ordering according to Cartesian coordinates must then give way to an 
existential construction of space. ÒDescartes was right in setting space free,Ó 
i.e., from the Aristotelian metaphysical ordering of space. ÒHis mistake was 
                                                
53 ÒEye and Mind,Ó 173. 
54 ÒEye and Mind,Ó 174. 
55 ÒEye and Mind,Ó 174. 
56 ÒEye and Mind,Ó 174. 
126 Part Two: Ontology 
 
to erect it into a positive being, outside all points of view, beyond all latency 
and all depth, having no true thickness. 57 
This Cartesian-Perspectival denial of depth is of the essence of the meta-
physics that Merleau-Ponty wants to criticise. The geometrical conception of 
the world leads us to a position in which we deny the reality of the dimension 
of depth. What characterises depth as a dimension and makes it different to 
the dimensions of height and width  That depth must always refer to a 
perceiver, and cannot belong to a purely ob ective world  depth relates things 
to my body in their voluminosity and in their distance. Fundamentally, we 
must be able to account for depth in terms of desire, since it raises questions 
like can I reach it Õ in relation to a source of food, will it hit me Õ in relation 
to a pro ectile or a falling mass, and can he see me Õ in relation to a friend or 
foe. 
Of the question of depth Merleau-Ponty writes 
 
The enigma consists in the fact that I see things, each one in its place, precisely 
because they eclipse one another, and that they are rivals before my sight pre-
cisely because each one is in its own place. Their exteriority is known in their en-
velopment and their mutual dependence in their autonomy. Once depth is 
understood in this way, we can no longer call it a third dimension. In the first 
place, if it were a dimension, it would be the first one; there are forms and definite 
planes only if it is stipulated how far from me their different parts are. But a first 
dimension that contains all the others is no longer a dimension, at least in the or-
dinary sense of a certain relationship according to which we make measurements. 
Depth thus understood is, rather, the experience of the reversibility of dimensions, 
of a global ÒlocalityÓ Ñ everything in the same place at the same time, a locality 
from which height, width, and depth are abstracted, of a voluminosity we express 
in a word when we say that a thing is there.58 
 
This depthÕ depends on our perception of things consisting in a bodily 
involvement with the world, with sight being an aspect of a broader percep-
tive relation which relates us to things, by which we meet our needs and 
develop our desires. This active aspect of sight is missing in Descartes, as well 
as in Hume, as Todes notes: ÒHume holds that we are aware of extension 
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through sight and touch, but he never understands that we may become 
aware of extension through movement.ÓŁ 
ather than resulting from an active experience, umean ÔimpressionsÕ 
simply strike upon the mind. This is in a sense true of objects, insofar as their 
appearing as what they are depends not on our perception but on them as 
features of the world. ÒBut it is not true of our active body, through which we 
make objects appear. In action, our body is already ÔinÕ our consciousness as 
soon as we become aware that something has to be done.Ó60 Action begins 
not with us perceiving our bodies as possibilities for acting, as we would see a 
tool, like an umbrella on a rainy day, then make use of it. ather, our active 
bodies ground the possibility of perception from the first. 
It is this fact that experience does not always Ôstrike uponÕ the mind that 
lies at the centre of the contribution a bodily perspective has to make to our 
understanding of vision. The umean conception of the passive, uninvolved 
and essentially indifferent perceiver now dominates not only our notion of 
vision, but also our metaphysics. Derrida could speak in terms of a critique of 
oculocentrism, but this does not really capture the problem, since the eye is 
usually employed as a moving and active component of a life lived in the 
world. hat is more problematic is the distanced notion of vision character-
istic of what uy Debord called the Òsociety of the spectacle,Ó which priori-
tises multiple specular virtualities over a sometimes drab reality, at the 
expense of active engagement (with either). The problem is not the emphasis 
on seeing in thought about perspective. It is the bias toward watching. 
Against ume, and his conception of passive experience furnishing us with 
impressions, it must be seen that whilst such passive reception of data is 
possible, the much more fundamental human experience is the more active. 
unger stirs in the core of the human being, driving him to engage with the 
world around him, to seek out food. This hunger is not imposed on him from 
the outside — the hunger is only passively felt if we conceive the human 
being as a mental essence in some way subjected to his body. But the human 
being is his body, and his hunger is an active part of his self-direction, towards 
food, towards the world on which he depends, towards life. The visual experi-
ence of the forager is not passive, nor disinterested, it is rather a search: the 
looker must decide where to look, combining instinct, memory, and present 
experience to find food. hen he finds it, it fills his senses, with colour, 
aroma, and texture. But to truly experience this object as food he must eat it. 
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Perhaps he will be permitted to do so immediately. But more likely, he must 
prepare it, cut it up, heat it, remove certain parts. Then it may enter his 
mouth: Now all experience of it is brought to a head in taste, the experience 
of which includes its look and smell, the sound made and texture felt as he 
takes a bite, the feeling of heat or cold in the mouth which sometimes 
reaches up to the top of the head, the combination of sweet, sour, salty and 
spicy felt on the tongue, and lasts long into the evening as that feeling of 
fullness, or over-fullness, or of unsatiated hunger. This fundamental engage-
ment with the world is nothing like HumeÕs conception in which experience 
simply strikes upon us. It is through and through our active engagement with 
the world given in our particular situation. 
 
Now perhaps we have a better sense of what is meant by that little verb Òto see.Ó 
Vision is not a certain mode of thought or presence to self; it is the means given 
me for being absent from myself, for being present at the fission of Being from the 
inside Ñ the fission at whose termination, and not before, I come back to myself.61 
 
In depth, sight is conceived no longer as representation of things spread 
out in three-dimensional space but as a relation to things whose primary 
dimension of depth relates our bodily mass to that of what surrounds us, and 
which we actively explore. 
 
Depth has a perceptual primacy for Merleau-Ponty first because of its originality as 
the source of all other dimensions and the one by virtue of which Òthings or ele-
ments of things envelop each other.Ó Furthermore, given its correlation with en-
velopment, height and width serve as measures of the ways that things are 
juxtaposed to each other. Depth therefore cannot be a dimension that stems from 
the others, as Descartes said in the Dioptrics. Rather, depth stands for a fundamen-
tal voluminosity in which we are already implicated. By contrast, the space of the 
Dioptrics is what a geometer would reconstruct as an object of a pense de sur-
vol.62 
 
On MorrisÕ understanding, Merleau-Ponty is developing a new understand-
ing of sense, or more accurately of sens. The French word already captures 
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something of the notion of meaning as tied to the world insofar as it can 
mean not only Ômeaning,Õ Ôlogic,Õ ÔreasonÕ or Ôinterpretation,Õ but also direction: 
a one-way street is signed Ôsens unique.Õ This meaning, like MorrisÕ understand-
ing of the body-schema, is easily lost in Colin SmithÕs translation of Phenome-
nology of Perception since he simply translates sens as Ômeaning.Õ So, in that 
translation we have, at the end of the chapter on movement and the spatiality 
of the body, Òwhat we have discovered through the study of motility, is a new 
meaning of the word Ômeaning.ÕÓ63 But Morris offers the much better alterna-
tive, Òa new sense [sens] of the word Ôsense [sens].ÕÓ64 When this point is made 
clear we can see how it ties in to Merleau-PontyÕs whole project in the Phe-
nomenology of Perception; IdealismÕs strength is that it acknowledges the given 
meaningfulness of perception, it avoids having to form the difficult link 
between meaning in the world of thought and the EmpiricistsÕ Òfortuitously 
agglomerated contents.Ó65 But in so doing, it considers all ÔmeaningÕ as Òan act 
of thought, as the work of a pure ÔI.ÕÓ Both these attempts to cross the 
Cartesian chasm fail; Although Merleau-Ponty thinks that Òrationalism easily 
refuted empiricism,Ó which cannot make sense of the meaningfulness of 
perceptions, it in turn fails to make sense of contingency, of the fact that not 
all perceptions are meaningful, of the obvious difference of the world to the 
mind. The shift Merleau-Ponty is trying to make is precisely that from sens 
understood as meaning, either imposed on or inherent in things, to sens in its 
more complex connotations, as intelligibilityÕs emergence from and adher-
ence to the sensible world. 
As we have seen, the role of the moving, perceiving body in this world is 
central. Morris argues that sens is inseparable from expression, it arises in the 
relations of the moving body to its world, and this is in some ways the con-
verse of the denial of representation. Speech, for example, is not the exter-
nalisation of an already-formed idea. Rather, the very thought is formed in its 
externalisation; the act of speaking is genuinely expressive, and as such it is 
like perceptionÕs opposite. It is not that the outside world is somehow 
brought into contact with an inner world at a distance; rather, the agent and 
the world shape and mould each other; they are different forces at work in a 
common stuff. And if we return to painting, we see again that painting 
provides a model for sight; painting does not simply mimic what is given in 
the world, nor does it externalise what is in the painterÕs imagination. Paint-
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ing brings to visibility a way of seeing which is also a way of thinking; the 
painting in some sense remakes the world. 
This point gets to the heart of the question about depth. It should be clear 
by now how the geometrical conception of nature abets a ÔgeometricalÕ 
account of perception and expression, in which everything which goes into 
the mind or comes out from it must pass, as a representation, through a 
single, unlocateable point. ÔDepthÕ is usually considered as extending from 
this single point into the world as from a point of view. But when the body in 
all its thickness, in its motility, in its edibility, in its dependence on and 
intertwining with the world, is considered as one side of depth, the world in 
its thickness is allowed to emerge as its correlate. As Morris has it, mental 
representations are supposed to help us to get over the aforementioned 
problem of Ôhaving the world at a distanceÕ by duplicating the world inside 
the mind. The mind is somehow to the retina as the retina is to the eye and 
the eye is to the world. But representations are supposed to duplicate the 
world in a different form; the same image is converted from light into 
thought. ÒThe traditional doctrine of representation endlessly [É] begs the 
question of how a brain-state becomes a representation, becomes something 
different and more than firings of neurons.Ó66 But if neither perception nor 
expression is a mechanical or quasi-mechanical translation between mind and 
world, the dualistic geometrism which it mirrors (or the physicalist or idealist 
monism which simply denies one or the other side, which spots the decep-
tion of the mirror-image) ceases to have such cachet. Instead, the fleshly, 
seeing body is intertwined with the world in depth. 
Glen Mazis rightly suggests that this understanding of depth, in its relation 
to the active movement of my body, implicates another dimension in our 
perceptual experience, that of time.67 Merleau-PontyÕs focus on painting in 
Eye and Mind leads him away from discussing the notion of time, but we can 
see that the time-bound nature of visual experience is a part of the reality 
from which the Cartesian optics abstracts, and helps us to understand the 
entwining of vision with the other senses. Our thought about vision has so 
often been dominated by the discussion of still images that time is easily 
forgotten, but temporality is clearly central to visual experience conceived as 
active, moving, and involving body and world in the fulfilment of needs and 
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cultivation of desire. Depth, then, is not the primary dimension only in the 
sense of situating the subject in the world; in an abstracted, static conception 
of perception disregarding time, this would risk leading to a broken ontology 
which cannot account for the unity of the world, to an idealism. The world to 
which my body gives me access, and of which my body is a part, is dynamic 
and changing, and this will be fundamental to understanding vision as 
grounding a ÔfleshyÕ ontology.  
 
The spatial attributes of depth are references to the temporality of existence. This is 
not to say that time is derived from our sense of space, but rather that time itself is 
lodged within the landscape and its resounding within space is a primordial depth. 
The locatedness of the perceiver is to be understood by realizing that Òwe must 
understand time as the subject and the subject as time.Ó68 
 
To say that Òtime is the subjectÓ would seem to contradict the claim that 
Òtime itself is lodged within the landscape.Ó But here lies another aspect of 
perception which is misunderstood on the geometrical model on which we 
are used to thinking. As Lakoff and ohnson observe, time can be understood 
on the metaphor of a river rushing past me, or as forward movement through 
a landscape. Do I, in perception, move forward through ob ective time as 
through space, or am I a passive witness to a passing time as like a stream  
Neither metaphor captures the reality. I cannot stop timeÕs movement, but 
neither does time go on without me. There is no absolute, neutral ero point 
of time or space by which to measure their movement  it is a matter of 
relation. We will return to the question of time, and the crucial example of 
the melody as a sensible idea, in the final chapter. 
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Ed Casey criticises the idea that depth is revealed by the ga e, as in Des-
cartesÕ clear and distinct perception, usserlÕs eidetic intuition, which fol-
lows the phenomenological reductionÕs excision of contingency from 
everyday perception, and SartreÕs intense interpersonal gaze.  
 
These various appeals to depth are often self-serving or at least self-supporting: just 
because essential structures come to us concealed thinkers consider themselves 
justified in employing a special philosophical method to get at them Ñ a method 
prescribed by someone who is convinced that only by proposing a new procedure 
in philosophy or science will the truth of things become unconcealed. Moreover, 
it is not at all certain that gazing takes us into the depths of a given phenomenon 
to begin with. We do speak of Ògazing into the depthsÓ; but if this is to occur effec-
tively, these depths must become accessible Ñ on some surface somewhere. Let 
us agree that, at the least, the depths sought by philosophers and scientists Ñ and 
doubtless also by the religiously minded Ñ must find their way to some significant 
plane of presentation if they are to be apprehended by any human look, whether 
this be a gaze or a glance. ÒThe surface,Ó as Gibson remarks, Òis where most of the 
action is.Ó70 
 
This antipathy to the ga e, on aseyÕs part, betrays a certain equivocity in 
the use of the notion of depth that must be made clear. There are three 
senses of ÔdepthÕ at work in what we have said; first is the artesian depth 
which is essentially the -axis of visual perception which must be recon-
structed from the putatively two-dimensional retinal image. This first sense 
can itself be thought through in two different ways; either the dimension of 
depth can be thought on the model of the other two axes of three-
dimensional space, as perceived by an outside observer or pense de survol, or it 
can be thought as the thoroughly existential dimension of the distance and 
separation or otherwise of the perceiver from things in his world. 
The second sense of depth, which is related to the first, is that which we 
have called the ÔvoluminosityÕ of things, which understands depth not solely 
in terms of naked three-dimensional measurements or of the arrangement of 
things around the perspectival centre which is the perceiver, but rather as the 
holding in tension of these two notions; the ÔdepthÕ of things here is consti-
tuted by their resistance to my investigation of them, what David Morris calls 
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their inexhaustibility. This is to understand ÔdepthÕ as a dimension of my 
bodily involvement in a real world which exceeds me and which cannot be 
reduced to a picture. 
The third sense of depth is in turn related to the second, and is that of the 
intelligibility which arises amongst things. This, we have insisted with Mer-
leau-Ponty, is not to say that the world is entirely intelligible, that everything 
can be led back to essence, which would be to deny the very real contingency 
of things. But it is to say that in so far as meaning arises, it arises in the thick 
of things, in the world and in things, not attached to them from without by a 
judgement or an operation of the understanding. 
It is in light of the second sense of depth that we must admit, with Mer-
leau-Ponty, that immanence is never complete: even that which is most 
plainly open to the investigation of perception is never open all at once but 
always and only in aspects. There is in this sense no pure immanence. And as 
such we consent to call the depth of the third sense ÔtranscendenceÕ: that is, 
not in the sense of an absolute outside but rather in the sense of an unknown 
inside. It is this union of transcendence and immanence which we call Ôincar-
national,Õ and it belongs not to a special domain of religious knowledge but to 
the everyday world of perception of things and interactions with persons. It 
is in virtue of our coincidence with things that they are able to transform us 
and it is this transforming-coincidence which is sought for in the posing of 
PlatoÕs Meno paradox: how can I ever learn something new, if to learn some-
thing I must seek it and to seek it I must already know what it is I seek?  
One of the best examples of what we mean by transforming-coincidence is 
that of human conversation. For Merleau-Ponty 
 
A genuine conversation gives me access to thoughts that I did not know myself 
capable of, that I was not capable of, and sometimes I feel myself followed in a 
route unknown to myself which my words, cast back by the other, are in the proc-
ess of tracing out for me. To suppose here that an intelligible world sustains the ex-
change would be to take a name for a solution Ñ and furthermore it would be to 
grant us what we are maintaining: that it is by borrowing from the world structure 
that the universe of truth and of thought is constructed for us.71 
 
In good conversation, unanticipated thoughts are made available to both 
speaker and listener. This is not just a repetition of the structure of the world 
but is rather an addition to it: the thoughts do not belong to a different world 
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than what is thought about, but rather join it in the same world. A Ôuniverse 
of truth and of thoughtÕ is constructed which is forever joined to the physical 
universe and which constantly transforms it. 
 
The Glance and the World of Affordances 
Ed Casey opposes the ÔgazeÕ of idealised aesthetic perception with the 
glance of everyday, embodied seeing. The gaze as the ideal mode of seeing, 
static, concentrated, and distanced from its object, is an artefact of what we 
have called the Cartesian scopic regime. The fact that the gaze attains to 
detachment from everyday, embodied seeing is not, in modern Western 
thought, a weakness but a strength. ÒIt is just because the gazer is convinced 
that his or her body is irrelevant  or in any case subordinate  to the 
enactment of gazing itself that the gaze has been so highly valorized.Ó Be-
cause we are attached to the perspectival, Cartesian scopic regime, we think 
of such detached seeing as proper, as Ôscientific,Õ as establishing true knowl-
edge of the world. ÒThe glance, in comparison, is considered by the same 
thinkers as a mere spontaneous gesture of the body and thus ineluctably 
linked to its fate: as fickle as the bodyÕs appetites, as blind as its instincts, as 
insatiable as its desire.Ó72 
On CaseyÕs analysis, it is the glance to which vision should attain: dynamic, 
situated, interested and fleeting, it takes in not a ÔpictureÕ but a world, con-
stantly being driven to develop a relation to its surrounding world by moving 
around in it. It is on the basis of its movement, its dynamism, that Casey 
attributes to the glance a real perception of the lived world of place. 
 
There is a close and continuing marriage between the glance and place. For the 
glance primarily seeks out what is happening within the boundaries of its own 
domain Ñ within the Òinternal horizonÓ that place provides.73 
 
Casey draws on James J. GibsonÕs account of the environment as affor-
dances, and as composed of mediating surfaces, which seems to begin to 
show us how the ethical relation to the environment is specified by our 
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glancing apperceptions, in which it is Ôgood forÕ some things and not others, 
and where desire appears pre-cognitively.74 
Gibson begins his seminal account of vision in The Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception with the recognition that where vision has been understood 
as the effect of light on the eye, connected to the brain, it has been studied 
by physicists, optical scientists, by anatomists, and by physiologists, and while 
these studies have achieved a great deal, producing interesting and important 
results for ophthalmology and optometry and the psychophysiology of vision, 
they have Òno real grasp of the perplexitiesÓ when it comes to explaining 
vision.75 The experimental situation of convenience has reduced vision to a 
Ôsnapshot,Õ a momentary flash in the dark presented before a subject immobi-
lised before them in an odd re-enactment of the Platonic cave. As Merleau-
Ponty observed, such experimental situations do not tell us much about 
perception as it occurs in the world. A new understanding of vision is re-
quired, and is what Gibson attempts to give us; an understanding of natural 
vision not as light interacting with eye and mind but as the function of Òthe 
eyes in the head on a body supported by the ground, the brain being only the 
central organ of a complete visual system.Ó76 
This immediately opens us onto a notion of perception that is different to 
the received picture. Gibson argues early on that the concept of space is 
irrelevant to perception, asking us to forget the Kantian maxim that Ôpercepts 
without concepts are blind,Õ and taking the perceived world, and not geomet-
rical space, as primary.77 On GibsonÕs understanding, if we perceived the 
entities of physics and mathematics, then we would have to impose meaning 
on things, for example by bringing them under a concept in the Kantian way. 
But in fact we perceive Òthe entities of environmental science,Ó and as such 
we do not impose meaning on things but discover it in them. 
The central concept of GibsonÕs ecological optics is that of the Ôambient 
optic array.Õ Gibson points out that optics has tended to conceive of light as 
radiation, as a singular ÔrayÕ travelling from a reflecting surface (or an illumi-
nating surface) to the eye, where it is focused into a point on the retina. In 
sensation-based theories of colour, these points of light with intensity and 
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wavelength detected on the retina are conducted by the optic nerve to the 
brain where they are translated into points of brightness and colour in the 
mental image, which introduces the problem of the imagined homunculus 
who views the mental image which we have already mentioned. Gibson wants 
to divorce the notion of stimulation based on the reception of light in the 
eyes from perception; there can be a situation, where I am in a bright, dense, 
fog, a ga el , in which there is a great deal of stimulating light coming into 
my eyes but I donÕt see anything because that light does not carry what 
Gibson calls stimulus information. Stimulus information is carried not by 
radiating light but in light as ÔilluminationÕ: where optics has tended to reduce 
light to a Ôray,Õ the reality of our visual environment is of those ÔraysÕ reflecting 
off things into a manifold, so that light travels from every direction to every 
point, in an Òomnidirectional flux.Ó78 When this light is different in different 
directions (i.e., is not a ga el ), then it carries some structure which is the 
basis of stimulus information. This structured field of light is what Gibson 
calls the Ôambient optic arrayÕ of any point in the environment which could be 
occupied by an observer. Gibson specifies the structure in terms of what he 
calls ÔinvariantsÕ; that is, as the optic array changes over time, or as an ob-
server moves around, there is change in the differentiated field of light, but 
this change preserves certain things, a Òvariation of structure that serves to 
reveal the nonvariation of structure.Ó79 That is, relationships between angles, 
gradients, colours and so on persist though the superficial appearances of 
them change. This, for example, is why the plate appears as circular; what is 
perceived is not the flux of elliptical appearances but the invariant shape (the 
circle) that grounds them. Such invariants are generally speaking the stable 
visible surfaces of solid substances, and when a solid thing changes state so 
that it melts, or burns up, for example, we say that the substance is destroyed: 
in terms of GibsonÕs ecological psychology, something has genuinely changed, 
an invariant structure has ceased to persist, where in physical terms nothing 
has gone out of or come into existence, there is only a change of state.80 
Such ecological events are, for Gibson, a primary reality. Where Newto-
nian thought assumed time to be an empty container which is ÔfilledÕ with 
such events, for Gibson Òthis habitual way of thinking puts the cart before 
the horse. We should begin thinking of events as the primary realities and of 
time as an abstraction from them — a concept derived mainly from regular 
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repeating events, such as the ticking of clocks.Ó81 He applies a similar analysis 
to space; space is also not an empty container which needs to be filled, in the 
way that the geometrical conception of nature assumes. It is first of all the 
spreading-out of surfaces, which neutral space abstracts from and measures. 
Both events and environments can constitute, for the animal, what Gibson 
calls affordances; that is, they can Òdemand or invite appropriate behaviours.Ó82 
Such behaviours are not given by the animal itself or by the layout of surfaces 
per se but by the situation, by the relationship of the animal to its environ-
ment, by the animal-environment gestalt. So Gibson emphasises that in 
perception egoreception (perceiving oneself ) and exteroception (perceiving 
the world) are inseparable, and it would seem that it is this inseparability that 
constitutes the ÔI,Õ that is, that no-one else can look at the world from the 
position of my body as I can. 
The notion of perceptual affordances also implies that ÔmeaningsÕ and even 
ÔvaluesÕ arise in our perception of our environment. The most basic affor-
dance, it would seem, is that of a relatively flat and relatively smooth surface 
which affords support for the animal and thus constitutes its ground. Various 
other surfaces, then, afford themselves as sit-on-able or climbable or bump-
into-able and so on. This helps us to make sense of the relationship between 
perception and skill, so that we can see how a freerunner might see the 
various surfaces of a cityscape as run-up-able, jumpable, and as affording 
opportunities to get to otherwise unreachable places, where such surfaces 
would not offer any such affordances to most pedestrians. The skill of 
freerunning is, in part, the skill of seeing surfaces as usable in certain ways. In 
this sense imagination is clearly a part of perception. Similarly, an excellent 
tennis player might see a difficult ball as reachable, and a golfer might see a 
long shot as puttable, and just as the skill depends on seeing in this way, the 
seeing reciprocally depends on the skill, on being able to exercise the ability 
to reach or putt the ball. Affordances, which as we have said belong neither 
to the observer nor to the world but to their relation, make value a function 
of the relationships between things. This depends on GibsonÕs hypothesis 
that there is information in the optical visual array and that such information 
can carry not just facts but meanings.  
With regards to the problem of depth, Gibson points out that while Ber-
keleyÕs formulation of visual distance as of a line going from the eye to the 
object presents the problem of accounting for how we can see an invisible 
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distance, if we account for distance in terms of a line extending along the 
ground rather than through the air, then distance is not an invisible dimen-
sion but one closely tied to our environment. There is a perspective gradient 
in environmental features which makes sense of depth as an aspect of our co-
habitation with things, our sharing a common ground with them. 
Gibson develops an understanding of vision as Ôecological,Õ and this eco-
logical optics makes use of what we will call a logic of incarnation, a logic that 
overcomes dualisms by understanding the relation between things (perceiver 
and object) in terms of their co-location, their co-inherence in a world which 
they constitute together. He calls into question the primacy of the frontal 
plane in the analysis of depth perception, which is understood to be the flat 
plane which is most similar to the curved retinal image.83 Rather than being 
derived from calculations of size and visual angle, the perception of depth is 
based on and grounded not in artificial perspective but in the ground, whose 
visual texture is most coarse, and finely-detailed, directly below us and which 
then moves out in a gradient of increasing density to the horizon. The hori-
zon, then, is the limiting case of our co-location with things; for Gibson Òit is 
neither subjective nor objective; it expresses the reciprocity of observer and 
environment: it is an invariant of ecological optics.Ó84 Merleau-Ponty asks 
whether this perception, in which the perceiver is located as a part of his 
world, and in which ÔBeingÕ is relegated from its position as an eternal, un-
changing, intelligible reality to a reality only partly known and exhausting all 
attempts at interrogation, is sufficient for philosophy:  
 
Is this the highest point of reason, to realize that the soil beneath our feet is shift-
ing, to pompously name ÒinterrogationÓ what is only a persistent state of stupor, to 
call ÒresearchÓ or ÒquestÓ what is only trudging in a circle, to call ÒBeingÓ that 
which never fully is? 
But this disappointment issues from that spurious fantasy which claims for itself a 
positivity capable of making up for its own emptiness. It is the regret of not being 
everything, and a rather groundless regret at that.85 
 
Whilst to accept that the human perceiver is a body is inevitably to accept 
that it is not everything, that its access to Being is limited by perspective, 
Gibson shows how it is also more than a perspective as it was understood by 
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the Cartesian scopic regime. This Òold approach to perceptionÓ centred on 
the problem of how depth is reconstructed from a two-dimensional and 
depthless retinal image, but it Ònever asked how one could see into the past 
and the future.Ó86 This is not an occultism: for Gibson it is clear that oneÕs 
perception of oneÕs environment is not of a momentary or instantaneous 
being but of an enduring reality, which is to say that Òthe environment seen-
at-this moment does not constitute the environment that is seen.Ó87 Just as 
the plate given as elliptical is seen as round, so the environment seen from 
here is just a part of the environment that is seen, that is all of a piece, so the 
environment Òseen-nowÓ does not coincide with the environment as it is 
seen. This reminds us of British artist David HockneyÕs comment that 
Òphotography is all right if you don't mind looking at the world from the 
point of view of a paralysed Cyclops — for a split second.Ó88 The Ôincarna-
tionalÕ logic that we have been arguing is present in both Merleau-PontyÕs 
ontology and J. J. GibsonÕs account of vision, is ÔperspectivalÕ in the sense that 
it takes account of the location of the perceiver in the world, it understands 
Being as given in limited aspects and not as a reality which could be best seen 
and ideally known from the perspectiveless position of an absolute observer 
or a purely transcendent God, or described in terms of a pure geometry. But 
there is a sense in which it is not ÔperspectivalÕ at all: as Gibson has it, Òan 
observer who is moving about sees the world at no point of observation and 
thus, strictly speaking, cannot notice the perspectives of things.Ó89 That is to 
say once again that the perspectiva artificialis of renaissance art, and of photog-
raphy, does not show us what it is like to see but is an abstraction from visual 
perception in its imbrication with the fullness of bodily life. As Gibson 
suggests in his later discussion of images, there is a great and obvious differ-
ence between a picture which uses perspective and one that does not, and the 
difference cannot be that the first represents reality and the second does not. 
What then is the difference? An image which displays a scene in perspective 
Ôputs the viewer into the scene.Õ And this is the difference between the two 
ÔperspectivismsÕ: the perspectivism of the renaissance, of the Cartesian scopic 
regime, perspectiva artificialis, constructs the scene according to geometrical 
laws and installs the perceiver as a point within the scene; it ingeniously 
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locates the viewer in the scene he looks at by the very construction of that 
scene; but in doing so it must reduce the viewer to a Sartrean point of noth-
ingness. The perspectivism we wish to affirm does just the opposite: under-
standing that natural perspective belongs not to the immobilised eye but to 
the living perceiver, it rejects the centrality of the picture in an account of 
vision and insists that the perceiver is installed among the things he is looking 
at; that what she perceives is a world, and that she knows this precisely 
because she sees it from a single perspective which it exceeds; this she knows 
because she moves around in the world, forever unhiding to herself previously 
unseen surfaces, and hiding others, both these acts being always reversible by 
reversing her path of locomotion through the world or undoing the moves 
made in her manipulations of things. 
In The Structure of Behaviour Merleau-Ponty claims that ÒPerspective does 
not appear to me to be a subjective deformation of things but, on the con-
trary, to be one of their properties, perhaps their essential property.Ó¯° That 
is, their appearing as the-same-yet-different, thingsÕ invariant structures are 
not hidden by the fact that I engage them from a certain perspective but are 
revealed in virtue of that fact. ÒIt is precisely because of it that the perceived 
possesses in itself a hidden and inexhaustible richness, that it is a Ôthing.ÕÓ91 
Merleau-Ponty is clear, here, that speaking of the Òperspectival character of 
knowledgeÓ is equivocal. It can mean that things cannot be known in them-
selves but only as they appear, as the neo-Kantianism of runschvicg, domi-
nant in early twentieth century rance, against which erleau-Ponty 
developed his position, would have it. ut there is another sense which, with 
rleau-Ponty, we affirm: Ò ar from introducing a coefficient of subjectivity 
into perception, it provides it on the contrary with the assurance of commu-
nicating with a real world. The profiles of my desk are not given to direct 
knowledge as appearances without value, but as manifestationsÕ of the 
desk.Ó92 
or ibson, it is crucial to realise that oneÕs own body does appear visually, 
from the appearance of oneÕs cheeks, nose and eyebrows at the edges of the 
visual field to the appearance of oneÕs hands and feet as we manipulate things 
and move around in the world. In this sense the body-schema is anchored to 
a visual appropriation of oneÕs own body in ways that are easy to miss, and 
which contribute to the failure of artificial perspective: although the perspec-
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tive image can include me, the viewer, and locates me with regard to itself, it 
cannot include my self-seeing; it seems to fracture me into a Cartesian 
duality, because though I am in some sense included or accounted for in the 
picture, my body remains resolutely outside of it. 
GibsonÕs account of vision develops a sophisticated view of my relation to 
the world of things which is consonant with the Merleau-Pontyan ontology 
we are pursuing, but, in The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, he does 
not get beyond the animalÕs relation to its environment and the objects 
within it. Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy already attempts to locate these 
problems with regard to the more significant question of the relation of 
vision to the problem of other persons. The visual access which I have to my 
own body is, of course, markedly different to that I have to the body of 
another, so how is it that the infant is able to associate, for example, my own 
Ômotor smileÕ with the seen smile of another?93 For Merleau-Ponty, in ÒThe 
ChildÕs Relation with Others,Ó it is because I am Òa consciousness turned 
toward thingsÓ94 that I can see the actions of others as relating to my own 
possibilities for action that I come to see behaviours or conducts, and then 
come to understand these behaviours in relation to the schematic bodies by 
which they are borne and so to see the psyches to whom such behaviours 
belong. But all this depends on a tacit recognition of my own intertwining 
with the world, an understanding that my body is not an Òagglomeration of 
sensationsÓ but a part of the body-world system which is always postured in 
relation to the world.95 This body-world system develops into a self-other 
system, or perhaps a self-body-world-other system. 
 
To be aware that one has a body and that the otherÕs body is animated by another 
psyche are two operations that are not simply logically symmetrical but form a real 
system. In both cases it is a question of becoming conscious of what might be 
called Òincarnation.Ó96 
 
The movement among things and manipulation of things that are essential 
to fully embodied sight, for Gibson, are Òkinds of behavior that cannot be 
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reduced to responses. 97 He does not cite Merleau-Ponty, and ibson does 
not seem to have been familiar with his philosophy, but as we have seen, this 
point was established in The Structure of Behaviour: indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, 
the very concept of behaviour demands it. ibson accuses his fellow psy-
chologists and physiologists of hanging on to the Cartesian notion that 
animals are complex automata and so do not behaveÕ in this sense but are 
determined by their perceptions (conceived as operations on atomic sense-
data) by the mind of which the brain is the seat. If Humans are somehow 
different, it must be because of the intervention of a soul which manipulates 
the nervous impulses in the human brain. For ibson, to say that the mind is 
a complex computer is little better, since it still assumes that behaviour is 
determined on a stimulus-response model. Rather, ÒLocomotion and manipu-
lation are neither triggered nor commanded but controlled and this control is 
a function not of the brain but of the Òanimal-environment system,  that is, 
of the animalÕs relationship to its perceived world of affordances.98 He 
proposes that various forms of locomotion require very different forms of 
classical kinaesthesis but the same form of visual kinaesthesis, and it is the 
visual perception of self and world that is dominant in controlling locomo-
tion. He formulates some approximations of rules which describe this kinaes-
thetic control, based on the outflow of texture of the ambient optic array 
from the point towards which one is moving, which describe the involvement 
of embodied visual perception in this basic mode of behaviour. 
All this contributes, finally, to a redefinition of perception. For Gibson, 
perception is not the appearance in the individualÕs consciousness of veridical 
representations of the outside world. It is rather an achievement, a worked-out 
contact with the world. Perception can be of something in the world, of 
something in the perceiver, or of both; it is not a mental act nor a bodily act 
but a psychosomatic act, of a living, bodily perceiver.99 It is a living contact 
between body and world which Gibson describes in terms of Ôinformation 
pickup.Õ Martin Jay, in his critique of the anti-oculocentrism of twentieth 
century French thought, Downcast Eyes, takes the implication of GibsonÕs 
argument to be that vision is originarily crossed with the other senses, but is 
capable of an artificial separation from them which is to some degree a 
cultural fact. On the basis of the Cartesian scopic regime and its failings, 
French anti-oculocentrism reacted against the dominance of isolated vision 
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by denigrating sight in toto, but the more constructive response, which Jay 
proposes, is to reassert the entwinement of sight with the other senses and its 
fundamental embodiment. 
 
Intelligible Structures of the World 
The fundamental embodiment of sight has been developed in terms of the 
intertwining of perception and movement, of reversibility and the intersenso-
riality of an originary synaesthesia. What we see in our environment and in 
animal and human others, is not simply information but meaning. The 
perceived world is not composed of pure facts but also of values, of opportu-
nities and dangers, desirable things, persons, and situations, and undesirables, 
of needs and wants and hopes and fears, rather than simply of sensations 
which are to be brought under judgments. This, from the first, was the 
significance of GibsonÕs theory of affordances. Does such meaning appear in 
sight? It does, but not as the visible. For Merleau-Ponty,  
 
Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the 
visible itself has an invisible inner framework (membrure), and the in-visible is the 
secret counterpart of the visible, it appears only within it, it is the Nichturprsen-
tierbar [unpresentable] which is presented to me as such within the world.100 
 
Clearly there is a paradox here; vision, according to Merleau-Ponty, gives 
us access to what is invisible. In the introduction to Signs, where Merleau-
Ponty first suggests that we speak of Òthe visible and the invisible,Ó as an 
alternative to the Sartrean Ôbeing and nothingness,Õ Merleau-Ponty clarifies 
what he means by the invisible, saying that visible and invisible Ôare not 
contradictoryÕ and suggesting that ÒOne says invisible as one says immobile — 
not in reference to something foreign to movement, but to something which 
stays still. The invisible is the limit or zero degree of visibility, the opening of 
a dimension of the visible.Ó101 Intelligibility no longer belongs in a Platonic 
heaven of the forms nor in the application of conceptual categories to a 
formless reality. Meaning is at the heart of things in a way which is difficult 
to specify; a way in which we will have to learn to think. Meaning appears in 
perception not as what is seen, but in what is seen; what appears is not brute 
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nature or the blo§e sachen but things, and persons, in all their richness, ambiguity 
and inexhaustibility. Whilst commenting on the work of Samuel Todes in 
Body and World, Hubert Dreyfus asks 
 
Are there two fundamentally different ways we make sense of the world, or does 
all understanding consist in using concepts to think about things? The philosophi-
cal tradition has generally assumed Ñ or, in the case of Kant, argued persuasively 
Ñ that there is only one kind of intelligibility, the unified understanding we have 
of things when we make judgments that objectify our experience by bringing it 
under concepts. But there have always been others Ñ painters, writers, historians, 
linguists, philosophers in the romantic tradition, Wittgensteinians, and existential 
phenomenologists Ñ who have felt that there is another kind of intelligibility that 
gets us in touch with reality besides the conceptual kind elaborated by Kant.102 
 
As Franois Dastur sees, to perceive is to Òorganize an area of the visible,Ó 
to Òopen oneselfÓ to a Gestalt.103 This perceptual organisation of figure 
against ground is not a matter of creating meaning in a kind of perceptual 
impressionism, of arranging the sensed in such a way as to determine out of it 
something intelligible; rather it is to arrange the manifold meanings of a 
situation into a directed sens; to decide upon and attend to the relevances of 
things by determining what, in a given situation, matters most. Gibson, in the 
end, calls the figure-ground structure of perception a Òfallacy,Ó104 but this 
comes in the context of the account of vision as it develops at the end of The 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception which restricts itself to the perception 
of the environment, for the most part limited to landscape, in the discussion 
of pictures and in particular of line drawings. If we take GibsonÕs point to be 
that perception does not disregard background to focus solely on a chosen 
Ôobject,Õ then he is correct. But if the figure-ground structure of perception is 
understood as a dynamic sorting of the contents of perception which makes 
their manifold and wild intelligibilities accessible and manipulable by organis-
ing them around a meaningful centre, as we do, then he is wrong to reject it. 
This thought is present in Merleau-Ponty already in The Structure of Behav-
iour, where he argues that Òwhat is profound in the notion of ÔGestaltÕ from 
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which we started is not the idea of signification but that of structure, the 
joining of an idea and an existence which are indiscernible, the contingent 
arrangement by which materials begin to have meaning in our presence, 
intelligibility in the nascent state [my emphasis].Ó105 
Darian Meacham notes that in the working notes to The Visible and the 
Invisible, ÒMerleau-Ponty writes that perception is always cultural,Ó106 claim-
ing Òwhat he means by this is that the meaning formations that structure our 
cultural world are not an ideal layer projected by a constituting subject over 
the perceptual field, but are through and through in the perceptual world 
itself, in the things themselves.Ó107 
This is not a complete picture, though; it is true (for Merleau-Ponty) that 
the meaning-formations from which culture is built originate in the perceived 
world, but the perceived world is also shaped by cultural transformations. 
Merleau-PontyÕs key example here is that of artificial perspective. ÒI say that 
the Renaissance perspective is a cultural fact, that perception itself is poly-
morphic and that if it becomes Euclidean, this is because it allows itself to be 
oriented by the system.Ó108 And this is about more than just paintings. In 
proposals for an Ontology among these working notes, Merleau-Ponty 
proposes to Òtake topological space as a model of being,Ó as Euclidean, 
geometrical space has been made the model for Òperspectival beingÓ (my em-
phasis), and he notes that there is an Òunderlying appropriatenessÓ of the 
notion of space which belongs to Euclidean geometry Òwith the classical 
ontology of the Ens realissimum, of the infinite entity.Ó109 The linear relations 
of movement and time, and presumably of volume, and of causality of the 
snooker-ball type beloved of some analytic philosophers, are imposed upon 
                                                
105 The Structure of Behaviour, 206–7. 
106 Darian Meacham, ÒFaith is in things not seen: Merleau-Ponty on Faith, Virt, and the 
Perception of Style,Ó in Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Religion and Perception, ed. 
Kascha Semonovitch and Neal DeRoo (London: Continuum, 2010), 188. Meacham refers 
this claim to Merleau-PontyÕs statements on p. 253 of The Visible and the Invisible, for 
example that Òthe distinction between the two planes (natural and cultural) is abstract: 
everything is cultural in us (our Lebenswelt is ÒsubjectiveÓ) (our perception is cultural-
historical) and everything is natural in us (even the cultural rests on the polymorphism of 
the wild Being).Ó There is more important material, which substantiates MeachamÕs 
claim, on p. 212, for example, Òthere is an informing of perception by culture which 
enables us to say that culture is perceived,Ó and the claim that culture constitutes an 
Òoriginal layer above nature.Ó 
107 Meacham, ÒFaith is in things not seen,Ó 188. 
108 The Visible and the Invisible, 212. 
109 The Visible and the Invisible, 210. 
146 Part Two: Ontology 
 
reality in what Merleau-Ponty calls perspectival being. A different culture, a 
different model of space, would result in a different framework and different 
perceptions. ÒThe topological space, on the contrary, a milieu in which are 
circumscribed relations of proximity, of envelopment, etc. is the image of a 
being that, like KleeÕs touches of colour, is at the same time older than 
everything and Ôof the first dayÕ (Hegel) [É] that is a perpetual residue.Ó110 
Merleau-Ponty is still aware, here, of how these questions arising from a 
geometrical conception of being necessitate some kind of theology. He 
argues that Òthe Theodicy of Leibniz sums up the effort of Christian theology 
to find a route between the necessitarian conception of Being, alone possible, 
and the unmotivated upsurge of brute Being, which latter is finally linked up 
with the first by a compromise, and, to this extent, the hidden god sacrificed 
to the Ens realissimum.Ó111 This is a clear rejection of the answers proffered by 
the theological tradition (or at least the one with which he was familiar) to 
the problems of understanding a world in which contingency and necessity, 
suffering and the good themselves seem intertwined, and there is no mention 
here of the promise of a theology of incarnation which Merleau-Ponty in his 
earlier writings seems at times to have seen. Nonetheless, he maintains here 
some kind of appreciation that the God of the Leibnizian Ens Realissimum is 
not the only option, to hold out some kind of hope for the Òhidden godÓ who 
will not be used to explain away suffering and evil. 
 
We must return to the question of the presence of intelligibility in the 
sensible. Merleau-Ponty claims Òthere is no longer a problem of the concept, 
generality, the idea, when one has understood that the sensible itself is 
invisible, that the yellow is capable of setting itself up as a level or horizon.Ó112 
This captures well the complexity of Merleau-PontyÕs understanding of vision 
in his late work. The invisible, we must remember, is not that which is totally 
foreign to vision, but is to the visible as rest is to motion. But what can it 
mean to say that the sensible is invisible? We must approach this issue with 
care. Our ÔgeometricalÕ way of thinking makes such a statement impossible to 
understand, but as he so often does, Merleau-Ponty is using this radical claim 
about the nature of things to provoke a different way of seeing. In what he 
has called a ÔtopologicalÕ understanding, we may be given to understand that 
sight does not give us simple sensations but that things appear as structures 
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whose reverse side and normative shape is ÔseenÕ even as neither is visible. 
The sensible property, like the yellow of the example, is perceived not as a 
contingent, material singularity nor as a necessary, ideal universal but as a 
level or a horizon in the sense that there is nothing beyond yellow things 
which constitutes their yellowness, yet there is a participation in a field, a 
relation to other things, involved in the yellow which cannot be captured by 
the thing tes ext  tes. Its reality, as we have said, depends on relation.  
In the final fully drafted chapter of e Visible nd t e Invisible entitled ÔThe 
Intertwining  The Chiasm,Õ Merleau-Ponty writes that Òno one has gone 
further than Proust in fixing the relations between the visible and the invisi-
ble, in describing an idea that is not the contrary of the sensible, that is its 
lining and its depth.Ó113 The appearance of the invisible idea in the visible is a 
matter of the internal depth of things in a way which is analogous to the 
appearance in sight of the unseen ÔdepthsÕ of things like their occluded sides 
and their normative shapes. How can this be the case? The occluded sides of 
a thing we have called visible because they can in principle be revealed to 
sight; if I move around the thing and find that its reverse side is empty, the 
whole thing ÔlooksÕ different, on the basis that my sight is not the operation 
of a momentary instant but of a moving body interrogating the world. Sight, 
we have seen, is in this way bound up with temporality, embodiment and 
embodimentÕs specific form of motility. But it seems hard to see how the 
sensible idea can become visible in this way; although this is not spelled out, 
it seems likely that an ÔideaÕ is not something which affords any possibility of 
vision. The shape of the thing, (the roundness of the plate) we argued against 
Alva No, is not st the sum of our possible perspectives on it but is some-
thing more than that; there is a normative dimension to its appearance as 
round which prioritises one perspective over the others in a way related to its 
use. Perhaps the appearance of the plate as round gives us a stronger analogy 
to the appearance of the sensible idea, of the invisible in the visible; insofar as 
it carries this dimension of normativity that is not visible even in theory or as 
a possibility. For Merleau-Ponty the question of Òthe bond between the flesh 
and the ideaÓ is Òthe most difficult pointÓ114 of his understanding of the 
intertwining, but it would seem that to understand it is crucial; if in the last 
instance it cannot cross the chasm between sensibility and intelligibility, 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology has not finally escaped Cartesianism. 
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The Proustian example (from Ë la recherche du temps perdu) to which Mer-
leau-Ponty gives so much weight is that of the Òlittle phraseÓ of VintueilÕs 
sonata, which expresses for M. Swann a great deal of the meaning of his 
relationship with Odette, which occasioned his falling in love with this girl 
about whom he expresses indifference up until the point that they hear the 
sonata together,115 and which reminds him of her in the passage to which 
Merleau-Ponty refers, at which point their relationship has cooled considera-
bly.116 Proust says of the Ôlittle phraseÕ from the andante of VintueilÕs sonata 
for Piano and Violin that ÒSwann referred back to it as to a conception of 
love and happiness whose distinctive character he recognised at once as he 
would that of the Princesse de Clves [a novel, anonymously published in the 
late nineteenth century and considered to be the first roman dÕanalyse or 
psychological novel] or of Ren, [an 1802 novella by Franois-Ren de Cha-
teaubriand, considered a founding text of early French romanticism] should 
either of those titles occur to him.Ó117 So, Merleau-Ponty surmises, with the 
Òmysterious entityÓ of the Òlittle phraseÓ we are not talking about a relation 
between the idea and the perceived reality which is particular to music, but 
one which is broader; which applies to other cultural items and also to ideas 
more generally conceived: as Proust has it, 
 
Even when he [Swann] was not thinking of the little phrase, it existed latent in his 
mind on the same footing as certain other notions without material equivalent, 
such as our notions of light, of sound, of perspective, of physical pleasure, the rich 
possessions wherewith our inner temple is diversified and adorned.118 
 
The visible both ÒmanifestsÓ and ÒconcealsÓ the Òinterior armatureÓ of 
things which is the ÒideaÓ in its bond to the Òflesh.Ó119 So, for Merleau-Ponty, 
Òliterature, music, the passions, but also the experience of the visible world 
are — no less than is the science of Lavoisier and Ampre — the exploration 
of an invisible and the disclosure of a universe of ideas.Ó120 The difference 
between these former and the ideas of science is that these ÔinvisibleÕ ideas do 
not stand on their own, Òcannot be detached from the sensible appearances 
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and be erected into a second positivity.Ó121 Indeed, the fact that they are not 
(unlike the parts of the object occluded from view at this moment) open to 
any possibility of appearing to visual sense simpliciter is what makes them the 
kinds of reality that they in fact are; Òhere [É] there is no vision without the 
screen: the ideas we are speaking of would not be better known to us if we 
had no body and no sensibility; it is then that they would be inaccessible to 
us.Ó122 It is in this sense that the analogy with some of the earlier-discussed 
aspects of sight comes into its own. Where the appearance of voluminous-
ness depends on the possibility that the unseen sides could be seen, it also 
depends on the impossibility of seeing all the sides at once, for this perspec-
tiveless thought would collapse all depth and neutralise the potency of my 
bodily engagement with the world. This would seem to clarify Merleau-
PontyÕs insight that the ÔinvisibleÕ sense of which we are speaking is not 
opposed to the visible; the ideaÕs invisibility is the condition of its possibility, 
and is its manner of appearing in the visible, just as voluminousness depends 
on perspective and occlusion. In this sense the third of the three senses of 
depth we identified very much depends on the second. 
This is a theme to which we will have to return later. But it seems worth 
mentioning here that it is not inconsequential that the example Merleau-
Ponty takes up is one based on a melody, which from his earliest work stood 
as an example of the way in which the perceived is structured and temporal; 
in The Structure of Behaviour, discussing the level of meaning which consti-
tutes behaviour properly speaking he writes 
 
vital acts have a meaning; they are not defined, even in science, as a sum of proc-
esses external to each other, but as the spatial and temporal unfolding of certain 
ideal unities. ÒEvery organism,Ó said Uexkll, Òis a melody which sings itself.Ó123 
 
In Merleau-PontyÕs articulation of the relations of consciousness and na-
ture as a structuration which lies at the origin of animal behaviour and of 
human thought, the example of melody shows us how an intentional and 
meaningful reality (a musical idea) arises from a sequence of physical events 
(i.e. the vibrations of strings) to which it cannot be reduced. 
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Just as the painter is struck by a painting that is not there, the body is suspended in 
what it sings: the melody is incarnated and finds in the body a type of servant. The 
melody gives us a particular consciousness of time. We think naturally that the 
past secretes the future ahead of it. But this notion of time is refuted by the mel-
ody. At the moment when the melody begins, the last note is there, in its own 
manner. In a melody, a reciprocal influence between the first and the last note 
takes place, and we have to say that the first note is possible only because of the 
last, and vice versa. It is in this way that things happen in the construction of a liv-
ing being.124 
 
Reconceiving Vision 
In the lectures on Nature, Merleau-Ponty takes up again UexkllÕs descrip-
tion of the ÔunfurlingÕ of the animal Umwelt in terms of melody, and he 
himself here compares it to the idea of the melody in Proust: ÒWhen we 
invent a melody, the melody sings in us much more than we sing it; it goes 
down the throat of the singer, as Proust says.Ó125 As Carbone sees it, Merleau-
Ponty develops Òthis convergence in order to conceive of the biological 
notion of ÒspeciesÓ as an essence inseparable from its manifestation in single 
individuals,Ó that is, not as a platonic idea or a real universal, but as a Òsensible 
ideaÓ126 of the kind we have been proposing. But this provides us with a clear 
consonance between ÔspeciesÕ in the biological sense and the broader sense 
which it contributes to a theory of sight. In her exposition and investigation 
of the medieval Franciscan thinker Roger BaconÕs theory of vision, Suzannah 
Biernoff deals with the notion of species as the central principle of his 
understanding Òof sensation, cognition and intellection,Ó an understanding 
which seeks to give a causal account of perception to insulate perception 
against doubt about its veracity. The notion of species is, for Bacon, an 
attempt to reassert the reliability of perception and to shore up epistemology 
against the doubts to which perceptual mistakes, and illusions, give rise, by 
giving an account of the continuity of species in the world and in the mind. It 
may seem strange, then, that Biernoff sees Merleau-PontyÕs ontology (includ-
ing his account of vision) as bearing an affinity with the medieval ideas of 
Bacon. 
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Biernoff emphasises that though species are not objects, Òthey do have 
material existence.Ó127 They are incarnated or Òbodied forthÓ in the media of 
air, light, water, and the humours of the eye, and in those media they have a 
real, physical being, just as sound, though not an object, has a material reality, 
for which vibration there must always be some medium. But, more than this, 
Biernoff expresses the Baconian understanding of intelligible species in terms 
strikingly similar to those of Merleau-PontyÕs citation of UexkllÕs analogy 
between melody and psychological species: ÒOne could say that species 
colonise matter: the corporeal nature of a species is identical to that of its 
recipient because the latter is merely a Ôhost,Õ transformed into the likeness of 
its coloniser. Or, to use an analogy more in keeping with BaconÕs visual 
orientation, the agent (species) ÔimpressesÕ its form on the recipient.Ó128 For 
both Aristotle (who is the source of the theory of sight as Ôintelligible spe-
ciesÕ)129 and Aquinas, the reception of species is a passive process which is 
attributed to the passive element of reason, and whose possibility depends on 
its being taken up into a process of active reason. This division of reason into 
active and passive, taken too absolutely, and the consigning of perception to 
the passive side, lies at the source of a dualism which is the fundament of 
both Empiricism and Intellectualism, which divides intellectual functions and 
thus the relations of nature and consciousness into separate passive and 
active moments. If we are to make use of the notion of intelligible species, it 
must overcome the passive-active duality, and attain to an understanding 
which better describes the phenomenology of perceiving, since we do not 
passively receive the forms of everything that enters our field of view but, at 
least for the most part, only that which we look at, and which is not too big 
or too small, but of the kind of scale which allows us to see it as an individual 
thing, i.e., that which we can take as Ôfigure' and not as Ôground.Õ  
Ockham rejected the Baconian theory of species because of its implication 
that of the senses, sight most strongly corresponds to the real structure of 
objects, and thus its privileging of visual sense. It seems that the notion that 
the species theory establishes sight as the prototypical sense may be less 
problematic if we take care to understand Ôspecies,Õ in accordance with its 
etymology, as the ÔlookÕ of things, (from the indo-european spek, to see) rather 
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than as something substantial. ÔSpecies,Õ if we are to understand them in this 
way, remain consistent despite variations of aspect, in the way that objects 
can retain a consistent look and appear as the same thing despite changes in 
lighting, perspective, position, speed, and so on. This does not establish 
ÔspeciesÕ as an essence or as a subject but as the relatively stable base on which 
the objectÕs consistency as a thing undergoing changes is founded. ather, 
intelligible species are understood here as something like GibsonÕs Ôpercep-
tual invariants,Õ but with the ÔnormativeÕ dimension we added in discussion of 
the plate example: the thingÕs intelligible ÔlookÕ relates not just its invariant 
structure as an element of the ambient optic array but also as an element of 
the human world — its function, its value, its meaning understood existen-
tially but in relation not only to the existential concerns of the individual but 
also to the shared concerns of the intersubjective world. We can progress 
from the geometrical species of aconian thought to a Merleau-Pontyan 
conception of species as the ÔlookÕ which endures through changes of aspect, 
of meaning and so on in this way. 
Though this understanding of intelligible species is not entirely faithful to 
the medieval understanding, it may be a plausible way of reading AristotleÕs 
notion of forms which reach the eyes to read them as Ôlooks,Õ which ground 
the possibility of change by attempting to account for the Ôinvariants,Õ 
whether optical, ecological or existential, which endure. So, on iernoffÕs 
understanding of aconÕs theory, Species not only convey the pictorial ÔformÕ 
of an object; they are vehicles of meaning. 13´ This (ab)use of aconian theory 
is doubly motivated: first of all, by the recognition (due to iernoff ) that his 
work attempts to preserve the imbrication of active and passive elements in 
perception, as we must; and second, that this synthesis allows it to think 
perception as relationship, and so to avoid the modern dichotomy of Ideal-
ism and mpiricism. That neither of these goals is fully attained in aconÕs 
work is due to the still too dualistic conception of the passive and active 
intellects; nevertheless his thought in certain of its aspects suggests a way 
beyond this dualism.131 As iernoff sees it,  
 
BaconÕs synthesis could be read as an attempt to embrace (rather than resolve) 
these contradictory propositions of what Merleau-Ponty calls the Ôperceptual faithÕ: 
the conviction that sight is both inside and exterior to us. What Bacon offers, in 
the final analysis, is an objective, extramental world that reproduces itself in the 
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mind; and an equally real sphere of human agency, consciousness and curios-
ity.132 
 
Ed Casey, whose notion of Ôthe glanceÕ emphasises the active element of 
visual perception and its basis in moving bodily engagement with the world, 
investigates the Platonic theory of extramission, Òa creative compromise that 
would resolve the dilemma into which previous Greek theories of vision had 
precipitated themselves: how can light originate equally within the eye and 
from the world?Ó133 For Plato,  
 
The first organ they [the gods] fashioned were those that give us light, which they 
fastened there in the following way. They arranged that all fire which had not the 
property of burning, but gave out a gentle light, should form the body of each 
dayÕs light. The pure fire within us that is akin to this they caused to flow through 
the eyes, making the whole eye-ball, and particularly its central part, smooth and 
close-textured so that it would keep in anything of coarser nature, and filter 
through only this pure fire. So when there is daylight round the visual stream, it 
falls on its like and coalesces with it, forming a single uniform body in the line of 
sight, along which the stream from within strikes the external object.134 
 
Although PlatoÕs model of vision is usually considered extramissionist, like 
the Baconian species-theory, it is not quite as unidirectional as it has been 
taken to be. Sight here occurs as a conjunction of the outward-flowing light 
of the eye and the ambient light, so that Òsubject and sun, eye and world 
contribute equally in the formation of the intermediary body, shaped as a 
cone or chain or cylindrical ÒpencilÓ that is necessary for vision.Ó135 Of course, 
it is empirically false that the attention of the eye forms an actual light; if 
attention is a ÔrayÕ then it is so only metaphorically. But nevertheless, the 
theory captures the fact that visual perception is not a passive reception of 
sense-data, but rather Òcombines two quite different ingredients.Ó136 
 Teresa Brennan argues that the passive, physiological account of vision 
and what she thinks of the culturalist, active account (which understands 
sight as culturally constructed) are related in ways which are particularly 
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difficult to specify in the gaze. Her use of this term is very different to 
CaseyÕs, for example: where in CaseyÕs terms ÔgazeÕ specifies the disinterested 
mode of looking of idealised aesthetic perception, to which he contrasts the 
engaged and interested ÔglanceÕ which roots perception in everyday life and 
the fulfilment of needs, Brennan is speaking of something more like the 
Sartrean ÔlookÕ in which the Other somehow brings themself to bear on me, 
objectifying me, by the assertion of their own seeing subjectivity. If ÒI feel 
myself looked-atÓ137 in the Sartrean example which we discussed earlier, it is 
because so ething comes out from the eyes of the looker; not light, we can be 
sure, but attention; and perhaps more importantly, a kind of orientation. The 
look of the Sartrean example constitutes the looker, the Other, as the centre 
of the scene, and so causes the looked-at to feel displaced, de-centred. 
Merleau-Ponty repeats SartreÕs exact phrase in The Visi le a  the Invisi le, 
ÒI feel my self looked at,Ó but the meaning here is not that the world, or a 
scene, is re-centred around the looker, it is rather that ÔcentresÕ are multi-
plied; the Sartrean solipsism is broken and the realisation that thinking 
perceivers abound is made. And here also is made the link between the 
passivity of seeing and its activity, which exposes the indivision of the passive 
intellect and the active intellect. To put the phrase in its context: ÒAs many 
painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally 
passivity.Ó There is a sense in which, for Merleau-Ponty, it is not just the 
(human?) Other which brings its look to bear, but also the things. James 
Elkins tries to make this point more fully in his The ect Stares Bac , and 
though his work there is evocative, he does not succeed in giving us a rigor-
ous explanation of what the claim that objects ÔlookÕ at us might mean. The 
extramissionist model of sight may help here, because although we may 
struggle to imagine that Òthe thingsÓ look at us in the sense of forming an 
image of us or becoming conscious of us, we may more sensibly think that 
many things cast around and interact with the things around them in the way 
that I do as an active perceiver. Elkins offer a comparison with the many 
Ôways of seeingÕ in which science depends on technology; like a camera-flash, 
an electron microscope or a radar device must emit something in order to 
make the object visible, measuring its reflection, as we might shine a torch or 
use a bicycle light when moving around in the darkness.138 
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learly, then, the ancient model of extramissionism is implausible as a sci-
entific account of seeing  but we are driven to return to it as a metaphor for 
the active, creative aspect of seeing which the intromissionist, physiological 
account of vision fails to capture. In her account of BaconÕs thought, Biernoff 
exposes a shortcoming of thinking in terms of the intromission extramission 
dilemma. For, according to Baconian intromission, sensed objects have an 
agency which they impose on the one who senses them  there is real potency 
in objects, in virtue of their sensibility. But the intromission which Merleau-
Ponty has criticised, the accounts of sensation conceived on Idealist or 
Empiricist models, are in part problematic because they allow no agency to 
the sensed world  either the meaning of things is imposed on them by the 
perceiver, for the intellectualist, or, for the Empiricist, there is no agency but 
only mechanical chains of causation which extend through the nervous 
system. 
What is in uestion is not just whether sensation or perception are an in-
ward or outward movement, but also what it is that is transmitted by this 
movement. learly, in the case of light, science rightly dismisses the idea that 
perception occurs by the emission of rays of light from the eyes  the light that 
comes from the eyes is reflected, rather than emitted from them, and is not 
decisive for perception. But the fact that sight depends on the reception of 
light does not make it passive in every sense. Indeed, this is in a sense the 
heart of Merleau-PontyÕs argument in the Phenomenology of Perception. In his 
crit ue of the Ôclassical prejudicesÕ of bjective hought, Merleau-Ponty 
criticises Empiricism for accepting that perception is produced entirely by 
the workings of sense on sense-receptors  this reduction of perception to 
observation, this Òimpingement of stimuli entirely from without on the 
passive receptive apparatus of the sensorium,ÓÁÂ9 as ay has it, cannot account 
for perception since it would suggest either a totally uncomprehending 
mechanical sight or a direct access to things, as we argued in the first chapter. 
Sight cannot be, on this model, simple passive reception of sensations. But 
similarly, the ÔintellectualistÕ account for which the world of things must be 
constituted Òentirely out of the subjectÕs own interiorityÓÁÃ0 fails to make 
sense of perception, because there is in it no real contact with the world, an 
ever-present threat of solipsism. Perception can be neither purely passive nor 
purely active, neither observation nor speculation, but must be passive-active, 
interrogative. he dominance of sight tends towards one or other extreme, 
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depending on whether we emphasise the intromissionism of the physics of 
light or the role of the brain in supposedly forming perceptual constructions 
from the retinal images. The examples of the other senses, and especially of 
touch and, as we have seen, of the special case of touch which is taste, tend 
less strongly toward this polarisation. ut this is not because there is a prob-
lem with the dominance of sight. The problem is with the way we are con-
ceiving it. 
Perception is extramissive insofar as I choose where I look, how I listen, 
and what I touch, and thus act in and on the world by perceiving. I emit, if 
you will, rays of attention, and I do things with my glances. Where empiricist 
intromissionism of light can be denuded of all agency, so aconÕs emphasis on 
the power of things over us depends not on intromissionism but on a certain 
perceptual interactionism. 
If Merleau-Ponty rejects perception conceived as observation and specula-
tion, ay asks, can it be said that he adopted the third alternative, that of 
revelatory illumination[ ] ÊË1 Illumination seems like an odd choice as a 
proposal for a third alternative here, and ay uses it because it is utilised by 
the Surrealists at around Merleau-PontyÕs time. ut ay is right to say that If 
the goal of the seer is understood to be the attainment of perfect transpar-
ency, fusion with the divine light, or clairvoyant purity, then obviously 
Merleau-Ponty with his celebration of the interminable ambiguities of visual 
experience was not of their number. ÊË2 Merleau-PontyÕs account of percep-
tion is not one of clairvoyance or of illumination but of interrogation. e 
understood the perceiver as an agent located in the thickness of the world; 
perception does not make sense of everything; necessity and contingency are 
entwined together in the reality of the fleshly world. And here theology can 
once again be brought back to its roots by philosophy; it is not a clear and 
distinct vision of the world which we are to seek but an interrogation of 
things which searches out understanding without demanding that everything 
is put in its place and all be contained in a monolithic and perspicuous 
metaphysics. An incarnational theology can learn from Merleau-PontyÕs 
incarnational account of perception in this regard, embracing ambiguity and 
the process of questioning which it enables.  ay notices two senses in which 
Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy appropriates certain positive aspects of what he 
calls the visionary tradition ; first, that in the fleshly intertwining of the 
perceiver and the perceived world, in the renewed form of perspectivism 
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which we have affirmed, there is an Òecstatic decentering of the subject, an 
acknowledgment that however active perception may be, it also meant a kind 
of surrender,Ó which de Certeau has compared to the ideas of Meister Eck-
hart.143 On the other hand, Òcontact with the visible world did not produce 
nausea in Merleau-Ponty as it did in Sartre, but a sense of wonder instead. 
Never fully throwing off the Catholicism of his early training, he reveled in 
the richness of created, incarnated Being available to the eyes.Ó144 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Institution and 
Incarnation in 
Merleau-PontyÕs 
Ontology 
 
 
 
 
 
hinking through a renewed conception of vision, in the previous 
chapter I began to develop an alternative to Cartesian perspectiv-
ism, its geometrical ontology, and its theology of God as penseur 
absolu du monde. I sought to recover aspects of the species and extramission 
theories of vision, establishing depth as a fundamental dimension of the 
perceived world, which installs transcendence at the heart of things, 
emphasising our perceptual imbrication with the world in its thickness 
and our interrogative relationship to this world. 
In this, my final chapter, I locate this account of vision at the centre of an 
ontology of flesh, paying particular attention to the importance of place 
rather than of co-ordinate space-time, and drawing out its implications for an 
incarnational thought which is both philosophical and theological. I argue 
that the transcendence of depth reveals a logos in things, a God Òon the other 
side of things,Ó in Merleau-PontyÕs terms. I argue for a conception of nature 
as the ÔsoilÕ which gives rises to this logos, developing the logic of incarnation 
with reference to Merleau-PontyÕs notion of institution, and arguing for a 
sacramental understanding of our engagement with the world. 
Merleau-PontyÕs relationship to Christianity, and to the catholic Christian-
ity of his upbringing, is riven with tensions which were left unresolved at his 
death. William Hamrick and Jan van der Veken point out that, as Òuniquely 
about the Word made flesh and his death,Ó Christianity continued to attract 
Merleau-Ponty and to hold some import for him long after he had left its 
T 
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institutions behind.1 In the Christian notion of the incarnation, I want to 
suggest, lie possibilities for thinking the juncture of nature and its outside 
through which Merleau-PontyÕs ontology may be developed in a fruitful 
direction; at the same time, Merleau-PontyÕs thought may contribute to a 
theological thinking of incarnation which will call Christianity back to an 
appreciation of the mystery of God at work in and through nature. In ÒIndi-
rect Language and the Voices of SilenceÓ Merleau-Ponty writes, 
 
It is a little too much to forget that Christianity is, among other things, the recogni-
tion of a mystery in the relations of man and God, which stems precisely from the 
fact that the Christian God wants nothing to do with a vertical relation of subordina-
tion. He is not simply a principle of which we are the consequence, a will whose in-
struments we are, or even a model of which human values are only the reflection. 
There is a sort of impotence of God without us, and Christ attests that God would 
not be fully God without becoming fully man. Claudel goes so far as to say that God 
is not above us but beneath us Ñ meaning that we do not find Him as a suprasen-
sible idea, but as another ourself which dwells in and authenticates our darkness. 
Transcendence no longer hangs over man: he becomes, strangely, its privileged 
bearer.2 
 
And this notion, even the thought that God has become impotent without 
us, is not an innovation in Christian theology. Indeed, as I am seeking to 
show, Merleau-PontyÕs break with objectivist ontology recalls the Christian 
theologian to an understanding of incarnation which objectivism made 
incomprehensible. We can trace this thought in Richard Hooker, for whom 
Òsince God has deified our nature, though not by turning it into himself, yet 
by making it his own inseparable habitation, we cannot now conceive how 
God should, without us, either exercise divine power or receive the glory of 
                                                
1 William S. Hamrick and Jan Van Der Veken, Nature and Logos: A Whiteheadian Key to 
Merleau-PontyÕs Fundamental Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011), 
121. 
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ÒIndirect Language and the Voices of Silence.Ó in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1964), 71. 
160 Part Two: Ontology 
divine praise.Ó3 So Òit pleases him in mercy to account himself incomplete and 
maimed without us.Ó4 
In his A Christian Theology of Place, John Inge argues that place is a critical 
category for theological understanding, and one to which too little attention 
has been paid, having been subordinated in the history of philosophy to the 
logic of space, and more recently that of time.5 In citing W.D. DaviesÕ com-
ments on the spatial symbolism of the Gospel of John, Inge writes that Òthe 
vertical dimension is, of course, what Christians refer to as the incarnation, 
which is central to the New Testament Witness and the Christian faith that 
springs from it, and the fact that Jesus was not a disincarnate spirit has 
profound implications.Ó6  
To speak in terms of verticality would seem to return us to the logic of 
spatial geometry and to fail to think incarnation in terms of place. But for 
Inge, the abstractive discourses of space (beginning in the pre-existing space 
in which TimaeusÕ demiurge creates the world, and the Aristotelian notion of 
space as a container)7 and of time (in LeibnizÕ insistence on the logical pri-
ority of time over space and in KantÕs argument that time as succession Òis 
the schematic expression of causality in the physical world orderÓ)8 in which 
we are immersed bring about the devaluation of place, which, as phenomeno-
logically and experientially prior to both time and space, ought to be more 
fundamental to our thinking.9 
So we must understand Inge with reference to his own claim that, in Chris-
tian theology, the embodied logic of place has priority over geometrised space; 
that is to say, that the verticality of the incarnation is not oriented around the 
infinite height (thought in terms of Cartesian coordinates) of God under-
stood as something like an absolute perceiver. Rather, we should seek to 
understand the incarnation in terms of depth; that the God who is at the 
heart of things traverses their depths to be made known on their surface, in 
                                                
3 Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book V, Ch.54.6. Cited in Margaret R. Miles, 
The Word Made Flesh: A History of Christian Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 322, though it 
is incorrectly attributed there, with the quote which follows, to Laws V.56.10. 
4 Richard Hooker Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book V, Ch.56.10. Cited by Miles, The Word 
Made Flesh, 322. 
5 John Inge, A Christian Theology of Place (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 32. 
6 Inge, A Christian Theology of Place, 51, referring to Davies, W.D., The Gospel and the Land: 
Early Christianity and Jewish Territorial Doctrine (Berkeley, CA: University of Californian 
Press, 1974), 335. 
7 Inge, A Christian Theology of Place, 2–4. 
8 Inge, A Christian Theology of Place, 8. 
9 Inge, A Christian Theology of Place, 1–26. 
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this particular human being (Jesus of Nazareth) and in that which bears 
witness to him. As we problematise this claim to verticality in denying the 
logic of God as an entity which occupies the place of the highest perspective 
on things,10 we also call into question the other orientation of verticality: If 
we are to take seriously ClaudelÕs view, cited by Merleau-Ponty, that God is 
beneath us, this is not to say that we are above him, but that God is Ôunder 
our skin,Õ that the God who transcends nature is already at work in its depths. 
For Leonard Lawlor, in his introduction to Merleau-PontyÕs course notes 
on Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, ÒMerleau-Ponty is orienting his entire 
philosophy toward the depth, in the ground, the visible, and not, as he says, 
in the heights, in the ideas, in the invisible.Ó11 This claim is based on a citation 
from the lecture course on Husserl, which I am here paraphrasing for the 
sake of readability (in the original there are a huge number of insertions to 
clarify Merleau-PontyÕs shorthand and terms untranslated from HusserlÕs 
German, which I translate): 
 
The theme of philosophy is the horizon of horizons. This goes deeper than 
HusserlÕs initial definitions of philosophy as a rigorous science. In particular, the 
initial definitions of the Eidos: the Eidos is from now on the interpretation of a ho-
rizon; eidetic variation seeks the invariant, Òas the essence/nature [wesen] con-
stantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon.Ó12 Does philosophy explain this 
essence/nature? Its theme is a Òreason hidden in historyÓ (Fink), a Òteleological rea-
son running throughout all history,Ó13 but which can be grasped only in filigree, as 
a secret or hidden connection. Therefore essence/nature does not engulf the hori-
zon. It is the formulation of its structure as [the] horizon of culture (Òour present as 
a process of traditionalizing itself in a flowing-static vitality.Ó)14 But this ÔstructuralÕ 
or concrete a priori is neither a Kantian category nor even a Hegelian idea; it is the 
                                                
10 Psalm 14:2 has it that ÒThe LORD looks down from Heaven on humankind / to see if there 
any who are wise, who seek after God.Ó But as BarnesÕ Notes on the Bible explain, ÒThe original 
word here - !"#$ shqaph - conveys the idea of "bending forward," and hence, of an intense 
and anxious looking.Ó God is not here the disinterested absolute observer but one who is 
somehow involved in the world. 
11 Leonard Lawlor, ÒVerflechtung,Ó in Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, ed. 
Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston, IL: Nothwestern University Press, 2002), xvii. 
12 This citation is from Edmund Husserl, ÒThe Origin of Geometry,Ó trans. David Carr, in 
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits, 112. 
13 Another citation from Husserl, ÒThe Origin of Geometry,Ó 112. 
14  Husserl, ÒThe Origin of Geometry,Ó 108. 
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Òuniversal ground of sense:Ó15 the sense, in the last instance, far from being an 
idea, is a ground. Philosophy seeks in the archaeology of ground, in the depth and 
not in the height (the ideas).16 
 
To say that Merleau-PontyÕs late philosophy is oriented toward depth is 
absolutely right; but of course to say that this excludes the ÔinvisibleÕ is a 
mistake. It rather seeks the invisible in the visible.17 Lawlor has to make this 
mistake, and misread Merleau-Ponty here, because his guiding thesis is that 
ÒImmanence [É] must be made complete,Ó18 drawn from Jean HyppoliteÕs 
claim in Logique et existence that immanence is complete.19 This idea is not at 
all consonant with Merleau-PontyÕs thought, which searches, as we are seeing, 
for a conception of transcendence that does not depend on a dualism. 
Henri Maldiney, in discussing the sense of transcendence in Merleau-
Ponty, returns to the Husserlian example of the perceived cube. Merleau-
Ponty uses this example, Maldiney thinks, despite its potentially geometri-
cised, disembodied inflections, because in it Òthe transcendence of the thing 
is shown in its naked and [É] pure state.Ó20 For Husserl, according to Mald-
iney, the ultimate reality of the thing lies in its transcendence, which is in 
some way vertical; this is perhaps the view that the being of the cube is the 
ÔhighestÕ perspective, the sum of all perspectives on it, which makes the 
viewpoint of a penseur absolu the only one which can grasp the thing as it is. 
Merleau-Ponty, too, speaks of a Ôvertical transcendenceÕ which does not have 
to be the transcendence of subordination but is that transcendence which 
                                                
15 Husserl, ÒThe Origin of Geometry,Ó 109.  
16 The source of this paraphrase is in Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 67. 
17 Cf., for example, Merleau-Ponty, Nature 271; The Visible and the Invisible 215, 235, 257; 
Kascha Semonovitch and Neal DeRoo, ÒIntroductionÓ in Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, 
Religion, and Perception, ed. Kascha Semonovitch, and Neal DeRoo (London: Continuum, 
2010), 15; Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-PontyÕs Ontology, Trans. Ted 
Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 240; 
Mauro Carbone, The Thinking of the Sensible: Merleau-PontyÕs A-Philosophy (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2004), 35, and many more.  
18 Leonard Lawlor, ÒThe Chiasm and the Fold: An Introduction to the Philosophical 
Concept of ArcheologyÓ in Chiasmi International, 4 (2002) pp.105–116, 115. Lawlor repeats this 
idea in The Implications of Immanence (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), and takes 
it as a guiding idea in his Derrida and Husserl (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2002). 
19 Cited in Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence, 4. 
20 Henri Maldiney, ÒFlesh and Verb in the Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty,Ó in Chiasms: 
Merleau-PontyÕs Notion of Flesh, ed. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), 63. 
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man bears.21 As Maldiney has it, Òwe do not learn the real through reflection, 
but in the wild state,Ó that is, I experience the cube as transcendent insofar as 
I find it in a world in which I myself am caught up and to which my mode of 
access does not make it transparent, but which is necessarily mixed-up 
because I am a part of it, am mixed up in it. So  
 
In contrast to Husserl, one could speak of a horizontal transcendence of flesh to 
flesh. But my going out into the other, my emergence into the other, is of the same 
order as our two respective emergences. It is the self-emergence of universal flesh: 
so these horizontal, or transversal relations imply a unique vertical transcendence 
in depth.22 
 
Verticality and Transcendence 
This vertical transcendence locates thought not only in a physical world, 
nor a world of meaningful logos, but also in a world of history. In the second 
course from the lectures on Nature, given in 1957–58, Merleau-Ponty declares 
that Òour goal is the series %&'() — *+,+) — history,Ó23 but the meaning of 
history here is not only that of human history but also of the history of a 
given body: — its institution, its natality, its belonging to a cultural world. 
History is here identified with Òthe human body as the root of symbolism,Ó 
which is Òthe junction of %&'() and *+,+),Ó and indeed the third course, given 
in 1959–1960, is entitled ÔNature and Logos: The Human Body.Õ A note, 
published with the working notes for The Visible and the Invisible and written 
in February 1959 suggests that there is a relation of this scheme to the Ôverti-
calityÕ of depth in transcendence when Merleau-Ponty repeats the formula, 
writing that the overcoming (in fact he uses the word ÒdestructionÓ) of 
Cartesian objectivist ontology requires the Òrediscovery of %&'(), then of 
*+,+) and the vertical history starting from our ÔcultureÕ and the Winke 
[pointers or signs] of our Ôscience.ÕÓ24 History, then, does not begin just with 
the vagaries of human history, but with the necessary contingencies and 
contingent necessities of human situatedness, embodiment, and cultural 
formation. This personal history is vertical insofar as I rise out of the depths 
                                                
21 Merleau-Ponty, ÒIndirect Language and the Voices of Silence,Ó 71. 
22 Maldiney, ÒFlesh and Verb in the Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty,Ó 64. 
23 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 199. 
24 The Visible and the Invisible, 183, emphasis added. 
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of my embodiment, an embodiment which must precede me. It is thus that 
Merleau-Ponty writes, in Phenomenology of Perception,  
 
 Since it is not oriented Ôin itself,Õ it must be that my first perception and my first 
taking-hold of the world appears like the execution of an ancient pact concluded 
between x and the world in general, that my history takes up a prehistory and its 
acquired results, and that my personal existence recovers a prepersonal tradition. 
There is, then, another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists before I do 
and who marks out my place. This captive or natural spirit is my body, not the 
momentary body which is the instrument of my personal choices and which fixes 
on a particular world, but the system of anonymous ÔfunctionsÕ which envelops all 
my particular fixations in a general project.25 
 
Merleau-PontyÕs phraseology is so beautiful, and the arc of his thought 
(from the earliest anticipations of this idea to their suggestive development in 
his late, unfinished work) so promising, that it is hard to resist simply deploy-
ing swathes of quotes to elucidate this idea, but resist we must if we are to 
progress beyond exposition of this promise to substantive philosophical 
development.26 It would seem clear that the Ôancient pactÕ between the x 
which is my body and the world is perception. There is ambiguity over the 
question of whether the anonymous body perceives or whether it is the 
necessary condition for perception; the body-subject of the Phenomenology of 
Perception is a subject of perception, but in The Visible and the Invisible there is 
an explicit denial that the body perceives,27 as well as an insistence that 
perception emerges against the background of or Òin the recess ofÓ the body28 
and that it is not the case that one could perceive without a body.29  
                                                
25 Phenomenology of Perception, 296. I have here re-translated from the French edition, 
Phnomnologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 293–4. 
26 I do not mean by this to put aside the work of those who set out to make clearer Merleau-
PontyÕs own ideas, as I have filled much space doing here. For example David Michael 
Kleinberg-Levin does this to great effect, as a stage in his development of a moral phenom-
enology, in his ÒTracework,Ó in Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the 
Tradition, ed. Bernard Flynn, Wayne Froman and Robert Vallier (Albany, NY: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 2009), 79–116. Because of the great suggestiveness of the notes and 
unpublished texts Merleau-Ponty left at his untimely death, this is a common and sometimes 
necessary gesture in working with his philosophy. 
27 The Visible and the Invisible, 9: Òmy body does not perceive, but it is as if it were built around 
the perception that dawns through it.Ó 
28 The Visible and the Invisible, 9. 
29 The Visible and the Invisible, 27: Òwe do not mean that one could perceive without a body.Ó 
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It seems reasonable to say that the body grounds perception, which could 
not occur without it, but that it is not exactly the same thing as the perceiver. 
Perception, I propose, Ôrises aboveÕ the body, grows out of it as its native soil, 
but constitutes more than it. But, crucially, perception does not leave this 
soil untouched; as Merleau-Ponty had been showing since The Structure of 
Behaviour, there is an exchange between the levels; and sensitive, perceptual 
nature is bound up with physical nature in its dependence on movement. The 
regulative ideal of maximum clarity in perception which guides the perceiver 
to look at an object from a certain distance and perspective is the first 
moment of this exchange. And so as the vertical, prepersonal history we have 
spoken of grounds, through perception, logos in phusis, meaning in nature, so 
phusis is transformed into logos, not all at once, as it were, but by the sedimen-
tation and accretion of Ôinstitutions,Õ that is, of meaningful structures in the 
world in which it lives and on which it acts; as the word is made flesh, so the 
flesh is made word. 
Bernard Flynn notes that Òthe dimension of Being that is beneath not only 
our personal life but also beneath history and symbolic institution is what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as Ôwild being.Õ In the context of his reinterpretation 
of Husserl, one could call this Ôthe Earth.ÕÓ30 That is to say that the body is of 
the Earth, that the human is truly of the humus. In his lectures on HusserlÕs 
text entitled ÒFoundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of 
the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, does not move,Ó31 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the Earth Òthat the Copernican man forgets,Ó32 an 
earth that is not an object but a ground, which grounds my body as object 
just as my body grounds my subjectivity (I am hesitant to use this word 
without a precise idea of what we mean by it, but this meaning can only 
emerge from our work here). Although Merleau-Ponty, in his working notes 
for The Visible and the Invisible, criticises his earlier work in Phenomenology of 
Perception, saying that ÒThe problems posed [É] are insoluble because I start 
there from the ÔconsciousnessÕ-ÔobjectÕ distinction,Ó33 there is an anticipation 
                                                
30 Bernard Flynn, ÒMerleau-Ponty and the Philosophical Position of SkepticismÓ in Merleau-
Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition, ed. Bernard Flynn, Wayne 
Froman and Robert Vallier (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009), 126. 
31 Edmund Husserl, ÒFoundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the 
Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, does not move,Ó trans. Fred Kersten and 
revised by Leonard Lawlor, in Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, ed. 
Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo, 117–131. 
32 Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 69. 
33 The Visible and the Invisible, 200. 
166 Part Two: Ontology 
there of the structuration of the gestalt in which subjectivity is not just 
ÔattachedÕ to an object in a substantialist mode of thinking but is grounded in 
the triangulated structure of subject-object-ground in a structural (but not 
necessarily structuralist) mode of thinking. 
Mauro Carbone points to34 Merleau-PontyÕs rsum of this course in which 
he spells out that for Copernican man, Òthe world contains only ÔbodiesÕ 
(Krper),Ó35 arguing that we must recover  Òa mode of being the idea of which 
we have lost, the being of the ÔgroundÕ (Boden) [or Ôsoil,Õ as Carbone trans-
lates], and that of the Earth first of all — the earth where we live, that which 
is this side of rest and movement, being the ground from which all rest and 
movement break away.Ó36 This idea of a mode of being is a crucial ontological 
concept for Merleau-Ponty, that of a ÔsoilÕ which is not an object but the 
ground of objects. John OÕNeill translates Boden as Ôground,Õ but Carbone uses 
Ôsoil,Õ and where Merleau-Ponty discusses this notion in his first lecture 
course on Nature, given in 1956–57, three years before the 1959–60 course on 
Husserl, he uses the French word sol, which can mean both soil and ground but 
transparently is etymologically closer to the former. In an introductory note 
to this course, (not the rsum, which is published separately in the Themes 
from the Lectures), he says 
 
Nature is the primordial Ñ that is, the nonconstructed, the noninstituted; [É] Na-
ture is an enigmatic object, an object that is not an object at all; it is not really set 
out in front of us. It is our soil [sol] Ñ not what is in front of us, facing us, but ra-
ther, that which carries us.37 
 
In ÔThe Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical ConsequencesÕ38 Mer-
leau-Ponty appeals to the primacy of perception as overcoming scepticism 
and pessimism, and locates his anti-atomism and anti-objectivism within a 
larger philosophical scheme: he argues against Pascal that one does not love 
                                                
34 Mauro Carbone, ÒFlesh: Towards the History of a Misunderstanding,Ó in Chiasmi Interna-
tional, Vol. 2, 49–57. 
35 Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures at the Collge de France 1952–1960, trans. John OÕNeill 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 121; Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenol-
ogy, 9. 
36 Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures, 121; Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 9. 
37 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 4. 
38 ÒThe Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences,Ó trans. James M. Edie, in 
Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception And Other Essays, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), 12–42. 
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only ÒqualitiesÓ but Òon the contrary [É] we call what we perceive Ôthe world,Õ 
and what we love Ôthe person.ÕÓ39 There is then, he argues, a type of doubt and 
a type of spite which are made impossible, and he finds a truth of love which 
Pascal destroys by analysis. ÒThe absolute which he looks for beyond our 
experience is implied in it. Just as I grasp time through my present and by 
being present, I perceive others through my individual life, in the tension of 
an experience which transcends itself.Ó40 He closes by relating this to Chris-
tian theology: 
 
There is thus no destruction of the absolute or of rationality here, only of the abso-
lute and the rationality separated from experience. To tell the truth, Christianity 
consists in replacing the separated absolute by the absolute in men. NietzscheÕs 
idea that God is dead is already contained in the Christian idea of the death of 
God. God ceases to be an external object in order to mingle in human life, and 
this life is not simply a return to a nontemporal conclusion.  God needs human 
history. As Malebranche said, the world is unfinished. My viewpoint differs from 
the Christian viewpoint to the extent that the Christian believes in another side of 
things where the Òrenversement du pour au contreÓ takes place. In my view this 
ÒreversalÓ takes place before our eyes. And perhaps some Christians would agree 
that the other side of things must already be visible in the environment in which 
we live. By advancing this thesis of the primacy of perception, I have less the feel-
ing that I am proposing something completely new than the feeling of drawing out 
the conclusions of the work of my predecessors.41 
 
It is not transparent what exactly Merleau-Ponty is anticipating when he 
speaks of the ÒreversalÓ expected by the Christian. But it seems clear when he 
says Òperhaps some Christians would agree that the other side of things must 
already be visibleÓ that this is not a marginal view but a central tenet of 
Christianity. In the gospels, Jesus comes announcing the Kingdom (-.'(*/(.) 
of God, and saying ÒThe time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come 
near [or is at hand]Ó;42 in the New Testament reports of his ministry, which 
this announcement begins, he demonstrates the presence and character of 
that kingdom in miracles, in prayer, in community, in refusing violent opposi-
tion to the Roman occupation and ultimately in accepting execution as a 
                                                
39 ÒThe Primacy of Perception,Ó 26–7. 
40 ÒThe Primacy of Perception,Ó 27. 
41 ÒThe Primacy of Perception,Ó 27. 
42 Mark 1:15 NRSV. 
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criminal and in bodily resurrection. Whether we read these events as histori-
cal or as mythological, whether we understand the kingdom Jesus announces 
as an inward power given to humans, as the breaking in to earthly reality of 
the Ôwholly other,Õ perhaps in the sacraments, as the Church, or as ÔHeaven,Õ it 
is difficult to take the line Albert Schweitzer takes in thinking of the king-
dom as wholly future, as Òan apocalyptic realm to be inaugurated by a super-
natural act of God when history will be broken off and a new heavenly order 
of existence begun,Ó as George Eldon Ladd puts it.43 If it were so, JesusÕ 
message would quickly have seemed implausible (if the kingdom were Òat 
handÓ in a purely temporal sense, and the expected apocalypse never comes) 
and lacking in force (if the kingdom was expected to be made known in and 
around Jesus and his followers but in fact nothing out of the ordinary hap-
pened), and regardless of its truth or falsity, history shows us that his message 
was neither of these things, but rather was effective in mobilising a quickly-
expanding movement of people prepared to commit themselves to this cause, 
at risk of exclusion from their own communities, ostracisation, and violent 
persecution in many places in the Roman world. 
This is all to say that Merleau-PontyÕs vision of the coming to fulfilment of 
the world within human history, of the showing of the truth of things not as a 
separated absolute in a heaven of ideas but as the absolute in the lives of 
persons, communities, and the places to which they belong, does not seem an 
innovation to the Christian, but a reminder of the truth which is summed up 
and brought to a head in the Incarnation. There is, then, a logic of imminence 
demanded by this ÔincarnationalÕ thought; that is, the Ôother side of thingsÕ of 
which Merleau-Ponty speaks, the invisible depths of the world, breaks 
through to the surface of things; but this is not a completed movement, and 
perception has not become absolute. The invisible remains the invisible, the 
world has not become transparent, but neither has it become opaque. Just as 
the Ôother side of thingsÕ is seen, though it is invisible, in any everyday object, 
it also crucially shapes our perception of place (the ÔinsideÕ depends on the 
same ÔoutsideÕ which it excludes) and our search for truth. This imminence is 
not the relation of a transcendence of infinite height to a pure plane of 
immanence but is that of a transcendence already lodged within the earth, 
the realisation of the depths of things, the coming-to-themselves of created 
realities. Lissa McCullough, reflecting on Simone Weil and S¿ren Kierke-
                                                
43 George Eldon Ladd, The Gospel of the Kingdom: Scriptural Studies in the Kingdom of God 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1959), 15. 
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gaardÕs ÔrevolutionizingÕ of the tasks of faith and prayer, in contrast to Augus-
tineÕs ÔotherworldlyÕ paradigm, has it that 
 
Our task or calling in life is not to ÒsufferÓ the temporal in patience, waiting it out 
in our quest for the eternal at the end of time, but to inhabit it and love it as the 
manifest and living will of God in the flesh. We must not only be prepared for the 
grace that carries us into eternity, or death, but we must be prepared for the grace 
that delivers us Ñ in a heartbeat Ñ back into our very flesh, into the task of life, 
regaining the finite in faith, such that the Òcity of GodÓ or Òkingdom of GodÓ is ac-
tively incarnate in us, here and now, in the very midst of the Òcity of man.Ó This is 
the radically dialectical task that Kierkegaard describes as bringing eternity to bear 
within time.44 
 
In the report of the discussion published with ÒThe Primacy of Percep-
tionÓ Merleau-Ponty responds to Jean HyppoliteÕs reminder that he Òsaid 
that God was deadÓ with the reply that ÒI said that to say God is dead, as the 
Nietzscheans do, or to speak of the death of God, like the Christians do, is to 
tie God to man, and that in this sense the Christians themselves are obliged 
to tie eternity to time.Ó45  
In a sense, to conduct this discussion only in terms of time and eternity is 
to make a mistake, as Inge shows us. If we take time to be the index of the 
particular, bodily life, as the locus of incarnation, without thinking of incar-
nation in a particular place, we simply stretch eternity out on a line; we 
perpetuate the mistake of constructing the world according to an Aristo-
telian, Euclidean or perspectival geometry. If our task is to bring eternity to 
bear within time, it is also to bring infinity or the immeasurable to bear in 
place. To think in terms of place is to refuse to abstract space or time as 
dimensional realities from the whole, to think in terms of orientation rather 
than of measure, to prioritise the absolute in man rather than the exter-
nalised absolute. But this place needs some kind of grounding that makes 
sensible our intersubjective life and explains why a place is not simply com-
mensurate with a particular space at a particular time. For David Abram,  
 
                                                
44 Lissa McCullough, ÒPrayer and Incarnation: A Homiletical ReflectionÓ in Benson, Bruce 
Ellis, and Wirzba, Norman (eds.), The Phenomenology of Prayer (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 209–216. 
45 ÒThe Primacy of Perception,Ó 41. 
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Underneath the modern, scientific conception of space as a mathematically infi-
nite and homogenous void, Husserl discloses the experienced spatiality of the 
earth itself. The encompassing earth, he suggests, provides the most immediate, 
bodily awareness of space, from which all later conceptions of space are de-
rived.46 
 
This latter space is what we are calling, following Inge, place. HusserlÕs ar-
gument in the ÒFoundational Investigations...Ó begins to build a conception 
of nature which goes beyond geometrisation, by insisting that space is 
founded on the earth, which provides the zero-point of movement and rest, 
and so cannot itself be in movement or at rest. It is our soil, the ground of 
our possibilities. 
 
Nature as ÔSoilÕ 
In a sense, this Husserlian notion of the earth as soil anticipates Merleau-
PontyÕs claim that the perceived world precedes and grounds the homoge-
neous ÔnatureÕ of the sciences. Perhaps it will help us to get clearer on what 
this claim might mean. On the one hand, it is clear that our understanding of 
the world in-itself can only be built on our perceptions of it. We can have no 
knowledge of a nature of which we are not in some sense a part. But does it 
not defy logic to claim that the world we experience is more real than the 
world which we understand by abstracting from our experience, by attempt-
ing to make sense of everyoneÕs experience? 
Science depends on the repeatability of experiments, and on the independ-
ent verification of results, because this combats individual bias in our under-
standing of the world. If many different observers observe that a particle 
travels faster than light, for example, then we can be more sure that such an 
outcome is not the result of wishful thinking, of deception, of mismeasure-
ment or of some other kind of mistake. If the experiment can be performed 
using different apparatus, so much the better. In what sense should the world 
as understood by such a process be made secondary?  
Surely the world as discovered by the sciences must most closely approxi-
mate the real world; surely that world must be the foundation of our ontol-
ogy? By abstracting from the role of any particular observer it gives us an idea 
of what the world is like to an anonymous observer. Does it also tell us what 
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the world is like when there is no one to observe it at all? If things behave in 
certain, predictable ways under all possible conditions of observation, it 
seems reasonable to think that they still behave in the same way when not 
under observation. It is on the basis of this claim that science abstracts from 
the observerÕs participation in the process and claims to tell us what the world 
is like and not just how it seems. The problem with this view, the source of its 
failure properly to understand the world in which we live, lies in its failure to 
account for the fact that the observer is not just an observer but also a human 
being. Even if an experiment can control all the observerÕs biases, it cannot 
control the fact that he does this experiment and not another one. Account-
ing for a certain situation or sum of facts as they are regardless of the status 
of observers crosses the established gap between appearance and reality in 
the scientific mind without firm foundations. 
What scientific thought forgets, when it tells us what the world would be 
like regardless of the status of the observer, is that the world is not empty of 
human beings, and that these human beings are never (except in certain 
respects under certain experimental conditions) observers but are real actors 
within that world. In Xavier TillietteÕs account of Merleau-PontyÕs lectures 
on ÔHusserlÕs Concept of Nature,Õ Merleau-Ponty argues that  
 
The real, the true, the in-itself is the correlative of a pure spectator, an I which has 
decided to know the world. This conception extends by itself, without limits, ap-
plying itself to the Weltall [world in its totality]. In this sense it is everything. When 
a philosopher journeys he carries these notions with him!47 
 
This is based on an account of HusserlÕs view: 
 
In Ideen II, Husserl envisions a sphere of pure things (blosse Sachen), things which 
are nothing but things, without predicates of value or use. This is the Nature of the 
scientists, of Descartes, the Nature of the sciences of nature. But it has its founda-
tion in the structure of human perception. [É] The idea of such a Nature, blosse 
Sachlichkeit [mere thingness], is circumscribed a priori when we make ourselves 
into pure theoretical subjects.48 
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Under normal circumstances we assume that our perceptions are percep-
tions of a prior world. This world is the world of nature, which imperfectly 
gives rise to our perceptions, and is the world to which we must lead them 
back, using the methods of science. But, according to Husserl, this is a 
mistake. It is right to say that our perceptions are the perceptions of a prior 
world. But it is the perceived world which gives rise to them, and science 
brings us not to this world but to an abstract world, devoid of colour, 
thought, or love. Science builds this confusion between two worlds, the world 
of perception and the world of nature, on the basis of a confusion between 
two selves; it mistakes the active, engaged perceiver of the lived world for the 
theoretical subject of the perceived world, and it is on this basis that it 
establishes its conception of the world of science: it is essentially the corre-
late of its notion of the detached, neutral observer. 
 
Husserl seems to suggest that the earth lies at the heart of our notions of time as 
well as of space. He writes of the earth as our Òprimitive homeÓ and our Òprimitive 
history.Ó Every unique cultural history is but an episode in this larger story; every 
culturally constructed notion of time presupposes our deep history as carnal be-
ings present to a single earth.49 
 
If the Òcore of realityÓ that is disclosed within perception is immemorial, then we 
can gain a new appreciation of the aloofness or inhumanity of the thing, that is, 
the sense in which it rejects the perceiving body. If Merleau-PontyÕs descriptions 
are accurate, then the perceiving subjectÕs relation with nature is always and es-
sentially Janus-faced: on the one hand, and as a condition for its attunement with 
the sensible, the body is co-natural with what it perceives; but, on the other hand, 
and as the condition for being in-itself, nature exceeds the body and withdraws 
into an immemorial depth before the bodyÕs advances. Thus, our kinship with and 
estrangement from nature are essentially linked already at the level of perceptual 
dialogue. This structure of kinship and estrangement is doubled when we consider 
reflectionÕs grasp of the prereflective body. This suggests that the kinship and es-
trangement of reflective consciousness with respect to its own embodied nature 
are equally essential.50 
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This claim that the perceived world is prior to and more fundamental than 
the world to which science attends would seem to risk idealism: if there are 
contents of perception which do not correspond to anything in the world of 
the blo!e Sachen, these contents must be at some level contributed to the 
scene by the mind or the perceptual process. But reducing reality to an 
essentially mental thing would shipwreck Merleau-PontyÕs entire project 
from The Structure of Behaviour to The Visible and the Invisible. If the world is a 
mental reality, there can be no thought of an Ôincarnation,Õ for how then 
would what is incarnated be any different to what is not incarnated? If flesh is 
reducible to word, then there can be no meaning in the claim that the word 
was made flesh. In Xavier TillietteÕs notes, Merleau-Ponty goes on: ÒThe 
universe of theories refers back to another universe, preceding it, primordial. 
It is a matter of unearthing a more original world vor aller Thesis [before any 
thesis].Ó This more original world is not a perceived world in the sense of a 
mental world. Rather, it is  
 
given to us leibhaft [bodily]. That is to say, consciousness has a very strong intu-
ition of the insurmountable character of the perceived. It is stuck, bogged down in 
the perceived thing, even though the blosse Sachen form a thin universe. This pre-
thetic universe is inscribed in the sense of the blosse Sachen, sedimented in them. 
The entire history of consciousness is found sedimented in Descartes. Pure things 
are idealizations, ensembles constructed upon what is solid. One must dig be-
neath them.51 
 
There is simply more to the world than the ÔthinÕ universe of mere matter. 
So it is that Òthe scientific universe does not rest on itself. It presupposes a 
sphere of experience which is the level upon which the other, the scientific 
universe, can draw.Ó Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are both sensitive to this and 
it is this for which the latter is arguing when he makes a case for the primor-
diality of the perceived world. The world is not mere matter, but is struc-
tured, meaningful, beautiful or ugly, mysterious or obvious, appealing or 
repulsive. To do away with these perceived qualities is to ignore certain 
aspects of the real world. ÒPerceptual consciousness is not a mental alchemy, 
it is global, total.Ó52 
Nature is our soil, which is to say that nature per se cannot be an object for 
us. This is not, of course, to deny the objectivity of the natural sciences; 
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indeed Merleau-Ponty is careful in the rsum for this course to protect the 
status of science, saying that Òit is not possible to reject science out of hand 
on the pretext that it works in terms of certain ontological prejudices,Ó since 
if they are prejudices, Òthe science itself, in its wanderings through being, will 
certainly have occasion to reject them.Ó So it is that Òthe philosopher [É] 
should not pretend to intervene in the field [É] or to arbitrate for science.Ó53 
The earth, we have said, with the late Husserl, is the ÔsoilÕ of the embodied 
perceiver. Nature is also our soil, but we do not wish to conflate nature and 
Earth. The Husserlian earth is, not a space, but the condition of place; that 
is, not a container nor a co-ordinate location but a unity which gives rise to a 
sum of horizons, an ÔimmobileÕ which is the ground of all movement, which 
cannot itself, therefore, move; just as when I walk through the carriages of a 
train I am moving through the train, and if it is light and I look out of the 
window of the train I know I and the train together are moving through the 
landscape, but still it is never the case that the train is moving around me.54 
Whilst the earth is not, in this understanding, an object among objects, it is a 
particular ground of possibilities which could conceivably be different, where 
nature is a general ground of possibilities: we can easily imagine a different 
earth, and indeed the Earth is always changing, but when we use the term 
ÔnatureÕ we tend to mean that which does not change and which does not 
have a place: the laws of nature, and its processes, powers, and potentialities. 
We can conceive of a different ÔearthÕ in the same nature, but if nature were 
different, so would the Earth be. And indeed, Husserl is clear that if I could 
go between two earths as ground-bodies, and could fly from one to the other, 
I would thereby unite the two earths into a single ground. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, Òwherever I go, I make a ground there and attach the new ground to 
the old where I lived. To think two Earths is to think one same earth.Ó55 In 
Xavier TillietteÕs notes on Merleau-PontyÕs 1957–58 lectures he writes  
 
There is but one humanity and there is never anything but a single Boden. The 
order of objective thought is therefore not exhaustive. The earth is not, as it were, 
pinned down; it is not a place in the sense that objects in the world have a place. 
The earth is our stock, our Urheimat [primal home]. It is the root of our spatiality, 
our shared native land, the seat of an Urhistorie [primal history], an originary in-
sertion. Husserl called this the originary arche. This means that it founds a pre-
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existence or a primordial existence. In this way, HusserlÕs philosophy is close to 
that of Heidegger.56 
 
He is right that there is in this natural arche-ology a kind of Heideggerian 
appeal to the primordial ground of Being. But for Merleau-Ponty, as, I think, 
for Husserl, to assert the importance of the notion of soil as a way to escape 
the pervasive ontology of the object is not to assert that this ground is co-
vered over nor that it must be uncovered; it is not to claim the ethical pri-
ority of the primordial nor that the answer to the question of the meaning of 
Being lies there, a question for which Merleau-Ponty shows little appetite (at 
least when posed, and answered, so directly). It is simply to help us to under-
stand ontology as a structure, and as a structure which is not purely ideal but 
which is instituted, which has a real historical depth. Where Descartes pre-
sented us with the opposed worlds of the mental and the physical, and Sartre 
the neo-Cartesian with the opposition of freedom and facticity, of negativity 
and positivity, Merleau-PontyÕs ontology complexifies this picture with the 
centrality in his ontological picture of the historical world, which is com-
posed of sedimented results of acts of institution.  
 
The Logic of Institution 
Merleau-Ponty developed the notion of institution in a specifically philo-
sophical way in his 1954–55 lecture course entitled ÒInstitution in Personal 
and Public History.Ó57 What exactly does he mean by institution? In his notes 
for the introduction to the course, he writes  
 
Therefore institution [means] establishment in an experience (or in a constructed 
apparatus) of dimensions (in the general, Cartesian sense: system of references) in 
relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense and will 
make a sequel, a history.  
The sense is deposited (it is no longer merely in me as consciousness, it is not 
re-created or constituted at the time of the recovery). But not as an object left be-
hind, as a simple remainder or as something that survives, as a residue. [It is de-
posited] as something to continue, to complete without it being the case that the 
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sequel is determined. The instituted will change but this very change is called for 
by its Stiftung. Goethe: genius [is] posthumous productivity. All institution is in this 
sense genius.58 
 
Institution establishes the dimensions of experience, Ôlines of forceÕ which 
make sens of the world. These dimensions are not simply subjective elements 
of experience, though: they are deposited in the world, not as detritus of 
experience but as the markers of meaning which carry forward their produc-
tivity. Merleau-Ponty makes clear that this notion bears on our conception of 
subjectivity, contrasting it to the Kantian notion of the constituting subject. 
There is an Òinstituted and instituting subject, but inseparably, and not a 
constituting subject; [therefore] a certain inertia — [the fact of being] ex-
posed toÉÓ59 Here institution marks the sedimentation of the subject in a 
living world which exceeds him, and thus the possibility of transcendence; in 
the summary of the course he clarifies this Òexposed toÉÓ by writing that 
Òeven if we grant that certain of the objects are Ônever completelyÕ constituted 
(Husserl), they are at each moment the exact reflection of the acts and 
powers of consciousness. There is nothing in these constituted objects that is 
able to throw consciousness back into other perspectives.Ó60 This again 
recalls the meno paradox: Ôhow can anything be learned?Õ That Platonic ques-
tion guides us in the matter of transcendence; PlatoÕs solution, of our recol-
lection of forms arising from an older familiarity with them, affirms the 
priority of a disembodied, atemporal world of abstraction over the life of the 
incarnate world. The logic of institution indicates not only a solution to the 
paradox, but an explanation of how philosophy could have asked a question 
so totally alien to life as we live it: that the transcendence of the unknown, 
the unseen, is not opposed to the immanence of the familiar world but is 
intertwined with it; it is possible for us to learn something new not because 
we somehow already knew it but because knowledge is not a world of its own, 
is not subject to laws of conservation, because we do not need to know for what 
we seek in fullness, because our bodily life consists in an engagement with the 
world which is not entirely perspicuous but which both reveals and conceals 
itself.  
Merleau-Ponty criticises the Ôphilosophy of consciousness,Õ that logic of 
the world ÔconstitutedÕ in the mind which he found in Husserl and whose 
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classic formulation is in KantÕs philosophy, because for it there can be no 
exchange, no movement, between the object and the constituting conscious-
ness.61 Because the unity of the world hangs on the constituting conscious-
ness here, the question of personal identity, of what makes the past ÔIÕ the 
same as the present becomes a problem, as does the question of the existence 
of other minds, since they can only be conceived as ÔnegativesÕ of myself. 
By contrast, for a philosophy which considers the subject as an instituting 
body and not a constituting consciousness, Òwhat I have begun at certain 
decisive moments would be neither distant, in the past, as an objective 
memory, nor would it be actual as a memory assumed. Rather, what I have 
begun would be truly in the Ôbetween,Õ as the field of my becoming during this 
period.Ó62 The philosophy of consciousness, and the logic of constitution, 
depends on the Cartesian logic of representation which we discussed in our 
previous chapter; for constitution, my relation to the world depends on the 
ongoing and continuous reality of my act of constitution; I must go on 
holding the world together in thought. Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy drops 
this prejudice against the world: 
 
The instituted is not the immediate reflection of the activity of [the instituting sub-
ject] and can be taken up by himself or by others without a total re-creation being 
at issue. Thus the instituted exists between others and myself, between me and 
myself, like a hinge, the consequence and guarantee of our belonging to the self-
same world.63 
 
In the lecture course, Merleau-Ponty develops the notion of institution 
with reference to four ÔlevelsÕ of phenomena. He characterises the first three 
as dealing with Ôpersonal or intersubjective history,Õ the fields of the institu-
tion of a feeling (particularly of love), of the institution of a work of art, and 
of the institution of a Domain of Knowledge (that is, a ÔscienceÕ in the 
broader sense; he takes mathematics as paradigmatic). The last he character-
ises as dealing with public history, and is the field of culture, of politics, or of 
history proper. Before dealing with these four fields Merleau-Ponty deals 
with ÔInstitution and LifeÕ in the first notes after the introduction to the 
course.  
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Institution does not belong solely to the human domain, and Merleau-
Ponty begins by thinking about institution in terms of biological organisa-
tion. Rather than being purely innate, biological development is seen as being 
characterised by a degree of lability or plasticity (he uses both of these words, 
in their French equivalents) which is Òlimited by consideration of place,Ó i.e., 
which is not arbitrary. The organismÕs destiny is instituted in the sense that it 
is not absolutely given in an innate structure, and is not independent from its 
environment. Merleau-Ponty then expounds the logic of institution with 
reference to puberty as a psychological, physiological and social, as well as a 
biological, development, paying special attention to the dynamic of the 
Freudian Oedipus complex as the failed Ôquestion,Õ a prior institution which 
human institution resumes. There is a biological anticipation of puberty 
which Òhuman institution [is] the transformation which preserves [É] and 
surpasses.Ó64 In the notes titled ÔInstitution of a Feeling,Õ Merleau-Ponty 
develops the notion of institution in relation to the phenomenon of love, and 
in particular in a detailed dialogue with the text of ProustÕs Ë la recherch du 
temps perdu, drawing a similar conclusion, that Òwhat is surpassed is the idea of 
love as a convention or sum of accidents or appearances, or artifice. What is 
not surpassed is the alterity of the other and finitude,Ó noting Òthe idea of 
institution is precisely the foundation of a personal history on the basis of 
contingency.Ó65 
In ÒThe Institution of a work of ArtÓ Merleau-Ponty returns to a theme he 
had already developed in ÒThe Indirect LanguageÓ (published in French in 
1945)66 and revisited in ÒIndirect Language and the Voices of SilenceÓ (from 
1952), where he first engages with the Husserlian notion of Stiftung, dealing 
with the notion of expression in painting.67 There he writes 
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There is a triple resumption through which [the painter] continues while going be-
yond, conserves while destroying, interprets through deviation, and infuses a new 
meaning into what nevertheless called for and anticipated it. It is not simply a me-
tamorphosis in the fairy tale sense of a miracle or magic, violence, or aggression. It 
is not an absolute creation in an absolute solitude. It is also a response to what the 
world, the past, and previous works demanded of him, namely accomplishment 
and fraternity. Husserl has used the fine word Stiftung Ñ foundation, institution Ñ 
to designate, first, the unlimited fecundity of each present which, precisely be-
cause it is singular and passes, can never stop having been and thus being univer-
sally. Above all, he has used Stiftung to designate that fecundity of the products of 
culture which continue to have a value after their historical appearance and open 
a field of work beyond and the same as their own. It is thus that the world as soon 
as he has seen it, his first attempts at painting, and the whole past of painting cre-
ate for the painter a tradition, that is, Husserl says, the power to forget origins, the 
duty to start over again and to give the past, not survival, which is the hypocritical 
form of forgetfulness, but the efficacy of renewal or Ôrepetition,Õ which is the noble 
form of memory.68 
 
The Creation of the work of art is not a production of the radically new, 
nor is it the outer reproduction of an inner vision or sense, but the resump-
tion and transformation of a tradition, personal (like the individual painterÕs 
style and its development) and prepersonal (his place in the history of art). 
Merleau-PontyÕs great example is that of the emergence of artificial perspec-
tive in the renaissance, especially as understood by Erwin Panofsky in Perspec-
tive as Symbolic Form,69 with which we dealt in the previous chapter. The 
problem of perspective is not resolved directly, as the result of focused 
investigation of and application to the problem. ÒThe investigation stops at 
an impasse, other investigations seem to create a diversion, but the new 
impulse allows the obstacle to be overcome from another direction.Ó70 There 
is an interrogation which is taken up and pursued in the ongoing institution 
of works of art, but this interrogation does not obey a Òmanifest logicÓ; there 
is not a single truth of a system which gradually reveals itself and which exists 
in a non-temporal ideality, waiting to be revealed. The ancients sought to 
express the world in painting, using, for example, several vanishing axes in 
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connection with a non-substantial understanding of space as the ÔgapÕ be-
tween bodies.71 So ÔintermediaryÕ space is not accurately represented in itself, 
but only as it is oriented to the subjects under consideration. Merleau-Ponty 
refers to Panofsky, for whom Òwhen work on certain artistic problems has 
advanced so far that further work in the same direction [É] appears unlikely 
to bear fruit, the result is often a great recoil, or perhaps better, a reversal of 
direction.Ó72 
In the Middle Ages, western painting stopped using these vanishing axes 
and turned to the flat mode of expression characteristic of the icons of 
Byzantine painting, in which linear depth is suppressed and the background is 
filled with gold or with a colour. This deflection of the interrogation of 
painting, to more ÔprimitiveÕ modes of expression, is a ÔrecoilÕ and Ôchange of 
directionÕ (in PanofskyÕs terms), but also a ÔdetourÕ (in Merleau-PontyÕs) which 
establishes a distance from the problems and thus makes room for a new 
approach to a solution.73 The Òluminous unityÓ of the medieval style loses 
mobility and expressivity, but introduces a conception of space as a con-
tinuum: not in the modern, geometrical sense, but in a Christian-Neoplatonic 
sense. For Proclus, space is Òthe finest light,Ó and as such is Òtransformed into 
a homogeneous and, so to speak, homogenizing fluid, immeasurable and 
indeed dimensionless.Ó74 Space here is unified, unlike in the ancient mode of 
expression, but is now oriented to the plane surface rather than to geometri-
cal depth. The renaissance invention of artificial perspective draws on this 
unified space, stretching it out again in the world. But, as Merleau-Ponty 
understands it, painting does not know what it is doing. It does not know 
that it is inventing a new conception of the picture and of space. ÒThe conse-
quences and the field open themselves, but we make something which has 
more meaning than we thought. [É] Cf. Proust: life gives us something other 
than what we were searching for, something else and the same thing.Ó75 
The point of all this is to show how institution is a process which is 
fundamentally in accord with Merleau-PontyÕs embodied understanding. 
There is a mixture of chance and reason in the development of perspective. 
There is contingency and necessity, navigated by an Ôoperative intentionalityÕ: 
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not the inevitable outworking of a telos which is somewhere absolutely given, 
but neither a meaningless flux, nor a pure negative freedom. 
In ÔThe Institution of a Domain of KnowledgeÕ Merleau-Ponty begins by 
saying that what was at issue in the discussion of the institution of a life, a 
feeling, and a work was the establishment of sens, of a history which is Ònot 
closed, not possessed by the mind, not signification, essence, or end,Ó76 but 
rather is open, which establishes connections between contingent givens and 
which thus intertwines essence and event. But he asks whether in the realm 
of knowledge, of objective truth (as opposed to the subjective truth of the 
lover or the painter) we must recognise the two orders of event and of es-
sence as absolutely separate. If this were the case, the objective history of art 
would undermine the reflective history we have been commenting on. To 
contest this, Merleau-Ponty sets out to specify the difference Òbetween 
knowledge, essence, and event.Ó77 For him Òthe true and the essence would be 
nothing without what leads to them. There is sublimation, not surpassing 
towards another order. The lekton is not supported by a logos which would be 
independent of the Ôaesthetic world.ÕÓ78 Truth is not absolutely independent 
of expression. Here Merleau-Ponty draws on HusserlÕs text ÒThe Origin of 
Geometry,Ó on which he lectured some five years later. Husserl investigates 
the being of the ideal objects of the sciences, archetypically geometrical 
objects. For Husserl, the knowledge involved in geometry does not exist as 
the contents of a mind but as a sedimented tradition; even geometrical 
knowledge, in its self-evidence as derived from the most basic axioms, is 
never fully consciously known; the geometer depends on theorems he already 
accepts to construct new ones.  
The problem with this, in HusserlÕs late thought, is its role in what he con-
sidered the crisis of European science, which was that it had become so 
dependent on a sedimented tradition that it no longer had any real idea of 
what it was that it was dealing with, of what its objects really were. He 
realised that his project to ground phenomenology as a rigorous science was 
failing; the sciences have their Boden in lived contact with the lebenswelt, a 
contact with which they have lost sight. Thus phenomenology became the 
enterprise of re-establishing contact with the lebenswelt and took up the goal 
of grounding the sciences. In On The Origin of Geometry Husserl speaks of the 
geometer Ôre-activatingÕ the tradition and the first theorems of geometry, and 
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so grounding the science of geometry again in living contact with the world. 
For Husserl, then, there is an ambiguity about the institutedness of a domain of 
knowledge; it in some way separates us from the truth of things, from the 
world as it is lived, as is the case for Heidegger. Husserl shows how Geometry 
as an institution depends on writing as a condition of its sedimentation, of its 
taking leave of living contact with the world and becoming a tradition.  
This, of course, later provided a starting point for DerridaÕs textualism, 
which depends on the notion that writing is divorced from the lived world, 
and indeed that writing asserts its own priority and becomes a textual world 
of its own. Merleau-Ponty is not so pessimistic. Indeed, in the lecture notes 
it becomes clear that the institution of science does not cover over some 
originary truth grounded in the lebenswelt but rather makes a certain kind of 
truth possible. It would seem that the intersubjective world and its truths 
arise not purely from our lived contact with the other but also in the elabora-
tion of that world in shared knowledge; the instituting operations of science 
do not simply aim at reproducing the truth of the world Ôinside the mindÕ; 
rather they create new, intersubjective truths which provide fresh ground for 
deepening investigations and for action in the world. Thus the sciences can 
never be separate from what they study, and can never complete the attempt 
to attain a dispassionate observation. This fact must drive us to an under-
standing of the dynamic instability of our conception of nature. Merleau-
Ponty observes that 
 
Just as arithmetical numbers, before [the] discovery of algebra, had properties of 
algebraic numbers [É], the trunk of the tree had the properties of the circle before 
the circle was known. This eternity depends on our conception of a nature. Never-
theless, this makes sense only retrospectively, and this remark does not only con-
cern the order of invention in opposition to the order of objective dependence. 
There is truly a retrograde movement of the true.79 
 
 Merleau-Ponty uses the word Sinngebung, Ômeaning-giving,Õ or perhaps 
better Ôsens-giving,Õ saying that what the solving of an animal problem and of 
an intellectual problem have in common is that a Òproblem-situation [brings 
forth] Sinngebung which fills the ÒgapÓ by affecting [some] element of the field 
with new sense.Ó80 In the properly intellectual creation of truth, the insight to 
which the institution within a history gives birth is a change of structure 
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called forth by the Ôproblem-situationÕ but not given in it, and, as Merleau-
Ponty understands it, this is the background to the emergence of the notion 
of essence. He says, Òthe tree branch was a possible stick before I think about 
it, i.e., there is an order of the in-itself in which the tree branch is by means 
of itself [a thing] whose proper use is to attain a goal. The reorganization 
offers itself as the discovery of a pre-existing, true, objective property.Ó81 And 
so he claims that Òthis is where the idea that there is an order of essences 
comes from, an order into which the individual somehow gains entrance. 
Insight [is] reminiscence.Ó82 The order of essences, then, for Merleau-Ponty, 
is a synthetic, but real, order of things, not an analytic order that belongs to 
extra-human nature. There is a certain kind of truth to the Platonic notion 
that insight into eidos is memory; but that memory is not the passive recall of 
representations of a given past, it is rather the fundamental making-sense 
which recalls man to himself and transforms his world through him. 
Is there a problem regarding the conception of time operative here? For 
Merleau-Ponty has claimed, as we have seen, that Òtime is the very model of 
institution,Ó yet there is now a retroactive movement of institution, en-
dorsement of BergsonÕs notion of the Ôretrograde movement of the true,Õ and 
institution seems to escape time and transform it; since the institutions of 
knowledge transform for us the whole of history. In a marginal note ap-
pended to this claim, Merleau-Ponty writes Òthat which is and demands to 
be; it has to become what it is.Ó83 What does this Ôhas toÕ mean? Merleau-
Ponty cannot be speaking of a teleological development of the thing, cannot 
be saying the thing must inevitably become what it is according to a pregiven 
pattern; this would run counter to the whole of his thinking in these lectures. 
Rather, he is saying that for a thing to be fully itself, it must become so; that 
when the thing is transformed from blo§e Sachen to a properly human thing, 
entering into history, it becomes truly itself. Time as succession is no longer 
our model, and though there is not here a fully-developed new concept of 
time, there is a suggestion of a notion of time which, like space, can no longer 
be conceived as a container in which things are located along spatiotemporal 
Cartesian coordinates, but is more strongly bound up with the thing and its 
sens. So Merleau-Ponty writes 
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Time carries itself beyond the succession of nows, a now is given as preexisting it-
self and in a certain way forever, but it preexists and endures eternally only as 
sense. [In other words], it is truly a creation which has taken place and it will be 
preserved only Òin substance,Ó i.e., we do not truly enter into the timeless, we en-
ter only into a time which is no longer a simple uprooting, destruction, in which 
the subject does not encounter simple adversity, but change in an immanent way, 
change itself, and thereby even the requirement of truth which has first led to to-
dayÕs formulation.84 
 
This suggests that a science which is not divorced from the life-world, 
which is not made sterile by forgetting its origins, would be a creator of truth; 
it does not just conceive an adequatio of timeless truths in the intellect, does 
not enter into the timeless, but can transform time from within. 
Before turning to the field of Historical Institution proper, there is a brief 
(four-page) excursus on ÔThe Field of Culture.Õ He begins by spelling out what 
he means by ÔcultureÕ in terms which are both broad and provocative: he calls 
culture a Ôtrans-phenomenalÕ cognitive process, which consists in openness to 
ideas but not to essences. The idea is not something that is possessed; it is 
not the case that we attain to an intelligible world by the knowledge of 
essences. Indeed, Òthere is no intelligible world; there is a culture,Ó which, 
like the institutions of love, art and science, is the opening of Òan ideological 
fieldÓ on the basis of Òapparatuses of knowledge (words, books, works).Ó85 
But if this is right, then the argument of the Origin of Geometry will fail. If 
the sciences genuinely produce truths, then these truths cannot require 
ÔreactivationÕ in the sense of calling to mind the whole passage of their 
institution, of gaining a clear and distinct idea of every prerequisite of a given 
theorem, of making the adequation complete. Merleau-Ponty returns to the 
Husserlian claim, established in the Origin of Geometry, that tradition is 
forgetfulness of origins, that is, that tradition does not simply preserve a past 
but produces Òa step to be taken.Ó For Merleau-Ponty, this ÔforgetfulnessÕ is 
not an unambiguously bad thing, but is at least the possibility of the sedimen-
tation of truth in the world. If tradition is forgetfulness, it is also a better way 
of remembering; in some sense tradition remembers for us. But this is not 
simply about the limits of our cognitive capacities to remember, or to actively 
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constitute and synthesise the truths of tradition all at once.86 For him, ÒWhat 
is not at issue [É] is to abridge the past in order to leave some space in the 
mental field for a wholly psychological phenomenon. [Nor a] virtue of logic as 
a separate order, which would in fact contain the whole past.Ó87 Rather what 
is at stake in the notion of the forgetfulness of traditionality is a parallel to 
the arguments against sensationalism in the Phenomenology of Perception: truth, 
like perception, is not a sum of given parts. Rather, Òthe issue is a survey 
comparable to that of the perceived through which I know in one sole act 
that my arm is resting on the table, that I can go over there without articu-
lated means.Ó88   
 The implications of this consideration of the field of culture bear on sub-
jectivity and on the question of Being. 
 
The notion of Òfield,Ó of institution, of truth, requires that subjectivity not be for it-
self at first, but the holder = X of an experience, that the Sinngebung be, not the 
apprehension of this or that under an essence, but the lateral idealization or gen-
eralization, by means of recurrence on the basis of a model (this is the Aufassung 
alsÉ as open), and consequently that the object is not only the correlate of my 
acts, but also provided with a double horizon by means of which it can become 
the object for others and not for me alone.89 
 
Intersubjectivity is essential for truth, which is not a relation of adequation 
or representation but a productive operation which involves my relation to 
the other as well as my relation to the world. ÒThe subject gives more than he 
has because [É] he proposes to the others enigmas that they decipher, [É] he 
makes them work, and what we receive, we give it for the same reason, for we 
receive only an incitement to Nachvollzug [comprehension/enactment].Ó90 So, 
for Merleau-Ponty, ÒBeing [is not] what is in itself or for someone, but what, 
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being for someone, is ready to be developed according to another becoming 
of knowledge, like a constellation whose figure would be continuously re-
made according to [a] project which appoints such changes as possible.Ó91 
Culture as instituted is not unmoored from nature and history, like Der-
ridean textualism, much as Merleau-Ponty might at times sound like a decon-
structionist. Culture, and the intersubjectivity it depends on, grows out of 
material bases. At the end of the section on culture Merleau-Ponty insists 
that we still need to specify Òwhat is invariant, the pivotÓ of this historical 
Being, to understand how institution implies a future and how the past is 
integrated into that future through institution. Our problem, he says, is to 
understand whether it is possible to apply the truths of the history of know-
ledge to Òother history,Ó by which we take him to mean still more ÔobjectiveÕ 
(though this word is anachronistic here) ÔpublicÕ history, whether we can 
move from personal history to Ôtotal historyÕ and maintain the importance of 
intersubjectivity within a Ôfield.Õ92 This is, in some ways, the problem of how 
we might think through the total from Ôground level,Õ without pretending to a 
pense du survol and reducing to the terms of objective thought. 
With this consideration of the implications of intersubjectivity in mind, 
Merleau-PontyÕs lecture course turns in its final section to deal with the 
ÔPublic HistoryÕ of the course title in a section entitled ÒHistorical Institu-
tion: Particularity and Universality,Ó asking whether we can find in universal 
history the same grounding in intersubjectivity that we found in the history 
of knowledge. He claims that the history of knowledge has unforeseeable 
outcomes; as we have suggested, it is radically creative in a way that thwarts 
any determinism, it Òresults in something other than what it wanted to make, 
is unforeseeable. But nevertheless algebra realises the wishes of arithmetic, 
etc. — Is there this Urstiftung-Endstiftung [originary institution-final institu-
tion] relation anywhere else? IsnÕt there rather [a] comedy of history, soci-
eties which are something other than what they wanted to be and their 
emblems?Ó93 
For knowledge in this sense, being situated is a means of knowing; a lo-
cated, limited perspective is the actual condition of knowledge. ÔGeneral 
history,Õ though, as such, is opaque, it is what it is. There is no ÔelsewhereÕ to 
look to, no reverse of things, but only what !i"ek calls Òthe flat, stupid reality 
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of what is just there.Ó94 On !i"ekÕs understanding, the fundamental lesson of 
Hegel is the importance of the problem of how something like appearance 
can emerge from this reality. For Merleau-Ponty and for the phenomenology 
out of which his thought emerges, this is not quite the right way to ask the 
question: the appearance comes first, and if experience leads me back to a 
brute nature, this nature always already contains the possibility of my emer-
gence within it. 
Merleau-PontyÕs notes here describe a Òreaction against HegelÓ which 
Òleads back to Hegel:Ó95 Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion of Òa real synthesis, 
which truly accumulates everything, against the idea of a system, of an actual 
possession of all dispersed existence of humans.Ó If history proceeds by way 
of institution, institutions give birth to new situations, but their sedimenta-
tion is at the level of the human body, not of the pure idea, nor of the purely 
material. Institutional situations have to be lived, to be reactivated not in 
their ideal unity but in their earthly significance. Merleau-PontyÕs rejection of 
Hegelian absolutism is thus not a rejection of historicism. He writes, think-
ing of both Sartre and Lvi-Strauss, Òour contemporaries disavow the Òphi-
losophy of history,Ó absolute knowledge. Therefore, they are for contingency, 
pure fact.Ó96 But this relativism of history repeats the kosmotheoros of the 
Hegelian knowledge of absolute history with a re-installation of the Òomnipo-
tence of the philosopher [É] in non-knowledge. [É] The absolute opacity of 
history, like its absolute light, is still philosophy conceived as closed know-
ledge. The one who observes the opacity sets himself up outside of history, 
becomes a universal spectator.Ó97 
Merleau-Ponty compares the radical relativism of Lvi-Strauss, which is 
dependent on an idea of absolute knowledge which is, for it, both impossible 
and necessary, with Einsteinian relativity, which he thinks has a similar 
problem. By identifying with Peter, and making the point that PaulÕs time is 
linked to PeterÕs, Einstein claims that time is dilated or contracted with 
movement. But this relativism assumes that one imposes PaulÕs time on 
Peter, Òthat one projects into Paul the image that Peter has of his time and 
that Paul does not have. [É] Einstein the physicist, interconnected with 
Peter, thinks that he is the universal spectator.Ó98 Which is to say that he 
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relativises the position of the universal spectator and creates a confusion. 
PaulÕs time is as universal for him as PeterÕs is for Peter, and so neither can 
know a non-universal time. For Merleau-Ponty, Òit is necessary to be more 
Einsteinian than Einstein and re-establish the world of perception with its 
ÔsimultaneitiesÕ — likewise it is necessary to be more relativist than Lvi-
Strauss and put knowledge back in the historical world of perception with its 
operation of Ôunderstanding.ÕÓ99 
We see here how Merleau-PontyÕs investigation of the notion of Institu-
tion keeps on returning us to the logic of incarnation, of the relationship 
between the knower, the bodily perceiver, the scientist, within the structure 
he seeks to know. Merleau-Ponty refers here to a citation of EngelsÕ Dialectic 
of Nature in Lvi-Strauss: Engels writes Òit is, therefore, from the history of 
nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they 
are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical 
development, as well as of thought itself.ÓÉHegelÕs Òmistake lies in the fact 
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not 
deduced from them. [É] The universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged 
in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a 
definite stage of evolution of human thought.Ó100 This notion of a natural 
dialectic, while it escapes HegelÕs absolutist Idealism, reduces history to 
nature, and thus pulls apart the subject and nature. For Merleau-Ponty, 
finally, Òthe dialectic becomes a paradox when it is realised in this way. There 
is no dialectic of nature.Ó101 The world is reduced to a lawlike operation 
whose inside is inaccessible to an absolute observer, which forgets that the 
observer is in the world. 
This makes of the question of universal history an existential problem, a 
ÔmysteryÕ in MarcelÕs sense: we cannot establish once and for all a valid field 
of universal history, but we must relate ourselves to history, and it seems that 
we can do that in more or less faithful ways. As he writes in ÒThe Metaphysi-
cal in Man,Ó Òto gain awareness of his task, the historian [ÉmustÉ] reject his 
claim to a Universal History completely unfolded before the historian as it 
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would be before the eye of God.Ó102 But while there can be no Universal 
History as kosmotheoros, a society must relate itself to the universal and find 
its place in it. 
 
There are at least, in a sense different from BergsonÕs, open societies and closed 
societies, societies which form the idea of a recuperation of history by means of 
history and other societies who do not do this [É], and we can call the latter false 
societies even if we do not call the first ones true. This does not mean that in cer-
tain relations they are not more beautiful. But these societies do not play the mys-
terious game which consists in putting all humans in the balance. They are not 
faithful to the a priori of institution or to its spirit, and they clench upon the letter 
of it. They do not intend the Miteinander or the Freinander, the universal inter-
mingling.103 
 
Institution & Historicity 
In ÔThe Discovery of History,Õ the introduction to one of the chapters of 
Les Philosophes Clbres, the 1956 volume on the history of philosophy which 
Merleau-Ponty edited, he writes,  
 
History, precisely because it is not nature, refuses to be treated as a second nature. 
It does not establish itself by substituting, in place of natural causality or finality, 
another order of causality or finality that annuls them. History slips in quietly, 
making the former adopt its language, artfully leading them away from them-
selves.104 
 
The language here reminds us of a passage from Merleau-PontyÕs third 
lecture course on Nature, given a few years later, in 1959–60. The section 
entitled ÒMan and Evolution: The Human BodyÓ begins with a quote from 
Teilhard de Chardin: ÒMan came silently into the world.Ó105 Merleau-Ponty 
asks what we might take this to mean, concluding that Òthere is a Ômetamor-
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phosis,Õ not a beginning from zero. This thought is not very compatible with 
the definition of the human by cephalization, cerebralization, and reflection 
— of which we said (here, with Teilhard de Chardin) that it would be better 
expressed by saying: transcendence.Ó106 That is, ÔtranscendenceÕ better char-
acterises the human than intellectualisation does: we might understand  this 
in terms of AristotleÕs understanding of man as Ôrational animal.Õ We cannot 
understand manÕs situation in nature if we think he is an animal body with 
reason added. But I want to suggest that man is an animal whose animality 
brings reason to bear on the world, and thus a being capable of transcending 
himself. 
History, then, arises in nature, like man, as a moment of natureÕs meta-
morphosis, internal transformation. It is not the junction of mind or of logos 
with nature; it is natureÕs production of a logos which exceeds it. But personal 
and public history both have their soil in Nature, in what Ted Toadvine calls 
the Ôimmemorial past.Õ Toadvine, in an unpublished conference paper, has 
suggested that nature can be thought as an archefactical resistance, saying 
Ònature in its primordial autonomy appears precisely as the resistance that 
the unreflective offers to reflection.Ó107 In his book Merleau-PontyÕs Philosophy 
of Nature, Toadvine spells out this resistance in terms of the pre-thematic 
dimensions of Space and Time in Merleau-Ponty, the ÔimmemorialÕ and the 
Ôlevel of all levels.Õ On ToadvineÕs understanding, reflection is always situated, 
and Merleau-Ponty attempts to pursue ÔRadical reflectionÕ: ÒRadical reflec-
tion aims to take into account its own immemorial past, its prereflective life 
in nature, as the fundamental condition for its operation as reflection.Ó108 As 
Merleau-Ponty puts it Òreflection does not grasp its full significance unless it 
refers to the unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon 
which it draws, and which constitutes for it a kind of original past, a past 
which has never been present.Ó109 We are now in a position to make sense of 
this claim to the fundamental importance of this Òpast which has never been 
present,Ó or immemorial past; it is not the past of prehistory in a temporal 
sense but the very ground of temporality; Alia Al-Saji identifies it with the 
Òvertical pastÓ of which Merleau-Ponty speaks in The Visible and the Invis-
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ible.110 This Ôvertical pastÕ is that historicity which is the ground of institution, 
as factical vertical history is its result. 
The Ôlevel of all levelsÕ parallels in space the meaning of the Ôpast which has 
never been presentÕ in time, the phrase being drawn from a single occurrence 
in the Phenomenology of Perception,111 in which Merleau-Ponty denies that we 
could have access to such a level:  
 
Since every conceivable being relates, directly or indirectly, to the perceived 
world, and as the perceived world is perceived only by way of our orientation in 
it, we cannot divorce ÔbeingÕ from Ôbeing oriented,Õ and we cannot provide a 
ÔfoundationÕ for space or ask what is the level of all levels. 
The primordial level is on the horizon of our perceptions, a horizon which in 
principle can never be reached and thematized in a specific perception. Each of 
the levels in which we live appears in turn, while we are anchored in the given 
Ômilieu.Õ112 
 
The primordial level, then, is this specific Earth, as vertical temporality is our 
factical history, and rests on ÔworldednessÕ in general as our history depends 
on a general historicity. This helps us to see more clearly how history and 
Earth are distinct from and bound to nature, which grounds them through 
worldliness and historicity, which, though they are general structures of 
reality, are not structures of nature per se but rather structures which can only 
arise in the genesis of animality; the structures of worldedness and historicity 
are mutually dependent on the living beings through which they have their 
reality. Nature is the non-instituted soil of our being; animals (and most 
clearly human beings) as agents in the living, instituted system of the earth 
are both instituted (they are born in a certain place, they live with this or that 
personal or public history) and agents of institution, in the sense that we 
discovered with our discussion of eating and the hungry animal; appetite is 
given, but is richly intertwined with hunger, which is the imaginative devel-
opment of desire. 
This raises the question of the relationship between what Toadvine calls 
this ÔsilentÕ nature, the historicity of things, and the perceived world. If we 
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call ÔnatureÕ that silent, anonymous world, can we have any access to nature at 
all? For Toadvine, we must reconsider the truism that Ôwe are part of nature,Õ 
because we must think nature not as an observed category, not as a collection 
of things, but from within. To open on to nature from within must also mean 
to be estranged from it, and from ourselves insofar as we are natural things; 
there is a hiatus in things, and I have a Ôblind spotÕ with regard to my own 
emergence. It seems that natures multiply: behind the Ôvisible natureÕ of the 
world of the sciences (naturata, perhaps) lies the Ôinvisible natureÕ of the silent 
world (naturans?), and betwixt the two (in some sense) there is a Ônature 
becoming-visibleÕ which marks the emergence of the subject and the world of 
perception. And this begs the further question, how can we establish that it is 
right to call the Ôsilent ground of natureÕ also nature? Is it nature Ôall the way 
down,Õ or is nature self-grounding? Toadvine is surely right that nature is not 
just a collection of things; but what else then is nature? Philosophy since 
Spinoza has thought of it as a substance, the one substance. The most obvi-
ous alternative is to think of it, with Whitehead, as a process, or a Òcomplex 
of passing events.Ó113 But this would seem to risk conceiving man as kos-
motheoros, that is, a subject of the world representing the world to himself as 
an object. For Merleau-Ponty 
 
there is not an experience of pure geometry in which we can grasp the structure of 
space. [É] There is the experience neither of pure physics nor of pure geometry. 
The same physico-geometrical ensemble is capable of covering both flat space 
and curved space. This puts in doubt the idea of a nature of itself of space. The 
part that amounts to the structure of space and to the physics of the milieu can be 
established only by a mind that knows space from the outside. But the world is not 
something that we can dominate. The result is thus not a de facto result, but a re-
sult in principle. To pose the question of the nature in itself of space is to admit a 
kosmotheoros. The question is not posed for living beings because it has no mean-
ing for them: space is part of their situation, yet a space of situation is not in-
itself.114 
 
Thinking nature from within, as Toadvine proposes, is a notion thoroughly 
concordant with Merleau-PontyÕs project of developing an ontology which 
escapes objectivism. But this denies us access to fundamental nature, since 
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we cannot ÔseeÕ it, it lies behind our whole existence, and indeed this inac-
cessibility of nature is a corollary of the denial of objectivism. As the Fox tells 
the Little Prince, LÕessentiel est invisible pour les yeux. The Earth with which we 
are intertwined can be taken up as an object in scientific theory, we can 
abstract out from our place in it, and construct a theoretical point of observa-
tion outside of it, for example a position relative to the sun which makes new 
sense of the observed paths of the planets in the night sky. But we can take 
no such stance with regards to nature. No conceivable point of observation 
lies outside of it. 
 
To say, then, that space is not Euclidean is not to say that space is non-Euclidean, 
or Riemannian, for example. Space is not something. The different geometries are 
metrics, and metrics are neither true nor false; and as a consequence, the results of 
these different metrics are not alternatives.115 
 
The Anonymous Body & Incarnation 
In the understanding we are developing, the animal as ÔinstitutedÕ thing, as 
a given Ôsedimentation,Õ is what Merleau-Ponty referred to as the ÔanonymousÕ 
body. Barbaras links this idea with BergsonÕs notion of the ÔturnÕ of experi-
ence, expressed in the claim that philosophyÕs Òlast enterprise [É] would be 
to seek experience at its source, or rather above that decisive turn where, 
taking a bias in the direction of our utility, it becomes properly human experi-
ence.Ó116 The ÔaboveÕ of the spatial metaphor is somewhat opaque, but since 
BergsonÕs point here is an opposition to empiricism and to Òthe impotence of 
an intellect enslaved to certain necessities of bodily life,Ó117 it seems that the 
source of experience, which Bergson seeks above the Òturn of experience,Ó is 
for Merleau-Ponty more plausibly sought below that turn, in the body prior to 
Ôproperly human experience.Õ The anonymous body, then, is the body below 
the turn, and is thus the bodily or natural subject. This bodily subject is the 
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subject of perception, as Flynn and Froman point out,118 and as Merleau-
Ponty suggests when he writes in the Phenomenology of Perception that  
 
I cannot say that I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say that I under-
stand a book or again in which I decide to devote my life to mathematics. My per-
ception, even when seen from the inside, expresses a given situation: I can see 
blue because I am sensitive to colours, whereas personal acts create a situation: I 
am a mathematician because I have decided to be one. So, if I wanted to render 
precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and 
not that I perceive.119 
 
If this prepersonal ÔoneÕ (on) of the body, this natural body which always 
precedes me is the subject of my perception then, crucially, nature lies on 
both sides of perception; both perceiver and perceived are natural beings, in 
this sense perception is part of my animality (and we have no doubt that 
animals, too, perceive). In the animal, as for myself, perception is bound up 
with motility. But animal perception is also intertwined in me with that 
Ôproperly human experience,Õ in BergsonÕs terms, with the decisions of which 
Merleau-Ponty speaks. These decisions set into motion acts of institution, 
which are the basis of that which we might consider as exceeding or trans-
cending nature. But their results are sedimented in the world of nature, 
which thus becomes a world of the instituted and its effects, just as my 
anonymous body, whilst prior to decision for me, exists as the result of the 
decisions (or the failure to make decisions) of my parents, in a cultural and 
physical world which is not of my making but which is the accreted result of 
the process of instituting performed by others. The passages in the Phenomen-
ology of Perception which develop this idea anticipate the future direction of 
Merleau-PontyÕs notion of flesh and of the ontology that he was still working 
toward when his life was cut short. 
 
The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it 
in the first place. As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as 
an acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some 
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idea of blue such as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge 
into this mystery, it Ôthinks itself within me.Õ120 
 
This movement of institution, the dialectic of the instituted and institut-
ing, undermines the division of nature and consciousness, of the in-itself and 
the for-itself. In the summary of his lecture course on institution Merleau-
Ponty begins by saying that Ôin the concept of institution we are seeking a 
solution to the difficulties found in the philosophy of consciousness.Õ It is 
clear from his comments in the working notes from The Visible and The 
Invisible that he considers the adherence to such a philosophy of conscious-
ness a failure of the Phenomenology of Perception, and as such I propose that 
this work on the notion of institution is a starting-point in his attempt to 
overcome such failings. As we have made obvious, there is much fruitful 
material in the Phenomenology, and we have shown that the way beyond the 
problem of consciousness is anticipated there in his notion of the anonymous 
body. Nevertheless, ÔconsciousnessÕ in its extant formulation is to be rejected. 
In the notes beginning the course on institution, he spells out this formula-
tion: 
 
Personal life considered as the life of a consciousness, i.e., a presence to the 
whole for which the other is empty negation [and] indifferent action, or, at the 
least, making sense only for me, through closed signification: the past exists for 
this consciousness only as consciousness of the past, i.e., as a picture that is over-
come; a mode of presence that is entirely spectacular; [É] Are we this immediate 
presence to everything before which the things that are possible are all equal Ñ all 
the things that are impossible? This whole analysis presupposes a prior reduction 
of our life to the Òthought ofÉÓ living. This is to say 1) a distinction of form and 
content: hyle and Auffassung als [apprehension as]É 2) a distinction which has 
the purpose only of extracting the content, of turning it into an ob-ject for the 
Òthought ofÓÉ, the signifying activity, considered as the sole thing that is concrete. 
But, both this real form-content analysis and the position of the form as the a 
priori condition of the content are illusory. [É] When we approach an object or a 
recollection, there is no numerically distinct Abschattungen [profiles] and no Auf-
fassung alsÉ representation of one selfsame intelligible core, there are no instants 
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and their ideal and signified unity, there is the consciousness of [the] thing and of 
its traces on the basis of the thing.121 
 
A kosmotheoros, or specular, geometrical conception of the world, is here 
rejected, in favour of an incarnational ontology which refuses to reduce life to 
the Òthought ofÓ the living, and so, it would seem, to posit life as an irreduc-
ible fact, intertwined with the world. The Aristotelian hylomorphism is 
foregone in favour of a unity of sensibility and intelligibility in the concrete 
thing. It would seem that Merleau-Ponty here anticipates the Derridean 
rejection of the Metaphysics of Presence, although his proposed alternative, 
of a metaphysics of the flesh, is of course quite unlike DerridaÕs textualism. 
Indeed, Merleau-PontyÕs model of institution, as he spells out in the follow-
ing pages of these lecture notes, suggests a philosophical approach which 
does away with many false problems: the relation of the mind to the external 
world is not a problem when we resist an artificial scission between them: 
there is an Òinstituted and instituting subject, but inseparably, and not a 
constituting subject.Ó122 The problem of other people dissolves, as the other is 
Ònot constituting-constituted, i.e., my negation, but instituted-instituting, 
i.e., I project myself in the other and the other in me.Ó There is a single 
Òintersubjective or symbolic field, [the field] of cultural objects, which is our 
milieu, our hinge, our jointure — instead of the subject-object alternation.Ó123 
The problem of time, too, is modified, because time is no longer ÒenvelopingÓ 
(i.e. objective, on a realist model) or ÒenvelopedÓ (i.e. subjective, as for 
Idealism); rather Òtime is the very model of institution: passivity-activity, it 
continues, because it has been instituted, it fuses, it cannot stop being, it is 
total because it is partial, it is a field.Ó124 
The logic of institution is a corrective to the orientation of philosophy 
towards consciousness, and, we think, an effective one. It shows us how 
subjectivity is inscribed in a world which it always remakes, the earth. We 
have said that nature is the ÔsoilÕ of this world, but it would seem that a 
philosophy of nature risks as much as a philosophy of consciousness at this 
point: just as there is no pure consciousness for the body-subject, there can 
be no pure nature. The milieu from which thought arises will not be able to 
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form a concept of either, because thought is already a transformation of 
nature. We are reminded again that the first line of Merleau-PontyÕs first 
book reads, ÒOur goal is to understand the relations of consciousness and 
nature.Ó125 To accommodate both is to refuse to prioritise either; Merleau-
PontyÕs philosophy, then, can be neither a Ôphilosophy of consciousnessÕ nor a 
Ôphilosophy of nature,Õ in the last instance, but must be a philosophy of 
thought and of the earth, a philosophy of history in its broadest sense. This 
philosophy of history would take seriously the verticality of history as it is 
instituted in the body and in the earth, realising that just as there is no 
consciousness before nature, there is no nature after consciousness, but that 
the genesis of consciousness transforms nature by its self-transcendence. 
Primordial nature exists for thought as a limit and not as an object before it. 
This incarnational philosophy is directly opposed to the very different 
philosophy which Michel Henry derived from Husserl. HenryÕs phenomenol-
ogy of life thinks of the subject as Òthe absolute foundation of being,Ó as Nick 
Hanlon puts it in his introduction to HenryÕs ÒPhenomenology of Life.Ó126 If 
we take the logic of institution seriously, the subject will always be grounded 
in something which comes before it; there is no pure ideal subject, for Mer-
leau-Ponty, and this is why he tries so often to excise ÔconsciousnessÕ or the 
Husserlian transcendental ego from his ontology. For Henry there can be no 
such thing as the life-world; ÒLiving is not possible in the world. Living is possible 
only outside the world, where another Truth reigns.Ó127 The spectre of 
Manichaeism hovers over this work: why would there be any created world, 
for a Christian thinker such as Henry, if it has nothing to do with the truth of 
things? Creation is seen here, in the phrase Merleau-Ponty borrows from 
Valry, as a Òflaw in the great eternal diamond,Ó and it is hard to see how such 
a flaw may arise from the work of a good God. Henry rejects the idea, found 
in HegelÕs philosophy and in Marxism, that ÒChristianity is a flight from 
reality, inasmuch as it is a flight from the world. But if reality resides in Life 
and only in Life, this reproach disintegrates to the point of ultimately appear-
ing as non-sense.Ó128  
Henry fails to heed the warning he most needs to hear, and buries his 
Christianity in a bizarre solipsistic idealism of the kind for which, Merleau-
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Ponty says, Òthere is, strictly speaking, nothing to do. ÔMy kingdom is not of 
this world.ÕÓ129 This is what Merleau-Ponty condemns as explicative theology, 
which would explain away the world and its resistance to consciousness, 
would make impossible the true transcendence of that which exceeds con-
sciousness. For Henry there is a Òprecedence of phenomenology over ontol-
ogyÓ130 which is precisely the reverse of Merleau-PontyÕs notion, from as early 
as the preface to Phenomenology of Perception, that Òthe most important lesson 
which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduc-
tion,Ó131 which works itself out in his later work in the move towards the 
priority of ontology over phenomenology. For Henry, the fundamental 
reversibility of perception, and the intertwining which emerges from it, is 
denied. ÒThe possibility of vision resides in this setting at a distance of that 
which is placed in front of the seeing, and is thereby seen by it,Ó132 and so the 
invisible is located not in the world and the subjectÕs chiasmatic intertwining 
with it, but purely in Ôlife,Õ which begins to look like the unexplained presence 
of the mind in the human observer. He remains, fundamentally, Cartesian. 
Rudolf Bernet, in ÒChristianity and Philosophy,Ó a short article on HenryÕs 
thought, brings some critical questions to bear, and in a crucial passage shows 
how HenryÕs thought cannot make sense of the incarnation. 
 
M. HenryÕs hyper-transcendentalism and his theological conception of Life does 
not lead only to the abandonment of the world, but also to a devaluation of every-
thing that makes the concretion of human life. We have seen how M. Henry disin-
terests himself of [sic] all that comes from the contingency or the facticity of 
human existence, that is, social, cultural, sexual, etc., differences, in the name of 
the condition of man as Son of God. [É] It is as if the fact of being born of a wo-
man and a man, of this woman and this man, it is as if our debt with respect to the 
past generations and our responsibility for the future generations were to be de-
prived of any transcendental signification. It is as if one had to choose between di-
vine generativity and human generativity, instead of them illuminating one another 
mutually. Is it a matter of indifference that the Archi-Son was born a Jew, that he 
took flesh in the body of Mary, and that he died on the cross at Golgotha? And this 
Incarnation of Christ, having become man among men (despite what M. Henry 
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says), had it not completely changed the meaning of human fecundity without tak-
ing from it anything of its carnal character?133 
 
Thus HenryÕs Manichaeism implies a Docetism. As Mauro Carbone points 
out, Henry rejects TertullianÕs understanding that the Incarnation means that 
in Christ God was joined to the Ômud,Õ the earthly soil of which all flesh is 
made. For Henry, human flesh (and the incarnation in which God is made 
flesh) can have nothing to do with those roots in the humus, and in humility, 
which Old Testament tradition has always ascribed to it. Carbone observes 
ÒNot from mud, but from the Word — Henry interprets — comes the flesh 
that unites mankind to Christ: therefore [É] flesh proves in his opinion to be 
incomparable both with Ôinert bodies of material natureÕ and with Ôliving 
beings other than mankind.ÕÓ134 HenryÕs phenomenology, here, does us the 
service of showing more clearly, by its own failure, the terms in which Mer-
leau-PontyÕs ontology can think the incarnation of the classical Christian 
understanding, of the ontological significance of the idea that God took flesh 
in a particular human body, was born to a human mother, with all the danger, 
dirtiness, and difficulty that this involves, that Christ was not only born in 
flesh but died there. This point of doctrine must lead to an absolute refusal 
to denigrate the bodily as bodily, and the material world as material, and even 
the animality which the body of the incarnate Son of God shared with the 
beasts in whose trough he slept as a baby. 
 
The Ambiguity of ÔFleshÕ 
Renaud Barbaras lays out an admirably clear objection to Merleau-PontyÕs 
late ontology in his article ÒThe Ambiguity of the Flesh.Ó135 For Barbaras, 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of Flesh and of incarnation is a transcendental 
anthropomorphism, a humanising of the whole of reality, and this transcen-
dental anthropomorphism is incompatible with the ontological anthropo-
morphism Òfor which the lived body is a privileged sample of the meaning of 
being.Ó136 Barbaras develops the tension between these two kinds of 
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anthropomorphism in dialogue with HansÕ Jonas work in The Phenomenon of 
Life,137 for whom a certain kind of anthropomorphism must be granted; for 
Jonas Òthe organic body signifies the latent crisis of every known ontology 
and the criterion of Ôany future one which will be able to come forward as a 
science.ÕÓ138 And so ÒPerhaps, rightly understood, man is after all the measure 
of all things — not indeed through the legislation of his reason but through 
the exemplar of his psychophysical totality which represents the maximum of 
concrete ontological completeness known to us.Ó139 JonasÕ philosophy, like 
that of Merleau-Ponty, seeks to develop an ontology, which takes the living 
body as its point of entry. But as Barbaras sees it, Merleau-Ponty fails, as he 
does not just start with it but absolutises it in the ontological notion of 
ÔFlesh.Õ Barbaras questions Merleau-PontyÕs adherence to the vocabulary, in 
terms such as ÔseerÕ and Ôvisible,Õ of the ontological duality that he is attempt-
ing to overcome. For Barbaras Òthe incarnation of vision and of consciousness 
that would lead us to call into question the transcendental point of view — 
how is it possible that the constituting subject as such is on the side of that 
which he constitutes?Ó140 This problem leads to Òa gap between the reality of 
incarnation, as irreducible dimension of being and the vocabulary through 
which Merleau-Ponty approaches it: the interiority of our body is thought as 
perception, as vision, and its exteriority is characterised as visibility, percep-
tibility.Ó141 
The implication is that there are two countervailing meanings of Flesh at 
work in Merleau-PontyÕs ontology, meanings which are irreconcilable and 
which it seems to me adhere to the two notions of the body. The first is that 
of my body as a body, that notion which we have called the anonymous body, 
which shows me that I am a thing among things, that other bodies are like 
my body. This body is both material and sensitive, and as such evades any 
duality between res extensa and res cogitans. Insofar as other bodies are like 
mine, they also escape this duality and cannot be reduced to the blo§e sachen 
of Husserlian nature. But to speak of the flesh of the world is in fact to speak 
of the world as living, insofar as flesh translates the German Leib, derived 
from leben (to live) and meaning the living body as opposed to the Krper of 
the anonymous body. In BarbarasÕ words ÒMerleau-Ponty uses the concept of 
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Flesh to define the external world.Ó142 Now, this is perhaps not straightfor-
wardly the case; Merleau-Ponty never says that everything is flesh. He does 
speak, however, in ambiguous terms, of Ôthe flesh of the world,Õ and if Barba-
rasÕ critique is correct, then we might think that such an idea has to remain 
ambiguous because to make it clear would be to make a nonsense of it, to 
highlight these two incompatible meanings of flesh. For Barbaras, Òto say that 
the world is Flesh amounts to saying that, like our flesh, its exteriority in-
volves a kind of interiority, which means that there is no longer an ontological 
difference between matter and organic beings.Ó143 This is why Merleau-PontyÕs 
philosophy has seemed, in certain of its moments, to suggest a panpsychism, 
or at least a panexperientialism, which would introduce a whole slew of 
philosophical problems, as in Eye and Mind when he speaks of the painter 
saying Òin a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at 
the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, were speaking 
to me,Ó144 and similarly, in The Visible and the Invisible, ÒI feel myself looked at 
by the things.Ó145 Merleau-Ponty retreats from these implications, though, 
when he says that Òthe flesh of the world is not self-sensing (se sentir) as is my 
flesh — it is sensible and not sentient — I call it flesh, nonetheless [É] in 
order to say that it is a pregnancy of possibles [É] that it is therefore abso-
lutely not an ob-ject, that the blo§e sache mode of being is but a partial and 
second expression of it.Ó146 This, Barbaras claims, leads to an equivocation 
over the meaning of flesh that makes a nonsense of its use as a foundation for 
his ontology. For Barbaras, ÒMerleau-Ponty misses the genuine unity of the 
body and this is why he cannot acknowledge the ontological consequences of 
incarnation.Ó147 For Barbaras, Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy remains a philoso-
phy of the insertion of consciousness into the world, and as such remains a 
philosophy of consciousness. 
It is certainly the case that Merleau-PontyÕs early distinction between the 
objective, anonymous body, and the lived body, the corps propre or oneÕs own 
body, in some ways focuses the problem of the Cartesian pineal gland on the 
surface of the body — how do ÔinnerÕ and ÔouterÕ world communicate? But it 
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seems that Barbaras misunderstands Merleau-PontyÕs project from the first 
when he identifies the crossing of the body and the world as the constituting 
subject who is on the side of what he constitutes. The logic of institution 
points to a route beyond this impasse precisely by showing us the way in 
which acts of institution are sedimented in the world. We have, here, a 
problem of language. How will we speak of the agents who perform these acts 
of institution? Merleau-Ponty, in his earlier work, speaks of the Ôhuman levelÕ 
and of the operations of consciousness. Barbaras, with Jonas, and like Michel 
Henry, speaks of ÔlifeÕ and of Ôorganic beings.Õ Either of these ways of speak-
ing seem already to imply a whole philosophy. By the time he is writing the 
extant chapters of ÔThe Visible and the Invisible,Õ Merleau-Ponty leaves talk 
of ÔconsciousnessÕ behind, for the most part, speaking only of ÔweÕ or ÔheÕ used 
as impersonal pronouns, essentially, of on (one), the perceiver. 
BarbarasÕ critique, that Merleau-Ponty confuses two ways of speaking of 
flesh, and that this makes his notion of Ôthe Flesh of the worldÕ as the basis of 
ontology an equivocation, strikes at the heart of the confusions latent in 
Merleau-PontyÕs later ontology. In the extant form of The Visible and the 
Invisible, the four full drafted chapters and extensive working notes, There is 
scant mention of ÔinstitutionÕ or of the Husserlian Stiftung which it translates, 
but it seems that with the use of this notion as he developed it in the earlier 
lecture course BarbarasÕ objections can be overcome. 
Barbaras interprets the Ôflesh of the worldÕ in terms of what he calls Ôtrans-
cendental fleshÕ; in this sense, the world is flesh insofar as it is the object of 
the operation of constitution for the transcendental subject; here we are 
thrown back into idealism. But this is not the only way to understand Mer-
leau-PontyÕs notion of flesh. On the basis of the logic of institution, we 
understand that to speak of the flesh of the world is to speak of the world as 
sedimented with human meanings; and these are not sedimented as ÔpsychicÕ 
substance, nor do they belong only to the perceiver as a form of interpreta-
tion of things. Rather, the world is made flesh, prototypically, in culture: 
traditions of eating are bound up with traditions of agriculture, so the treat-
ment of animals, and the condition of soil, ecosystems and human biology are 
all affected by the ways people eat. There is not a chasm between the facts of 
the world and peopleÕs absolutely free choices; rather, the condition of the 
Earth is bound up with, constantly affecting and affected by our mode of life 
which consists not in a series of acts of free choice but in our inheritance of 
habits as they are sedimented in culture and our institution of new ones. The 
same is true of our traditions of building, of architecture and planning, our 
social relations as they organise human power and the ways in which we make 
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use of natural resources; the institution of money and the ways it determines 
human relations being amongst the most powerful. 
Philosophers of mind and of technology, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, have 
spoken of Ôextended cognitionÕ in those cases where their use of extra-bodily 
systems has played a determinative role in the thought of given individuals. 
For example, Clark and Chalmers cite the example of Otto,148 who suffers 
from AlzheimerÕs disease, and who relies on a notebook that he carries with 
him, and in which he writes down information. This notebook serves as a 
significant part of his memory, and the information in it serves for him as a 
normal personÕs latent beliefs do, at least with regards to the kind of informa-
tion it contains. Thus cognition is extended, depending not only on the mind 
in the brain but on OttoÕs extended, bodily life. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc 
argues that, mutatis mutandis, Otto could write his intentions down in a 
notebook, and that these writings could serve effectively for him as inten-
tions, which therefore need not be mental states.149 (Note that we use Ôinten-
tionÕ here in the everyday sense of Ôa plan to do xÕ and not in the sense of the 
intentionality of Brentano and the phenomenologists). 
These examples show at the most basic level the way in which thought and 
matter are entwined in bodily habit. We could deepen the example with 
reference to Richard WranghamÕs work Catching Fire: How Cooking Made us 
Human, in which he shows how human evolution has made use of the devel-
opment of cooking to outsource much of the work of digestion and thus to 
enable humans to make available the surplus of energy and of time required 
for thinking and for the large brains which support it.150 Here is an example 
of Ôextended digestionÕ which shows how not only our ability to eat but also 
our ability to think belongs to a tradition, a culture which is bound up with 
our biology, our agriculture, our use of fuel, our division of labour, and so 
much else. Our whole bodily situation is determinative, and our whole world 
participates in flesh through us. 
Clark and Chalmers alert us to the persistent Cartesian assumptions of 
philosophy when they note of OttoÕs unusual case that Òlike many 
AlzheimerÕs patients, he relies on information in the environment to help 
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structure his life.Ó151 Should it not be obvious to us that we all constantly rely 
on information in our environments to structure our lives and even to think 
in the most basic ways? In his reflection on animality in the second nature 
course, Merleau-Ponty writes 
 
Consciousness is only one of the varied forms of behaviour; it must not be defined 
from within, from its own point of view, but such as we grasp it across the bodies 
of others; not as a centrifugal form, but as a closed world where external stimula-
tions appear to it as outside of it. Consciousness must appear as institution, as a 
type of behaviour. Behaviour includes elementary organization (embryology), and 
physiological, instinctive organization, or behaviour properly called. We must al-
low for an Umwelt at the level of the organ, at the level of the embryo, just as it is 
necessary to allow for activities of consciousness.152 
 
Contrast this to BarbarasÕ view of Merleau-PontyÕs notion of conscious-
ness: ÒMerleau-PontyÕs philosophy is not a philosophy of flesh but a philoso-
phy of the incarnation, as the insertion of consciousness in the world, that is, a 
philosophy of consciousness.Ó Barbaras repeats this understanding of incarna-
tion a few lines later, saying that in Merleau-Ponty Òour body is described on 
the basis of the incarnation, as the insertion of a consciousness in the world, 
that is, as the unity of a vision and a visibility.Ó153 Here the question of theol-
ogy returns forcefully, with the notion of incarnation. For Barbaras, incarna-
tion means the insertion of transcendence into nature, of the elsewhere in 
the here, of the foreign in the native. But this is not what it means for Mer-
leau-Ponty. Similarly, the geometrical view of nature, in which God is the 
absolute perceiver, has fostered an understanding of incarnation as that of a 
totally ÔoutsideÕ God entering the world, as though the viewer Ôstepped inÕ to 
the painting. But perhaps this is not the most cogent theological view. 
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Incarnation, Existence and Musterion 
In ÒThe Philosophy of Existence,Ó originally a 1959 article in the journal 
Dialogue,154 Merleau-Ponty discusses existentialist thought in France. For 
him, existentialism begins after 1930 in the reaction to the dominant Kantian 
Idealism of Brunschvicg, and Òis primarily explicable by the importance of a 
completely different theme, that of incarnation.Ó155 He takes Gabriel Marcel as 
an example. The philosophy which Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others of their 
generation knew had considered the body, oneÕs own body, to be an object in 
the same way that othersÕ bodies, animals, and Ôordinary objectsÕ (i.e. tables 
and suchlike) are objects, and that I am mind, an essentially thinking thing 
which is not an object at all, Òand opposite me there is, therefore, this body 
which is an object.Ó156 Marcel opposed this view, and showed that attention 
to my body reveals that it is not simply an object; it is in some sense myself. 
Through this attention to the body, the general reduction of existence to 
objectivity is brought into question. Philosophy, then, is to attend not to 
scientific objects but to sensible things, to that which exists. For Marcel, this 
establishes an important distinction between philosophy and other disci-
plines: Òit deals with mysteries, not problems.Ó157 Merleau-Ponty explains this 
distinction as it appears in Marcel:  
 
A problem is a question which I pose to myself and then resolve by considering 
different givens which are external to me. For example, if I wish to know how to 
construct a bridge or how to solve an equation, I consider the givens of the prob-
lem and then try to find the unknown. In philosophy it is an entirely different phe-
nomenon, because, as Marcel said, in philosophy we must work out a very 
singular type of problem. In these problems, the one who poses them is also en-
gaged. This person is not a spectator in relation to the problem, but is rather 
caught up in the matter, which for him defines the mystery.158 
 
This notion of incarnation emerged with Marcel, amongst others, during 
the editorship of the catholic personalist Emmanuel Mounier at the journal 
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Esprit, which was at the centre of a circle of broadly catholic thinkers of 
which Merleau-Ponty was a part as a young scholar. The concept of incarna-
tion has, then, a definite theological genesis, although it is here being used and 
taking on a new shape in philosophy. Nonetheless, there seems no doubt that 
these reflections on the body have their roots in a catholic framework, and 
perhaps of the questions posed by the notion that God could become man. 
The opening to mystery, which for this group had significant political impli-
cations, arises directly from the reality of being embodied, of being a subject-
object, or in other words, from my own mystery, from the mystery of exist-
ence. Merleau-Ponty claims that the question of existence, and of conducting 
an investigation without being able to take up a spectatorial position, this 
logic of incarnation in Marcel, was broached by his own early work, because 
the sensible knowledge of the world is Òcompletely paradoxical, in the sense 
that it always appears to me as already complete at the very instant that I pay 
attention to it.Ó159 The early existentialism characteristic of Marcel also 
introduced the theme of oneÕs relations to the other, a theme which Merleau-
Ponty often returns to, and which developed into the logic of intersubjec-
tivity and of history which we have been discussing: Merleau-Ponty claims, 
here, in 1959, that Òthe theme of history [É] is essentially the same as the 
theme of the other.Ó For him,  
 
What simultaneously attracts and scandalizes philosophers about history is pre-
cisely manÕs given condition of not being alone, of always being considered in the 
presence of others, in an extraordinarily complex relationship with them. The re-
sult is that we are no longer concerned simply with juxtaposed individuals, but 
with a sort of human tissue which is sometimes called Ôcollectivity.Õ160 
 
Here we see how, for Marcel and for Merleau-Ponty following him, the 
theme of incarnation suggests a series of priorities for philosophy which 
dualisms tend to ignore: the problem of the other, both in the form of the 
basic question of the existence of other minds and then in the more nuanced 
form of the question about my relation to the other. This leads us to a 
consideration of intersubjectivity, and of history. The importance of time in 
this regard comes to Merleau-Ponty from his inheritance from Bergson 
rather than from early existentialism, as the most basic form of subjectivity, 
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but the logic of duration is in fact crucial in his investigations of all these 
themes. 
For Alexander Schmemann, Òtime is the only reality of life,Ó and like Mar-
cel he offers a suggestion that Christian thought on time cannot offer a 
solution to a philosophical problem but a gift, which engages with the mys-
tery of time.161 For Schmemann 
 
Christians [have been] tempted to reject time altogether and replace it with mysti-
cism and ÒspiritualÓ pursuits, to live as Christians out of time and thereby escape 
its frustrations; to insist that time has no real meaning from the point of view of the 
Kingdom which is Òbeyond time.Ó And they finally succeeded. They left time 
meaningless indeed, although full of Christian Òsymbols.Ó And today they them-
selves do not know what to do with these symbols. For it is impossible to Òput 
Christ back into ChristmasÓ if he has not redeemed Ñ that is, made meaningful Ñ 
time itself.162 
 
On SchmemannÕs understanding, Christianity is responsible for the patho-
logical modern approach to time because, on the one hand, it Òmade it 
impossible for man to live in the old natural time, broke beyond repair the 
cycle of the eternal return,Ó163 revealing time as history, but, having done so, it 
has abandoned it, inviting Christians to reject time and history in favour of 
the hope of eternal rest. For John Inge, drawing on Timothy Gorringe, an 
understanding of time in this context is related to sacramental action. Inge 
explains that the word sacrament derives from the Latin sacramentum, and as 
such is not present in the New Testament.164 That Latin word is  a rendering 
of the Greek µ&'2/3(+4, which as Rowan Williams shows derives from the 
word µ&5, meaning to conceal, and carrying the sense of showing something 
in its hiddenness. It is used in this sense to speak of the rites of the Greek 
mystery-cults.165 Whilst in Christ GodÕs mystery has been made known in its 
fullness, at the same time there is still ambiguity, the secret is not simply laid 
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bare, and on WilliamsÕ understanding this is because human Òmotivations and 
desires do not display themselves unambiguously.Ó166  
This notion of sacrament or µ&'2/3(+4 must be understood in relation to 
the logic of the incarnation, with all its attendant ambiguity, which we are 
here developing: ÒThe incarnation is the primary and determining Christian 
musterion.Ó167 For Aquinas, in the sacraments, Òthe word is joined to a sensible 
sign, just as in the mystery of Incarnation the Word of God is united to 
sensible flesh.Ó168 In the sacraments, the invisible logos of things is encount-
ered through their visible form; Aquinas cites Augustine on this point that 
the sacrament is the visible sign of the invisible truth of things.169 Aquinas 
makes it clear at the beginning of his discussion of the sacraments that there 
is a general sense of this word which refers to a thingÕs Ôhidden sanctity,Õ and 
he for the most part limits his use of this word to a more restricted special 
sense, that of the specific signification of the seven sacraments; nevertheless 
for him Òevery sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament,Ó170and it is in this sense 
that theology has extended the notion to Christ himself, the Church, and to 
the world, as evidenced by the titles of the texts under discussion here.171 For 
Schmemann, Òthe sacrament is the manifestation of the Word,Ó172 and the 
limitation of the sacramental in this broad sense is an effect of the fall: ÒThe 
fall is not that [man] preferred [the] world to God, distorted the balance 
between the spiritual and material, but that he made the world material, 
whereas he was to have transformed it into Ôlife in God,Õ filled it with mean-
ing and spirit.Ó173 
As a sign, then, the sacramental depends on perception, on the intertwin-
ing of ÔconsciousnessÕ and ÔnatureÕ which Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh 
has made thinkable. Schmemann reminds us that man is a hungry being, and 
that although Òall that exists lives by Ôeating,ÕÓ174 which is determined by what 
we earlier called appetite, there is a development of this which can be seen in 
man: Òhe alone is to bless God for the food and the life he receives from Him. 
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He alone is to respond to GodÕs blessing with his blessing.Ó175 The signifi-
cance of manÕs ability to bless, of course, depends on his being able to with-
hold blessing, to refuse thankfulness, which is to say that it depends on that 
same freedom which makes him not just appetitive but hungry. ManÕs rela-
tionship to God is not one of the mechanical return of gratitude or acknow-
ledgement to God, rather it depends on the creative expressivity of his ability 
not just to return GodÕs blessing but to ÔrecirculateÕ it in the world, extending 
the sacramental moment in unforeseen ways.  
This freedom, this lability of his bodily life is thus fundamental to what we 
have called sacramentality, and it is in this connexion that Schmemann writes 
in For the Life of the World, ÒThe first, the most basic definition of man is that 
he is the priest.Ó176 For Schmemann there is a sense in which the human act of 
blessing God unifies the world. Perhaps this can help us to form a better 
understanding of MaximusÕ notion of man as microcosm: Humans do not, 
and cannot, Ôunify the worldÕ by participating in the preexisting and separated 
worlds of the rational, spiritual, or mental and the natural, material or ex-
tended. Rather, they participate in the emergence of this duality in the mode 
of intertwining; as capable of expressive love, he is, as participant in a greater 
Ôwe,Õ able to continue this action and to make a world. 
Graham Ward relates this movement to the complex moment of Ôthe frac-
tureÕ in the liturgy of the Eucharist: The priest, acting and speaking on behalf 
of the gathered church proclaims ÒWe break this bread to share in the body 
of Christ,Ó the people responding ÒThough we are many, we are one body, 
because we all share in one bread.Ó177 At the very moment that the Church is 
gathered together, and ready to receive, its fracture is begun, because the 
Eucharistic binding-together demands that this Ôwe,Õ to maintain its unity, 
must always remain open; that those who receive do so in view of being sent 
out, as they Ògo in peace to love and serve the Lord.Ó Ward writes elsewhere 
Òthe Church is now the body of Christ, broken like the bread, to be food 
dispersed throughout the world.Ó178 Thus Inge refers to Timothy GorringeÕs 
notion that the sacraments are Ôextroverted.Õ ÒHaving been fed with the 
sacramental elements of bread and wine, through which Christ nourishes us 
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with his body and blood, we are to go out to find Christ in the people and 
places of our everyday life.Ó So Òthe physicality of [É] the sacraments are Ôan 
affirmation of the material, as the assertion, consonant with the incarnation, 
that you cannot go round, or beyond, matter, but that you must go through 
it.ÕÓ179 For Schmemann, Òthe Church is mission, and [É] to be mission is its 
very essence, its very life.Ó180 
For Benedictine Timothy Fry, then, ÒMaterial things are sacramenta, sym-
bols that reveal the goodness and beauty of the creator,Ó181 and for Graham 
Ward, Òto desire or love God is to invest the world with significance, a 
significance which deepens the mysterious presence of things.Ó182 This logic 
of an everyday sacramentality, the denial of a rupture between matter and 
meaning, between the sacred and the profane, stems from the same root as 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh, from the basic understanding that gives 
him to claim that Òsensation is literally a form of communion.Ó183 This convic-
tion that the logos is made known in and through things roots perception in 
history and in the logic of institution in Merleau-PontyÕs ontology and in 
sacramental thought. Williams emphasises that the church is bound up with 
GodÕs self-revelation in history, and that ÒThe Church is a mystery as a whole: 
not only in its praying and feeding but in its vulnerable historical actuality.Ó184 
For Schmemann, the idea of the sacramental is a fundamental intuition that 
the world Òis an epiphany of God, a means of his revelation, presence, and 
power,Ó185 not only Òin its totality as cosmosÓ but also Òin its life and becoming 
as time and history.Ó186 Williams warns that to think the Church as sacrament 
in this sense Òleads us not towards a static picture of the Church as a simple 
epiphany of the Ôsacred,ÕÓ and against any notion of the church as an idealised, 
perfect spiritual entity, but rather to an understanding of the realisation of 
the logos of God in the midst of contingency, in a Church whose life is Òstill in 
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formation, still subject to change and suffering.Ó187 This ambiguity would call 
into question any kind of pansacramentalism. For Gorringe, Òif everything is 
a sign, nothing is,Ó and Inge cites his claim that sacraments are Òthose rents in 
the opacity of history where GodÕs concrete engagement to change the world 
becomes visible.Ó188 These can be ÔrentsÕ on a world-historical scale, as at 
Pentecost or when God called to Moses from the burning bush. But as Inge 
suggests, the most everyday of events can be sacramentally transfigured.  
 
Sacramentality is not simply an affirmation of the world as it is, but of the fact that 
Christ is in the world to unite the broken fragments of life by making the material a 
vehicle for the spiritual. This is not, it should be emphasized, equivalent to propos-
ing a dualistic approach: our experience may sometimes suggest such a duality, 
but religious experience understood sacramentally links the dualities under which 
the one world keeps appearing. Christ himself is the reintegration of GodÕs original 
creation, and in Christ God has restored the sacramental nature of the universe.189 
 
That is, GodÕs intervention restores the world to itself. Speaking of Mar-
riage as Sacramental, Schmemann writes Òfor the Christian, natural does not 
mean self-sufficient — a Ônice little familyÕ — or merely insufficient, and to 
be, therefore, strengthened and completed by the addition of the Ôsupernatu-
ral.Õ The natural man thirsts and hungers for fulfilment and redemption.Ó190 
Sacramentality, then, is not the addition to nature of the supernatural. It is 
rather the calling into question of the very idea of nature; it is a rejection of 
the idea that there could be any sufficient definition of ÔnatureÕ or of Ômatter.Õ 
Rejecting the pure presence-to-itself of nature conceived on a geometrical 
model, it puts into relief the idea that the being of things dwells not in pure 
positivity but in relation, and as such, it makes a question of nature, not in 
the mode of Ôis nature all there is?Õ and Ôcan there be anything supernatural?Õ 
but rather as the question Ôwhat is nature, and what is its relation to con-
sciousness?Õ 
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God and Nature 
In his lectures published as Nature: Course Notes from the Collge de France, 
Merleau-Ponty focused on the arrangement of the ontological problematic 
around Òthe nexus [É] ÔNatureÕ — ÔManÕ — ÔGod.ÕÓ191 In these 3 seriesÕ of 
lectures, as he does so often, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly takes Descartes as his 
starting point. Descartes and Newton posited a new idea of nature, which, as 
he sees it, makes possible new scientific discoveries, rather than being 
prompted by them. This new conception is not, as it may first seem, the 
rejection of Aristotelian finality, but is rather its sublimation, in God. 
The new element is the idea of infinity, which derives from Judaeo-
Christian monotheism, and which splits the Aristotelian nature into the pair 
natura naturans, nature considered as productive power, and natura naturata, 
inert and mute nature, nature as pure externality. Insofar as Aristotelian 
finality had constituted the meaning of things, it was expelled from nature as 
naturata, and located in God considered as the source of nature. Merleau-
Ponty acknowledges the origin of the division, which the Cartesian concept 
of nature made concrete, of the opposition between naturans and naturata in 
Averroes, and suggests that it was this division that allowed Thomas to 
integrate the Greek conception of nature with Christianity in his metaphys-
ics, though it is not until Descartes that the consequences of this are realised. 
In dealing with the Humanist conception of nature, Merleau-Ponty takes 
Kant as paradigmatic. Whereas for Descartes, nature as given by God was 
basic, and the human was a problem (which was expressed in terms of the 
question about the relations of body and soul) KantÕs ÔCopernican revolutionÕ 
puts human experience at the centre, so making a problem of the constitu-
tion of phenomenal nature. Kantian humanism seems to be indifferent with 
regard to God, although Merleau-Ponty cites Brunschvicg as finding in 
KantÕs thought an anthropo-theology which invests the autonomy and 
finality of DescartesÕ God in Man. Merleau-Ponty says Òin the end, by way of 
morality, Kant lets the old ontology subsist.Ó192 For him, Kant has not done 
away with the Cartesian Ontology, or its nexus of God — Man — Nature, 
but has just shifted the priority of the terms. It is Schelling who moves on 
from the Kantian humanism: where for Kant nature is the abyss of human 
reason, that which lies beyond reason, for Schelling this abyssal element is the 
definition of God. Where non-knowing is the limit for KantÕs epistemologi-
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cal ontology, for Schelling there can be some recognition of the non-known. 
For Schelling, being exceeds the limit of reflection. Nature is considered as 
both product and productivity, and the distinction between natura naturans 
and natura naturata is no longer simple and unidirectional. Part of what is 
reproduced, for example, in animal reproduction, is the productive capacity 
itself. 
Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly critique an ontology which takes God as 
its basic term. For him the concept of nature is always a privileged expression 
of ontology in toto, so it is that the Cartesian understanding of nature ex-
presses an ontological complex which also must find a place for God and for 
Man.  He wants, then, to work over the concept of nature in an attempt to 
build a larger ontology, on the basis of Òour experience of Nature in us and 
outside of us.Ó193 In this phrase he refers to his work on perception, which 
gives us a picture of reality that centres on his account of the subjective body, 
as developed in the vital understanding of structure in The Structure of Behav-
iour and in the intentionality of the body-subject in the Phenomenology of 
Perception.  
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty writes, Òthe flesh is not mat-
ter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old 
term Òelement,Ó in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth and fire, 
that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal 
individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle.Ó194 Alphonso Lingis, in 
his Translator's Preface to this work, argues that flesh is not identical with the 
experienced body, which Merleau-Ponty had contrasted in Phenomenology of 
Perception to the objective, observable body. The experienced body would not 
seem to be correctly described as an element or a general thing; rather, it is 
characteristic of the lived body that it is a specific thing which nevertheless 
shapes all of, and only, my experience. There is a general reality, which ought 
to be basic to ontology, for Merleau-Ponty, to which the specific reality of 
my lived embodiment gives me access, and this general reality is flesh. Lingis 
writes ÒThe flesh is the body inasmuch as it is the visible seer, the audible 
hearer, the tangible touch — the sensitive sensible: inasmuch as in it is 
accomplished an equivalence of sensibility and sensible thing.Ó195 All this is to 
say that the Merleau-Pontyan ontology of flesh is well captured by the title of 
his unfinished last work; the flesh is the meeting-point of the visible world of 
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the senses and the invisible world of intelligibility, so that Merleau-PontyÕs 
ontology of the flesh is, in the last instance, about the instantiation of mean-
ing or intelligibility in the sensed world. It is not that flesh joins the mute, 
physical substance of nature to the meaningful, intellectual or spiritual human 
substance; rather Merleau-Ponty writes that ÒWe must not think the flesh starting 
from substances, from body and spirit — for then it would be the union of contradicto-
ries — but we must think it, as we said, as an element, as the concrete emblem of a 
general manner of being.Ó196 Galen Johnson notes that 
 
the pregnancy of the Flesh with expression renders this new ontological term as a 
correlative of the old term, Logos. Together, Flesh and Logos are icons of a Biblical 
theme Ñ Óand the Word became Flesh and dwelt among us,Ó and these two 
words suggest to us an inquiry regarding depth and spirituality in Merleau-Ponty. 
We recall the range of the word esprit in the title of ÔEye and MindÕ Ñ conscious-
ness, wit, spirit. This is the term chosen by Jean Hyppolite, French translator of 
Hegel, as the closest available French term to convey the sense even of HegelÕs 
Geist. The attentive reader must also wonder about the pervasive sacramental lan-
guage of ÒtransubstantiationÓ found in ÔEye and Mind,Õ so readily related to the 
creedal phrase, Òmaker of all things visible and invisible,Ó found in the title of Mer-
leau-PontyÕs last work.197 
 
As Johnson notes, The title of The Visible and the Invisible is an allusion to 
the formula of the Nicene Creed: ÒI believe in one God, the Father almighty, 
maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible.Ó In the French 
translation of the Latin, both of which Merleau-Ponty would have been 
familiar with, God is maker of ÔlÕunivers visible et invisible,Õ literally Ôthe 
visible and invisible universeÕ which carries a sense of the unity of created 
things, where the English Òall things, visible and invisibleÓ names a duality in a 
plurality of things, and not a (singular) universe. We can see here the conso-
nance between Merleau-PontyÕs recognition of a distinction between the 
sensible and the intelligible, even as this distinction is grounded in the notion 
of Ôflesh,Õ and the visible and invisible universe of the creed, which alike 
encompass both terms. In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
makes use of a metaphor of transubstantiation to convey this elemental unity 
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of the in-itself and the for-itself, writing Òjust as the sacrament not only sym-
bolises, in sensible species, an operation of Grace, but is also the real pres-
ence of God, which it causes to occupy a fragment of space and 
communicates to those who eat of the consecrated bread, provided that they 
are inwardly prepared, in the same way the sensible has not only a motor and 
vital significance, but it is nothing other than a certain way of being in the 
world suggested to us from some point in space, and seized and acted upon 
by our body, provided that it is capable of doing so, so that sensation is literally 
a form of communion.Ó198 
Clearly Merleau-Ponty rejected any notion of an entirely sufficient analogi-
cal relation between the sensible and intelligible worlds. In an interview with 
Maurice Fleurent he explicitly repudiates the view that the realm of the 
visible is systematically grounded in and points to a higher world of eternal 
truths, saying: ÒHusserl contends that western philosophy has for centuries 
been founded on a rationalist dogma whose origin is theological: the world is 
entirely rational.Ó199 What exactly can he mean by this? It is, it seems, a 
challenge to any notion of God which implies a purely necessitarian concep-
tion of the world, which denies freedom. (In ÔFaith and Good FaithÕ Merleau-
Ponty writes, thinking of that religion which Hegel called Ôthe reign of the 
Father,Õ ÒThere is always an element of Stoicism in the idea of God: if God 
exists, then perfection has already been achieved outside this world; since 
perfection cannot be increased, there is, strictly speaking, nothing to do.Ó)200 
By way of explaining HusserlÕs contention, Merleau-Ponty says Òthe nine-
teenth century understood this for the first time, even though we cannot 
affirm it a priori, which does not authorise us to abandon reason but obligates 
us to redefine the human situation in order to see reasonÕs tasks more clearly. 
There is reason and logic in the course of things, but only de facto, not de jure, 
and we have to describe the human condition with this mixture of chance 
and reason that defines it.Ó201  
A necessitarian rationalism is not definitive for theology. Lars Thunberg, in 
his book on the anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, finds that for 
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Maximus there is a basic distinction between the intelligible and sensible 
world, which is Òcommon to most Greek thinking and is shared by the 
Fathers of the Church.Ó202 For Maximus, ÒManÕs position in the universe 
makes [this] basic dichotomy of creation particularly noticeable in relation to 
him.Ó203 According to Thunberg, manÕs position in the universe is understood 
in terms of microcosm; that is, man is the meeting-point, the hinge, between 
intelligibility and sensibility. This is articulated in terms of the faculties of 
sensation and mind, of aisthesis and nous, and reason is precisely, according to 
Thunberg, the meeting of the two. Although Maximus views the soul as one 
of three parts, with body and spirit, which make up a human being, and as 
itself composed of parts, he emphasises that these divisions are not absolute; 
what is characteristically human is the mediated unity of the three parts, 
rather than their separation.  
If we can draw a parallel between Merleau-PontyÕs notion of flesh and what 
Maximus means by man in the general sense, we can see that it need not be 
the case that priority is given to the ÔhigherÕ spiritual world; rather a philoso-
phy which begins and ends in man can locate its unreflected ground outside 
of itself without reducing that ground to gross materiality nor to the world of 
forms. Indeed, both the theology of Maximus and the philosophy of Mer-
leau-Ponty complicate the platonic division between a sacred, divine world of 
forms and a profane, terrestrial world of matter. Maximus subordinates the 
distinction between the sensible and the intelligible to a distinction, as 
expressed in the creed, between the created and the uncreated order. That is 
to say, if there is a ÔspiritualÕ order, it is not asserted simply as the ÔgoodÕ 
realm, opposed to the evil, created, realm of the flesh, since both visible and 
invisible orders are part of the created world. Unlike a crass Gnosticism, 
which sees human souls as divine sparks somehow trapped in an evil world, in 
the picture presented by Christian orthodoxy, the world of the senses is 
affirmed as a part of the created world which, whilst fallen, bears the marks 
of some original goodness. 
Merleau-Ponty argues in his lectures on nature that LaplaceÕs conception 
of nature is at bottom theological.204 It was Laplace who first formulated the 
idea, belonging to classical physics, that if one knew the position and motion 
of every particle in the universe at an instant, one would be able, in principle, 
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to derive the whole history and future of the world from it. Why would 
Merleau-Ponty claim that such a conception is theological? Because this 
understanding of the world stands in a tradition for which law-like predicta-
bility is ascribed to God, and Laplace simply translates this law into an 
absolute physical law which can in principle be known. Indeed, I would 
suggest that this gets closer to what Merleau-Ponty means when he uses the 
term ÔtheologicalÕ in the disparaging way he does here — Laplace replaces the 
bad-faith pretense of the priesthood to possession of an absolute law with its 
scientistic equivalent. For Merleau-Ponty, this conception of God is implicit 
in Descartes. Cartesian philosophy makes concrete the division between 
mind and extended nature; this makes way for DescartesÕ geometrical con-
ception of the physical world for which all behaviour can be reduced to a set 
of axioms which are fundamental physical laws, explicable in geometrical 
terms. LaplaceÕs determinist mechanism is based on this conception. But the 
axioms themselves, for Descartes, are not purely contingent. Rather, they are 
the result and outworking of GodÕs nature: for this reason, as God (axiomati-
cally) is unchanging, so we can be sure that the fundamental physical laws of 
nature are eternally unchanging. In SpinozaÕs Cartesianism, the absolute 
divide between res cogitans and res extensa is collapsed; the two are modes of 
one underlying substance. DescartesÕ conception demands that we would ask 
the question how exactly the laws of nature are grounded in God, a parallel 
question to that of how the two substances are connected in the human 
being. SpinozaÕs picture is an improvement on DescartesÕ insofar as it re-
moves this problem: God just is the laws of nature. ÒFor all things follow from 
GodÕs eternal decree by the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a 
triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.Ó205 
In this sense, God is neither determined nor undetermined, but is the de-
termining itself. Whether or not SpinozaÕs position is in the last instance 
ÔtheologicalÕ in the sense of being grounded in an idea of God, or whether this 
is a thin cover for atheism, is a question we leave to scholars dedicated to his 
thought. But SpinozaÕs philosophy is certainly ÔtheologicalÕ in the sense 
Merleau-Ponty means the word, as I have described. Such a theological 
conception of nature is problematic because, adopting the posture of an 
observer who takes a GodÕs-eye-view of Nature (as in Descartes) or even one 
which holds both God and Nature within its purview (as in Spinoza), it fails 
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to account for the limited position of the observer within nature. If thought 
is conceived as a knot in the cord that makes up the fabric of nature, then we 
are driven to do away with the logic of substance with regard to thought. 
There is, perhaps, what !i"ek calls a Ôparallax gapÕ between thought and 
nature, in the purview of the thinking perceiver. The two are absolutely 
incommensurable parts of one picture. 
Paradoxically, where DescartesÕ dualism and SpinozaÕs parallelism end up 
reducing thought and nature to one basic reality, that of substance, a Mer-
leau-Pontyan thought of intertwining, which focuses on the common grounds 
of thought and nature in embodied life, recognises their differences. The 
logic of Merleau-PontyÕs Ôchiasm,Õ as developed in the last complete (though 
presumably not in what Merleau-Ponty would have considered its finished, 
final, form) chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, is ambiguous. The most 
obvious reading is that in his philosophy thought and nature, the visible and 
the invisible, constitute two strands which are bound together. But perhaps a 
more plausible and more sophisticated reading would be one for which what 
are intertwined are the many strands of visible nature. The Invisible is not 
one strand among the many here, nor is it several: rather, the invisible is the 
chiasm, the crossings, the knots formed in and between these strands, the 
logos Ôon the other side of things.Õ It is no wonder, then, that when the physi-
cist unpicks the strands of the web, he finds nothing corresponding to 
Ôthought.Õ The notion which I am proposing, an anthropology and a philoso-
phy of nature which sees the distinction as undecidable, of Homo Sive Natura, 
means that thought arises in and towards a world, but necessarily exceeds 
that world as thought, though it is absolutely a product of that world as sub-
stance. 
If we take the notion of anthropocentrism quite literally here, then an 
anthropocentrism is justified: thought accounts for the world as human 
thought; it understands that the human must inevitably be its centre, not as if 
the human were the fulcrum of reality, but rather in the understanding that 
my interrogation of the world takes its fundamental orientation not from a 
set of neutral Cartesian coordinates but from my location in and orientation 
to the world. Indeed, it is by embracing this epistemological anthropocen-
trism, by making explicit the fact that our knowledge of the world depends 
upon and is centred around our relationship to it, that we overcome the 
ontological anthropocentrism which, by thinking as if thought had unbiased 
access to the world, as if the world could be seen from no perspective in 
particular, fails to notice and take account of its own epistemological anthro-
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pocentrism. Anthropocentrism is thus to be acknowledged and overcome: in 
thinking about nature, we must inevitably think about it as our environment 
first of all. 
As Ted Toadvine points out, it is not often noticed that Merleau-PontyÕs 
notion of flesh has its foundations in SartreÕs use of that term in his account 
of desire in Being and Nothingness. For Sartre, the flesh, as the site of the 
often insatiate and distracting or destructive impulse of sexual desire, is a 
blockage, a factical obstacle to the existential freedom of a human being. 
SartreÕs notion of flesh here is reminiscent of St. PaulÕs sarx, a principle of 
dissipation against which the human spirit must struggle, and of AugustineÕs 
thinking of the flesh in terms of concupiscence. For Sartre, the flesh is tragic. 
But for Merleau-Ponty, flesh is not at all an obstacle. Indeed, as his earlier 
thought made clear, embodiment is not the obstacle of freedom, but its very 
condition. The flesh does not, for Merleau-Ponty, oppose the spirit, but is its 
incarnate ground. The flesh is the site of possibility.  
We have already seen that in the Cartesian-Spinozist conception of nature, 
nature mirrors God; God is the source of the laws of nature or is in fact those 
laws themselves. This always leads to an insistence that there can be no 
hiatus, no ÔgapÕ between God and nature. There is no possibility, in this case, 
of God completing nature through grace, since nature either is God (under a 
different mode) or is the outworking of GodÕs own nature. Neither is there a 
possibility of God intervening in nature, for the same reason. It seems that 
Cartesian thought accepts, implicitly, that matter might have been created ex 
nihilo, as a totally alien substance to its creator. But for Descartes, thought, 
reason, or res cogitans is not truly new; it must proceed from God on the basis 
of his nature, it must be the creation of God ex Deo. Spinoza does not accept 
any creatio ex nihilo; for his geometrical understanding, there is no creation in 
that sense. All that is is simply the outworking of what has been; the origin of 
things is obscured. 
We must return here to Merleau-PontyÕs claim: nature is soil. It is a pro-
ductive capacity which is grounded in substantial reality. It is the potency of 
ÔVibrant Matter,Õ as Jane Bennett calls it.206 In The Structure of Behaviour, 
Merleau-Ponty wrote of the relation of the soul to the body that 
 
it is not a duality of substances; or, in other words, the notions of soul and body 
must be relativized: there is the body as mass of chemical components in interac-
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tion, the body as dialectic of living being and its biological milieu, and the body as 
dialectic of social subject and his group; even all our habits are an impalpable 
body for the ego of each moment. Each of these degrees is soul with respect to the 
preceding one, body with respect to the following one. The body in general is an 
ensemble of paths already traced, of powers already constituted; the body is the 
acquired dialectical soil upon which a higher ÒformationÓ is accomplished, and 
the soul the meaning which is then established.207 
 
The notion of soul is found in Merleau-PontyÕs earliest work, and it serves, 
I contend, the same function: although Merleau-PontyÕs work here is con-
cerned with the problem of the body, and not with nature, the point is the 
same. The body is not simply an analogue of nature; it is nature as the human 
being. ÔNature,Õ like Ôbody,Õ names neither a substance nor a process but a 
material site of generativity. If what we usually denote by the term ÔnatureÕ is 
something like the organic world, then this is because it is the world that we 
most obviously depend on for our sustenance, which is the ground of our very 
possibility. The term is ambiguous because its meaning must derive from its 
structural relation to its other, to what we mean to mark out as Ônot natureÕ 
when we call everything else Ônature.Õ Thus nature can be the opposite of the 
unnatural, art, artifice, man, the supernatural, grace, freedom, and so on. 
There is an inorganic, mineral world which constitutes nature with respect to 
the organic world, and looked at in this perspective human beings are not 
distinct from that organic world; we too need to eat salt. But the organic 
world is also transformed by the effects of human action, as we have argued: 
making nightmarish as well as fecund situations possible — in this regard 
Man is ÔnatureÕ with respect to the organic world; human action is the ÔsoilÕ 
from which a transformed world grows. This is to say that all is nature and all 
is non-nature; that the Man-nature distinction is a structural distinction 
which must be made if we are to think ÔmanÕ against the background of the 
conditions that make humanity possible. And this helps us to understand why 
Ònature loves to hide:Ó208 because thought is prone to forget its dependence 
on a set of conditions, that their ÔfigureÕ exists against a Ôbackground.Õ When 
life is endangered, its dependence on the nature which is its ground returns 
very much into view, and we see the figure against its background.  
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God and The Logic of Incarnation 
We have here pursued Merleau-PontyÕs final ontology in response to a 
philosophical problem, that of the failure of dualistic ontologies. We found 
dualisms to be implied in all kinds of objective thought, and we have seen 
that we continue to think in ways that are more Cartesian than we realise. 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh resists dualisms and enables us to think 
Man and nature outside of them. But pursuing Merleau-PontyÕs thought has 
reintroduced another term to the ontological nexus, that of God. 
Where Theology has been dismissed in modern thought, this has been on 
the basis of the ÔflatÕ ontologies of objective thought, and especially of em-
piricist naturalism. There the experienced world was spread out into a pure, 
externalised nature which reduced everything to phusis, or perhaps more 
accurately to physics in its modern sense, a sense which excludes not only the 
first-person perspective, not only freedom ungoverned by mechanical deter-
minism, but also excludes all that in nature which cannot be reduced to a 
geometry. Indeed, the God who was dismissed on the basis of this geomet-
rism was dismissed because ÔI have no need of that hypothesis;Õ and as such 
science became theological in the sense Merleau-Ponty associates with the 
Stoics as well as Laplace. 
The failure of naturalism does not by any means imply the return of reli-
gion. But it does suggest that the terms on which some modern thought 
dismissed Christianity were wrong; the dismissal of religion was based on a 
misunderstanding, on the arbitrary replacement of one kind of theology with 
another. Any return to religious questions will not occupy the ground of the 
Ôsupernatural.Õ When nature exceeds itself, when a philosophy of nature has 
become impossible, no longer is religion a matter of the Ôsupernatural,Õ but of 
what is unknown in nature. Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of the flesh, then, by 
no means requires Christianity. But it does reopen the realm of metaphysics, 
not of metaphysics conceived as what it excluded by a clear domain of phusis, 
but of metaphysics in another sense. Often this word is mistakenly under-
stood as if its sense were something like Ôparaphysics,Õ as speaking of that 
world in which phusis is contained; in fact its name comes from the title given 
by Andronicus of Rhodes to the work by Aristotle which, in their customary 
ordering, comes after the Physics. Thus metaphysics is not a matter of that 
which is detached from the visible world, but of that which is visible in it but 
is not of it; of the invisible, in the sense we have developed, following Mer-
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leau-Ponty. We are not speaking here of a metaphysics of total transcend-
ence but of the metaphysical which is made known in the world. In an article 
originally published in July 1947, Merleau-Ponty was content to speak of 
ÒThe Metaphysical in Man,Ó as opposed to the metaphysics Òwhich Kantian-
ism reduced to the system of principles employed by reason in constituting 
knowledge or the moral universe,Ó209 writing 
 
Metaphysics is the deliberate intention to describe this paradox of consciousness 
and truth, exchange and communication, in which science lives and which it en-
counters in the guise of vanquished difficulties or failures to be made good but 
which it does not thematize. From the moment I recognize that my experience, 
precisely insofar as it is my own, makes me accessible to what is not myself, that I 
am sensitive to the world and to others, all the beings which objective thought 
placed at a distance draw singularly nearer to me.210 
 
Merleau-Ponty ends the passage cited here with a footnote which refers to 
a planned work to be called The Origin of Truth. This work was never com-
pleted, but became what we now have as The Visible and the Invisible; thus the 
affirmation of this sense of Metaphysics is an immediate progenitor of the 
Merleau-Pontyan ontology of flesh. Albert Rabil tells us that, for Merleau-
Ponty, 
 
metaphysics no longer means a philosophy of first principles; now it refers to a 
philosophy of being-in-the-world, a philosophy of finitude. [É] Metaphysics no 
longer concerns itself with that which transcends the world (God, Being, con-
sciousness), but only with experience, Òthis world, other people, human history, 
truth, culture.Ó211 
 
What are the implications of a fleshly ontology for metaphysics? First of 
all, it is clear that Metaphysics must always begin with the perceived world, 
with the sensible. In the Preliminary Summary of the Argument in ÒThe 
Primacy of Perception,Ó Merleau-Ponty states his conclusion thus: ÒThe 
perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all 
                                                
209 ÒThe Metaphysical in Man,Ó 83. 
210 ÒThe Metaphysical in Man,Ó 94. 
211 Albert Rabil, Jr., Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967), 84; he refers to ÒThe Metaphysical in Man,Ó the final quote being 
taken from p. 94. 
5: Institution and Incarnation 223 
value and all existence. This thesis does not destroy either rationality or the 
absolute. It only tries to bring them down to earth.Ó212 The perceived world 
must be the always presupposed foundation for metaphysics, for Christianity, 
and for any possible understanding of God. 
Second, this metaphysics will not see necessity behind all that happens; the 
contingency of the perceived world is not held to be unreal in comparison to 
some ideal necessity. There is reason and necessity in the course of things, 
but only de facto, not de jure. Merleau-Ponty claims that Òthe contingency of 
all that exists and all that has value is not a little truth for which we have 
somehow or other to make room in some nook or cranny of the system: it is 
the condition of the metaphysical view of the world.Ó And Òsuch a metaphys-
ics cannot be reconciled with the manifest content of religion and with the 
positing of an absolute thinker of the world.Ó213 Does Merleau-Ponty mean 
here to reject all possible religion? It seems not, because in ÒFaith and Good 
Faith,Ó originally published a year earlier than this essay, he outlined the 
possibility, at least, of a true Ôreligion of the incarnationÕ which does not posit 
God as absolute thinker of the world. Time is not the unfolding of a course 
already given in immanent laws working themselves out mechanically; nor is 
it the procession of things toward a teleological goal given Ôfrom the outside.Õ 
Rather, there is an immanent teleology of things which proceeds from their 
depths, which does not determine their behaviour but precisely makes 
possible ÔbehaviourÕ properly speaking, which is the result not of mechanism 
but of the power of agents to structure the world, to bring it to expression 
and as such to sediment their own meanings within in. 
Thirdly, the invisible meanings of things can be made known in the world; 
the invisible is made known in the visible. If we are to suppose a God, God 
must be seen in things. If this God is known in human history, this know-
ledge will depend on its historical mediation, and thus on an invisible which 
not only appears in the sensible but which is instituted there. For a God to be 
encountered, especially a God who is in some way related to humanity, we 
would need a God to whom witness is borne in nature and history, as institut-
ing and instituted. God is here the silent ground of nature in which he 
institutes himself as a sign. 
This institution of invisible meanings, of the logos at work in things, is not 
once and for all, but is a living tradition, that is, what is sedimented there 
must be recuperated. The tradition does not need to be wholly reactivated, 
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down to its primordial roots, to be reconstituted as a whole in thought; but 
its sedimentation does not exhaust it, since a tradition is never pure sedimen-
tation but also living expression; where tradition is not recuperated in this 
way it is sedimented as a dead expression no longer to be taken up. The non-
recuperation of the tradition does continue to express the tradition; but it 
expresses it as no longer liveable, as a fossilised tradition of dead history, as a 
tradition that is already on the way to being lost. 
Christianity, then, can make sense of this ontology and its general implica-
tions for metaphysics in more specific ways. First is its insistence (which kept 
Christian Neoplatonism from coinciding with Plato) on the lived earth, the 
created world, as fundamentally good, as freely created, and as blessed with 
an analogous freedom, so that when God creates he allows for the genuine 
freedom of his creation, granting the power of the creation of the radically 
new to the created world. This creative dimension of the creative world 
demands the radical contingency of things to make possible the appearance 
of the unanticipated. Merleau-Ponty speaks of this in terms of the doctrine 
of felix culpa. ÒThe Christian teaching that the Fall is fortunate, that a world 
without fault would be less good, and, finally, that the creation, which made 
being fall from its original perfection and sufficiency, is nevertheless more or 
was all to the good makes Christianity the most resolute negation of the 
conceived infinite.Ó214 That is to say, of God as the great geometer. Contin-
gency and freedom are inevitable if a God of love created a world for the sake 
of the genuine expression which can only come from others. In ÔFaith and 
Good FaithÕ Merleau-Ponty writes 
 
Hegel said that the Incarnation is Ôthe hinge of universal historyÕ and that all his-
tory thereafter has only developed its consequences. And the God-man and the 
Death of God do, in effect, transform spirit and religion. As if the infinite God were 
no longer sufficient, as if something moved in Him, as if the world and man be-
came the necessary moments of a greater perfection instead of being a useless de-
cline from the originating perfection. God can no longer be fully God, and 
Creation cannot be completed unless man freely recognizes God and returns Cre-
ation to Him through Faith. Something is happening; the world is not futile, there 
is something to be done. Man could not return to God unless he had been sepa-
rated from Him. ÔFortunate the fault which merited such a Redeemer.Õ215 
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This last line is a quotation from the Latin phrase, used in the Exsultet in 
the Roman Catholic Easter Vigil Mass, cited by Aquinas and alluded to by 
both Augustine and Aquinas, ÒO felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit 
habere Redemptorem,Ó usually translated in English as ÒO Happy fault that 
merited such and so great a Redeemer!Ó216 This religion of the incarnation, 
then, dissolves the problem of how God might make Godself known in the 
world without compromising human freedom: there is no contradiction here, 
indeed human freedom proceeds, in a sense, from God. 
God is made known in the flesh, in nature and history, with the incarna-
tion; this is communicated in the traditions we might associate with word and 
table: as the linguistic expression of a set of invisible truths, most obviously in 
the traditions of scripture, liturgy, and theology (understood as the reflexive 
element of continued expression of these, that is, as the reflection on scrip-
ture and liturgical tradition which is incorporated into them.) But this lin-
guistic sedimentation is not all; there is also a tradition of sacramentality. 
This involves a focused expression of the truth at the heart of things in the 
bodily practices of worship and prayer.  
ÒSensation is Literally a form of communion.Ó217 This is to say that the 
sensed thing, the visible, has a reality which is like that of the host. This 
raises the question of transubstantiation, the question of what it would mean 
for the substance of a thing (which is invisible) to change whilst its (visible) 
accidents remain the same. Conor Cunningham points out that Òaccording to 
Aquinas, we do not comprehend the substantial form of any being. We learn 
of a thing, instead, by its proper accidents. {É} ÔThe essential grounds of 
things are unknown to us.ÕÓ218 This leads us to HookerÕs proposal that, as 
Anthony Thiselton puts it, ÒÔreal presenceÕ derived not from the consecrated 
elements of bread and wine, but from the Christian believerÕs understanding, 
reception and appropriation of the promissory word of God through the elements.Ó219 
This might at first look like a nominalism that would deny the bodily reality 
of the Eucharist. But we can read it in another way. Perhaps the importance 
of this is that the host is transformed not in the mode of the blo§e sachen but 
in the fullness of its materiality; it is not that the physical atoms of which it is 
made change, but that its whole being, in its relation to the oriented being of 
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humanity, is transformed. Merleau-PontyÕs analysis of perception showed us 
that the sensible thing is not an aggregation of accidents; its substance is not 
the blank which supports a collection of accidents, nor is it mathematisable 
form determined from an absolute perspective, but is rather its Ôflesh,Õ its 
resistant and productive intertwining with nature and history. The host 
appears no longer as a brute in itself but sub specie regni, under the aspect of 
the kingdom of God and the remaking of Heaven and Earth.  
Thiselton notes that Òthe 1662 English Book of Common Prayer defines a 
sacrament in its Catechism as Ôan outward and visible sign of an inward and 
spiritual grace unto us, ordained by Christ himself as a means whereby we 
received the same and a pledge to assure us thereof.Õ To the next catechetical 
question, ÔHow many parts are there in a sacrament?Õ The answer given is 
ÔTwo: the outward visible sign and the inward spiritual grace.ÕÓ220 Again this 
sounds like a dualism, and could be contrasted to John MilbankÕs insistence 
that Òas Christians we have to view the world as GodÕs creation and therefore 
we have to view the world sacramentally: this means that everything in the 
world is at once a thing and a sign.Ó221 Again, a non-dualistic reading is de-
manded: the host is not ontologically divided, because the outward and 
inward parts are not substances but dimensions of the thing; they are not 
separable. If the Ôinward spiritual graceÕ was given without the Ôoutward 
visible sign,Õ it would not be the same grace. The bread considered as mere 
matter is not the same thing as the host, because it is not understood in its 
instituted thickness, but the practice of using bread as this sign transforms 
not only the bread used as sacrament but announces and points to a yet-to-
come reality in which all bread is recognised as a means of GodÕs grace. And 
indeed the bread considered as mere matter is not the same as any real bread, 
which, as thick with instituted meaning, as deeply significant for human life, 
is always more than matter. 
This is also to say that there is no simple divide between substantiality and 
intelligibility. The knowledge of the logos of things is not gained by referring 
them to a God who perceives all. The end of things does not lie in God 
conceived as the ultimate explanation for existence. Remy Kwant thinks 
Merleau-PontyÕs Òdenial of the absolute and his conception of metaphysical 
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consciousness, clearly presaged his atheism.Ó222 Kwant is not quite right to  
say that Merleau-Ponty denies the absolute; Merleau-PontyÕs claim is that 
Òthe absolute which [Pascal] looks for beyond our experience is implied in it. 
Just as I grasp time through my present and by being present, I perceive 
others through my individual life, in the tension of an experience which 
transcends itself.Ó So it is that, as we saw earlier, ÒChristianity consists in 
replacing the separated absolute by the absolute in men.Ó223 In a footnote 
Kwant explains: ÒThe thesis that intelligibility belongs to the order of facts 
indissolubly connected with man implicitly contains the germ of atheism. For 
God is always conceived as the one who understands all reality. If there is a 
God, then, reality must be intelligible and, reversely, there cannot be a God  
if intelligibility is a fact indissolubly connected with man.Ó224 But this would 
seem to impose a much too rigid divide between nature and grace, between 
substantiality and intelligibility. Merleau-PontyÕs position is not that intel-
ligibility belongs to the order of facts. From the beginning his philosophy 
militates against the idea that there is a simple plane of facts or of sensation. 
Rather, intelligibility belongs to the lived world as the present belongs to 
time; the human perceiver does not have a status somewhere between the 
created world and God conceived as pure thought, nor as a conjunction of 
the two. To ask whether (and on what terms) creation is intelligible without 
reference to a human perceiver is to ask not about the general intelligibility 
of  things but to enquire about the meaning of a world severed from itself. 
We concur with Merleau-PontyÕs claim that ÒGod needs human history,Ó not 
in any sense that would imply that human history precedes God, nor that 
God could not exist without it, but that it is an integral part of the world 
God has created and in which he became incarnate; ÒGod ceases to be an 
external object in order to mingle in human life, and this life is not simply a 
return to a non-temporal conclusion.Ó225 
Merleau-PontyÕs position does not at all imply atheism. Rather, it takes 
seriously the notion that God is not the final referent of all intelligibility as 
an explanation for things; God is not ultimately to be understood as the 
answer to the question Òwhy is there something rather than nothing?Ó God is 
not the explanation for nature. Rather, God is natureÕs ultimate ground. To 
                                                
222 Remy Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 1963), 128. 
223 ÒThe Primacy of Perception,Ó 27. 
224 Kwant, Phenomenological Philosophy, 128 n. 1. 
225 ÒThe Primacy of Perception,Ó 27, emphasis added. 
228 Part Two: Ontology 
expect that the world would be intelligible if we excise man and history from 
the picture is to fail to see that intelligibility belongs to nature as a graced 
whole rather than to its atomic elements. Creation is not a plane of pure 
positivity, and as Emmanuel de Saint Aubert puts it, in an article entitled 
ÇLÕincarnation change toutÈ, ÒMerleau-Ponty seeks the Ôpositive signification 
of negativity,Õ that which [É] belongs to Ôthe essence of ChristianityÕ. Yet it is 
this same fecund negativity which the theology he has called ÔexplanatoryÕ has 
missed. That theology is thus stopped in its tracks in a tentative thought of 
the central mysteries of Christianity, and does not respond to the dual 
requirement of contesting false absolutes and thinking the Incarnation 
through to its end.Ó226 In ÒFaith and Good Faith,Ó Merleau-PontyÕs accusa-
tion had been that Christianity compromises with political conservatism or 
with liberalism because ÒThe Incarnation is not followed out in all its conse-
quences. [É] And so love changes to cruelty, the reconciliation of men with 
each other and with the world will come to naught, the Incarnation turns 
into suffering because it is incomplete, and Christianity becomes a new form 
of guilty conscience.Ó227 
Finally, Creation is abandoned to evil and the goodness of God is thought 
of as outside the world. Saint Aubert cites Merleau-PontyÕs unpublished 
manuscripts from the Bibliotque Nationale, in which he writes, ÒThere is a 
Ômilieu,Õ not infinite greatness, not infinite smallness, which is the place of 
meaning [sens]. The infinity of God is sought on this side and not with the 
bad infinity of magnitude.Ó228 
The Ôbad infinite,Õ of Ôcalculability,Õ as Saint Aubert has it, which is aligned 
with what we have called the geometrical conception of nature and its im-
plicit theology, is contrasted to the good infinite, which for Saint Aubert is 
linked to the knowledge of intuition rather than of mathematics.229 God is 
not derived like a mathematical law but intuited like a sensible idea, heard 
like a melody, in the depths of things. Saint Aubert again cites an unpub-
lished note: ÒThis infinity [É] belongs for me to the visible thing or to the sea 
no less than to God. For, in some ways or in all ways, its richness is no less, it 
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is in every case inexhaustible. [É] We say that we see the sea because there is 
in it this carnal and invisible infinity. Just the same, we say the we see God 
Being because there is within this carnal infinity.Ó230 ÒThus,Ó for Saint Aubert, 
 
In opposition to the mode of knowledge, transposed into Man, as a cyclopean 
God who sees everything, all at once, Merleau-Ponty takes as a model the thought 
of the vision of the sea and of horizons, building up the implicit model of a beati-
fic vision. For the inexhaustible God in a vision without flesh, he substitutes an-
other absolute, in which the inexhaustibility of depth is the durable core of being, 
just as being is the condition of possibility of this vision. For the secret ontology in-
formed by the generalization, of being and of God, of being because of God, of an 
imaginary omnipotence which represses the corporeal modalities of our opening 
to the world, the philosopher of the flesh is in a quest for another ontology, where 
the negativity intrudes into the force of being, where it is the condition of the 
possibility of donation. Thus seeking the sole absolute which does not bridle the 
inexhaustibility of desire, this phenomenology affirms that it is in the flesh that we 
see being, whose infinity is not of another nature than the inexhaustible which is 
expressed in our relation to the sensible world.231 
  
Sacramentality, to retain its meaning, must transform the world of which it 
itself is a part as a sign of the greater transformation in which it participates, 
must follow the logic of incarnation in the work of reconciliation, in Mer-
leau-PontyÕs terms. Those who are fed in the Eucharist must continue the 
expression of the work of love as they Ògo in peace to love and serve the 
Lord,Ó which derives from the Latin phrase which gives the mass its name: 
Ita, Missa Est. The mass is not mass without mission, but by the same token, 
mission depends on and begins with the mass.232 As (and when) Christians 
feed the poor and heal the sick, expressing the love of this God of love in 
action, it is instituted as a tradition of transformation. This tradition must 
always be prepared to submit itself to its own logic of transformation, to 
work out and bring to expression its own implications in its institutional 
forms. 
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In this thesis I have presented a series of concentric conceptions of trans-
cendence. Beginning with perceptual faith, we turned to desire and its imagi-
native development, to the transcendence of visual depth, the voluminosity 
of things, and their intelligible depth, which we called logos, revealed, finally, 
in the sacramental understanding of flesh. The central motif which unites 
these forms of transcendence is the possibility for transformation which they 
make available: — the perceptual faith is the ground of the emergence of 
perception from the indistinct field of sensation; the voluminosity of things 
completes this transformation by installing the perceiver in an inexhaustible 
world which is resistant to his investigations; the possibility of hunger allows 
for the imaginative transformation of given desires, and the intelligible depth 
of logos and the sacramentality of the flesh call us toward the possibilities for 
transformation in intersubjective sociality, in the pursuit of understanding 
and of wisdom, and to the transformation of our relation to the world which 
comes from understanding it in relation to the God who is its source. What 
all these transformations share is that they lead us into a deeper engagement 
with the lived world and not to a detached ascent from the world to a different, 
higher realm. 
God in himself must remain beyond determination, in this ontology. God 
cannot be known as if he were submitted to a gaze which could take in both 
Godself and the World; God must be known as the invisible in the visible, in 
and through the world.  
 
A God who would not be simply for us but for Himself, could [É] be sought by 
metaphysics only behind consciousness, beyond our ideas, as the anonymous 
force which sustains each of our thoughts and experiences. At this point religion 
ceases to be a conceptual construct or an ideology and once more becomes part 
of the experience of interhuman life. The originality of Christianity as the religion 
of the death of God is its rejection of the God of the philosophers and its heralding 
of a God who takes on the human condition.233 
 
The forcefulness of some of the claims Merleau-Ponty makes for this reli-
gion of the incarnation and of the death of God can make him sound like a 
supporter of Christianity. He was not. No doubt his modes of thought are 
deeply shaped by his catholic intellectual inheritance. But what he describes 
here is a Christianity hoped for but not seen. It is hard not to read Merleau-
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PontyÕs writings on religion and comments on the church as bearing witness 
to a certain crisis of faith, a crisis which remained unresolved. It may be that 
such a crisis is the most intellectually honest way of responding to the chal-
lenge of Christianity in light of certain of the churchÕs failures. But to remain 
honest would also require that such a crisis does not prevent us from acting: 
Indeed, it would require that we do act. 
Albert Rabil, Jr., in Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World, under-
stands Merleau-Ponty differently. For him, ÒMerleau-Ponty does not say, 
though he implies, that the only way for Christianity to rejoin human experi-
ence is to abandon the idea of transcendence.Ó234 This claim is not unreason-
able in light of the passages Rabil cites, but it seems hard to resolve with 
Merleau-PontyÕs continued attempts to present a this-worldly transcendence, 
a position to which he still seems committed in The Visible and the Invisible. 
Rabil does recognise that the later Merleau-Ponty allows for a distinction 
between subordinating ÒverticalÓ transcendence and a liberating Òhorizontal 
transcendence.Ó But this does not quite get things right, because it is the 
logic of depth, not of planar horizontality, that is developed into a new 
notion of transcendence, and this logic grows out of Merleau-PontyÕs 
thought. It does not arise from any sudden change around 1950, as Rabil 
suggests.235 Similarly, In ÒThe Soul of ReciprocityÓ John Milbank engages 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology to develop an Aristotelian account of the soul, and 
although he characterises Merleau-Ponty in broadly positive terms, he finally 
suggests that his model is Òa decapitated Catholic theology in which God 
incarnate is only incarnate and incarnate everywhere.Ó236 I have shown that we 
do not need to read Merleau-Ponty in this way: his thought does not imply a 
denial of transcendence. Philosophy begins in immanence, but it cannot 
remain there; immanence cannot be made complete. Transcendence appears 
in the perceptual faith which is basic to our encounter with the world, and in 
the imaginative excess of our perceptual desire. Transcendence is revealed in 
depth, in the simple sense that what is is always in excess of my perspective. 
My existential relation to the world reveals things in their inexhaustible 
voluminosity, and in their intelligibility discovers the logoi of things at the 
heart of the world. This transcendence is necessarily ambiguous; in Cunning-
                                                
234 Albert Rabil, Jr., Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967), 224. 
235 Rabil, Merleau-Ponty, 225. 
236 John Milbank, ÒThe Soul of Reciprocity Part Two: Reciprocity Granted,Ó Modern Theology 
17:4 (2001), 504. 
232 Part Two: Ontology 
hamÕs terms, God is known without being comprehended, just as the objects 
of perception are known whilst remaining partly comprehended.237 God is the 
ultimate voluminosity, the inexhaustibility at the source of all that is. Of 
course this knowledge of transcendence is brought to expression in theology, 
not proceeding directly from the thought of flesh but rather from the history, 
from the institutions, from the living stories which the philosophy of flesh 
makes way for and demands, but which it cannot complete. This is no de-
capitated theology, but it is true to say that the ÔheadÕ is excluded from its 
purview because its focus is elsewhere. 
On Albert RabilÕs understanding, ÒMerleau-PontyÕs interpretation of the 
Christian doctrine of God is Sabellian.Ó238 It is true that Merleau-Ponty 
opposes the Ôreligion of the FatherÕ to the Ôreligion of the SonÕ and of the 
spirit. But this is no modalism; the point is that the incarnation actually 
changes things, that Christ necessarily transforms our understanding of God. 
For Merleau-Ponty, 
 
The Incarnation is not followed out in all its consequences. The first Christians felt 
abandoned after the death of Christ and looked everywhere for a trace of him. 
Centuries later the Crusaders plunged into the search for an empty tomb. And this 
was because they worshiped the Son in the spirit of the religion of the Father. They 
had not yet understood that God was with them now and forever. The meaning of 
the Pentecost is that the religion of both the Father and the Son are to be fulfilled 
in the religion of the Spirit. [É] ChristÕs stay on earth was only the beginning of his 
presence, which is continued by the Church. Christians [É] should live out the 
marriage of the Spirit and human history which began with the Incarnation.239  
 
Both Rabil and Milbank assume that the Ôreign of the fatherÕ must be done 
away with in Merleau-PontyÕs thought (because, for him, it is incompatible 
with incarnationalism) and object to this. But ÒFaith and Good FaithÓ sug-
gests something different: that in view of the incarnation, a liberal Ôreligion of 
the sonÕ is not to be balanced against a conservative Ôreign of the fatherÕ; 
rather the two undergo a radical tranformation. The God of Grace is no 
longer posited in thought as existing in a kind of unknowable clarity, distinct 
yet separated from us by an epistemic chasm which can only be crossed by a 
blind leap of faith. Rather, the world as created becomes a milieu for such 
                                                
237 Cunningham, ÒThe Difference of Theology,Ó 294. 
238 Rabil, Merleau-Ponty, 221. 
239 ÒFaith and Good Faith,Ó 176–7. 
5: Institution and Incarnation 233 
action, for our interrogation which discovers the ground and source of things 
in God who is mediated to us through nature, who instituted himself in the 
world. This implied an earthliness of theology, taking seriously the notion 
that God is revealed amongst the outcast, interrogating the world with an 
expectation, or at least an openness to the possibility, that such interrogation 
draws us into to grace. 
Another way to say this would be to insist that theology, if she is the queen 
of the sciences, will become their servant, since her logic is that of the incar-
nation, of the kenosis of God. Theology itself, we may say, must have Òthe 
same mind [É] that was in Christ Jesus,Ó 
 
Who, being in very nature God,  
did not consider equality with God something to be grasped,  
but made himself nothing,  
taking the very nature of a servant.240 
 
Merleau-PontyÕs thought alone cannot get us here. But, far from foreclos-
ing on transcendence, Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy awaits theological comple-
tion, and cries out for the logic of incarnation in all its consequences. 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh does not only seek a way beyond the 
impasses of the Ôphilosophy of consciousness.Õ It also anticipates, and seeks to 
avoid, the problems of a too crude or reductionist Ôphilosophy of nature.Õ 
This notion of transcendence, which is essential to the sense of Merleau-
PontyÕs ontology of flesh, as we have seen, problematises and pluralises the 
notion of nature, as we see in his three courses on nature, which engage with 
a great breadth of thought on nature but which find no monolithic account, 
no final definition, even while each engagement with a particular thought of 
nature generates insights. For the ontology of flesh, nature exceeds itself, 
insofar as that which exceeds nature, the more-than-natural, appears in and 
through the natural in perception, through intersubjectivity, through institu-
tion. Man does not act in total freedom. Indeed, this would make his free-
dom utterly meaningless. Rather we have not just freedom from constraint 
but freedom to do something, to change the world. Acts of love, the creation 
of art, the generation of new knowledge, and political action in the arena of 
public history all produce new situations whose efficacy lasts, which go on 
determining the possible. Institution rejoins nature, and such acts of institu-
tion can ossify and go forgotten or can be remembered and take on new life, 
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but this latter is only possible as they are developed, as they encounter the 
world anew and are taken up into new acts of institution. All life is this 
paradox between the thrown-ness, the given-ness, the natality of its situated-
ness in positivity, and the creativity, the generativity, the indeterminacy of its 
negative freedom. But the two poles only make sense at all in light of the 
paradox we describe: givenness can only be givenness to the freedom which 
encounters it as its limit; freedom can only be freedom to act in a world if it 
is situated within something which is resistant to it. There can be no ÔnatureÕ 
without Ôconsciousness,Õ to remain with these old terms; and no Ôconscious-
nessÕ without Ônature.Õ  
The depths encountered in the situated encounter of perceiving nature 
transcend nature in any normal sense, and all the more so as perception is 
drawn into intersubjectivity: I see the other hungering, loving, thinking, and I 
see the other perceiving, even perceiving myself. All these operations are 
instituted in the sense that they arise from a natural ground, from the living 
system of the earth as soil; and they return to that soil, making it ever new, 
insofar as the effects of hungers, loves, thoughts, and perceptions do not 
Ôfloat freeÕ from the perceived world but remain attached to it, having their 
own consequences there. Naturalism, then, can never understand nature, 
since nature exceeds itself in depth, in intersubjectivity and in institution. 
Merleau-Ponty sought to avoid the Ôphilosophy of consciousnessÕ which fails 
to account for consciousnessÕ grounding in nature, and so to account for 
either nature or consciousness. Today some are striving for a philosophy of 
nature, to address the natural problems created by our failure to properly 
think our relation to nature; the real, pressing problems of resource deple-
tion, climate instability caused by human effects on the biosphere and global 
inequality. The answer is emphatically not to turn to a Ôphilosophy of natureÕ 
in any straightforward sense, since such a philosophy would repeat the 
mistake: in failing to think the relation between consciousness and nature, it 
would fail to account for either. 70 years after The Structure of Behaviour, to 
Òunderstand the relations of consciousness and natureÓ241 remains our task. 
A Òphilosophy of lifeÓ repeats the failings of a philosophy of consciousness 
if it divorces life and truth from the world, as we saw in Michel Henry. We 
would be inclined to assert a materialism, insofar as all that we can speak of 
arises from a material soil in nature. But, as we have constantly emphasised, 
nature exceeds itself. And we can too easily become Cartesian again, can 
collapse all that is into one side of the dualistic divide. We have affirmed the 
                                                
241 The Structure of Behaviour, 3. 
5: Institution and Incarnation 235 
metaphysical in matter, but this makes of matter a question rather than a 
given; to use MarcelÕs terms, matter has become a mystery, because it is not a 
world from which we can separate ourselves. We are matter. And as such, we 
do not yet know what matter can be. On this point, both Spinoza and 
Deleuze were assuredly correct.242 For this reason we have refused to lay 
claim to a naturalist or materialist determination of this ontology of flesh; the 
truth is that we do not have a sufficient definition of ÔnatureÕ or of ÔmatterÕ to 
make such a claim. 
Christian faith, and the story it tells about human origins and human ends, 
about the sens of existence and the last things, about the meaning of the 
created world and the nature of the God who created it, is thus not an 
attempt to construct an adequate model of the world in thought. It is not an 
attempt to re-present reality in the mind. Rather, it must be an attempt to 
live with a fuller orientation to reality and to the world in which we find 
ourselves. We cannot know what God is like from a standpoint outside of the 
world; no such standpoint is available to us. Whilst, of course, we cannot 
know before the fact how a God may make himself known to us, we know 
that we can only attain to a vision of God on the basis of the world we know. 
Christianity does not seek to make known the God who is penseur absolu du 
monde, who is the ultimate perspective on things, the God who is perceiver of 
all, as if we could share this knowledge or this perspective. Rather it seeks to 
make known the God who is in all things and through all things and to all 
things, who is revealed in the depths of perception as the truth of the world, 
in whom and through whom and for whom are all things, Òvisible and invis-
ible,Ó243 who is revealed in the depths of perception as the truth of the world. 
 
The human soul can signal GodÕs place at the origin of the world, but it can nei-
ther see nor understand Him and cannot therefore be centered in Him. The world 
ceases to be like a flaw in the great eternal diamond. It is no longer a matter of re-
discovering the transparence of God outside the world but a matter of entering 
body and soul into an enigmatic life, the obscurities of which cannot be dissipated 
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but can only be concentrated in a few mysteries where man contemplates the en-
larged image of his own condition.244 
 
We may think that the Christian tradition does not fully agree with Mer-
leau-Ponty here. If the human soul cannot be centred in Him, what would be 
the point of Christianity? It seems to me that Merleau-PontyÕs point here is 
not to deny that the soul is the basis of the humanÕs relation to God, but 
rather that this ÔsoulÕ (Merleau-Ponty is not at all shy about using the word 
esprit in this sense) cannot see God in a purely perspicuous vision. Rather, the 
soul is thoroughly embodied, it is not something separate or detachable from 
the body, and its access to God is always mediated by its bodily condition. 
The notion of the Òflaw in the great diamondÓ is taken from Paul ValryÕs 
poem Le Cimetire marin, to which he alludes in Phenomenology of Perception245 
and elsewhere; Merleau-Ponty uses it as a cipher for the unexplainable fact, 
that which gives the lie to any great systematic explanation of the world. In 
Phenomenology he uses it to speak of the fact of perception, that fact of which 
Objective Thought cannot give account. Here, he is speaking of the Christian 
acosmism that he has opposed, the Manichaean thought which cannot 
understand why God would have compromised his perfection by creating a 
world. A Christianity which understood this would, then, cease to be a 
metaphysics in the rationalist sense. Rather than looking up into the sky, it 
would focus on the Òfew mysteriesÓ which he speaks of. This is almost cer-
tainly another appeal to sacramentality. For Merleau-Ponty, here man con-
templates Ôthe enlarged image of his own condition.Õ This might be read as an 
understanding of Christianity as a Humanism writ large, as a case of man 
making God in his own image. Such a reading fails to attend to Merleau-
PontyÕs real concern in the passage, and his appeal to sacramentality as an 
example. Rather, I read Merleau-Ponty here as claiming that the Incarnation 
on which Christianity reflects gives us a symbol to think through what it is to 
be human. That the logic of mystery in MarcelÕs sense, applies not only to 
humans but also to God, who acts in and on a world of which he has become 
a part, into which he has arisen from its depths. 
And sacramentality does not and cannot constitute a discrete moment in 
the life of the believer and of the church. The sacraments are cultural forces, 
                                                
244 ÒFaith and Good Faith,Ó 175. 
245 ÒMes repentirs, mes doutes, mes contraintes / Sont le dfaut de ton grand diamantÓ Paul 
Valry, Le Cimetire marin, cited in a translatorÕs note in Phenomenology of Perception, 241. ÒMy 
penitence, my doubts, my limitations / are the flaw in your great diamondÓ (my translation). 
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transformative not only in what they do for the individual believer or for the 
local community of believers. They also form a part of the broader culture in 
which they are situated. This is true both of the sacraments properly speak-
ing, which sediment and express the internal cultural memory of Christianity 
and continually form and reform its imaginary. It is also true of the broader 
sacramental action that is involved in the making-known of the God who is 
posited as Ôthe other side of thingsÕ by enacting the love that God is, a love 
biased towards the poor, the broken, the hungry, the disenfranchised, the 
lonely and the sick. 
Merleau-PontyÕs final ontology was left incomplete as a consequence of his 
untimely death, just as he was preparing to write what might have been a text 
which gave his renewed and developed ontology of the flesh as full an expres-
sion as the Phenomenology of Perception gave to his early philosophy of em-
bodiment, the philosophy out of which all his further work grew. We have 
attempted, here, to bring the ontology of flesh to expression by tracing it 
from these roots, through his essays and lecture courses, to the extant work 
towards the project in The Visible and the Invisible. We have pursued the 
implications of embodiment for perception broadly conceived in the example 
of eating, by situating these implications within a developed account of vision 
and of visibility, and finally by showing how this ontology may be understood 
as uniquely consistent with elements of Christian practice, with the logic of 
GodÕs appearance in the world he creates in the Incarnation, and of the 
sedimentation and continued expression of the God revealed there in sacra-
mental celebration and action. 
Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh, to be brought to full expression, de-
mands to be Ôfleshed outÕ in the concrete terms of a living tradition. To make 
full sense, it must complete the joining of abstract thought to the under-
standing of a culture and a set of lived expressions, and ultimately to be lived, 
though we accept that such a task lies outside the domain of academic 
philosophy. This general philosophical account of perception, of seeing, of 
God, of man, of culture and of history must work itself out in relation to 
particularities in these fields of thought. It is for this reason that, in an 
attempt to work out the internal logic of Merleau-PontyÕs thought, we have 
brought it into contact with Christian experience and with the Christian 
tradition. 
Whilst Merleau-PontyÕs position does not imply an approval of all the con-
tents of Christian belief and experience; perhaps it would be right to say that 
Christian theology does imply an ontology which is something like the fleshly 
ontology we have developed here. It seems clear that Merleau-PontyÕs 
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thought is at least in part inspired by his deep understanding, an understand-
ing developed on the basis of a lived engagement with them as a believer until 
his late twenties,246 of the theological concepts of sacramentality and Incar-
nation, and their philosophical implications. 
 
 
 
                                                
246 Merleau-Ponty alludes in ÒFaith and Good FaithÓ to the Austrian Christian Socialist 
Chancellor Engelbert DolfussÕ (a catholic who had suspended and seized power from the 
Austrian Parliament) shelling buildings in Òworking-class sections of Vienna,Ó inside which 
Austrian Socialist rebels has barricaded themselves. This happened in February 1934, when 
Merleau-Ponty was approaching his twenty-sixth birthday. Merleau-Ponty recalls the story of 
Pierre Herv, who was shocked when some monks with whom he had been invited to eat 
refused to condemn Dollfuss, as he was the established power in the nation, despite their 
being members of a progressive order which had supported the workersÕ cause in Austria. 
Merleau-Ponty seems to identify with Herv when he says that Òthe young man never forgot 
this moment,Ó and it seems these events played a significant part in his own rejection of 
Catholicism. ÒFaith and Good Faith,Ó 172.  
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 set out, in this thesis, to bring to expression Merleau-PontyÕs ontology 
of flesh, to develop a logic of incarnation which we found latent in that 
ontology, and to draw out those aspects of this ontology which carry 
significance for Christian theology. 
In the first chapter, I argued that perception depends on the perceiver 
being installed at the heart of things, actively engaged in a world on which he 
depends. Drawing on Merleau-PontyÕs Phenomenology of Perception, I empha-
sised the reversibility which overturns the idea of perception as an observa-
tion from outside, as well as emphasising that there is a basic perceptual faith 
which is demanded of us if we are to live: our most basic encounter with the 
world already depends on faith, a faith which is our assent to our own incar-
nation. We acknowledged there the inevitability of a certain kind of duality 
in our ontology of the flesh, and the pervasiveness of Cartesianism in our own 
thought, which must be overcome from within and cannot be excised from 
our thinking by a wholesale rejection of philosophy. The perceiver is a body-
subject — engaged, interested in his world, and, indeed, hungry. He mediates 
desire and flesh, self and world, thought and things. 
In the second chapter, I argued for a distinction between animal appetites 
and properly human hunger, making the case that to be the sort of thing that 
perceives is also to be the sort of thing that desires. The movement of per-
ception is mirrored by that of imagination in expression. Taste is not a 
matter of cultivated disinterest but of our fundamental perceptual invest-
ment in the world. Man the hungry animal transforms his desire and thus 
makes way for the transformation of the world. 
I 
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In the third chapter, I brought the old ontology, which Merleau-Ponty 
seeks to overcome, to a clearer expression. Where a pervasive Cartesianism 
has been criticised, DescartesÕ fundamentally geometrical paradigm has been 
countered in modern thought with an antiocularcentric ontology which 
reverses the hierarchy of the senses, often giving priority to touch. Such 
ontologies fail because sight is not opposed to touch, but rather roots a 
fundamental synaesthesia, which integrates the other senses into the basic 
existential dimension of depth within which it situates us. 
To find our way out of Cartesianism, we must refuse the attitude of denial 
that denigrates vision, and instead offer a non-Cartesian account of vision. 
I also established here that the Cartesian visual ontology enshrines a theo-
logical position. The dualistic position grounds a naturalistic approach to the 
world in a conception of God as enseur bsolu u mo e, as the highest princi-
ple and absolute which stands utterly outside of the world and divorced from 
it. Merleau-Ponty counters this dualism with an ontology which implicitly 
opposes this theology, with a position that has an utterly different theological 
genesis, a radical theology that springs from an incarnational source. This 
theology posits us not as abstract consciousnesses but as concrete bodily 
subjects, entwined with the world, shaped by it and shaping it, labile and 
dependent, perceptive and expressive. 
Thus a non-dualistic ontology requires a recovery of vision as central to 
ontology, a recovery that we rehearsed and developed in chapter four. 
Movement is central to sight as we experience it; the sight of HockneyÕs 
Ôparalyzed Cyclops,Õ the immobilised subject of PlatoÕs cave, is not in fact 
sight at all. Perception offers us not atomic sense data but a world. Our 
seeing involves us in a world whose significance for us is not superimposed on 
it but arises from its depths. The world is thick with sexual meanings, with 
desire and love in general, with hunger and thirst; this basic insight has been 
obscured by a dualistic Sartrean theology of the negative freedom of human-
ity installed in the pure plane of positivity, arrayed before God conceived as 
the highest point of view on things. 
By replacing this conception of sight as representation of things spread out 
in three-dimensional space with one of the relation of the perceiver to her 
world in the fundamental dimension of depth which carries his involvement 
with that world, we liberate the conception of God from its Cartesian deter-
mination and the negation of that determination in modern atheism. 
This liberation prepares the ground for an incarnated conception of God. 
The Cartesian God is hro omor h  in the sense that he is the infinitisation 
of human perspectives who is required to guarantee human knowledge. The 
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God who is liberated by the ontology of flesh is understood in ÔincarnationalÕ 
terms on the basis of our own incarnation: God is not posited as the highest 
axiom from which all existence derives but as the most basic soil from which 
nature and humanity grows. This is not God as determining first cause but 
God as the fecund soil of all that is; God does not determine all things but 
rather makes possible all things. My originary relation to God is not one of 
alienation; but of dependence and involvement. Transcendence emerges as a 
possibility of this world. Perception is incarnational insofar as it is both 
passive and active; we become both subject to the world and responsible in 
part for the world, as agents able to shape it. Perception is not here a matter 
of illumination but of interrogation, and transcendence appears, not as the 
ÔbeyondÕ of ultimate height, as with the God beyond the heavens, but in 
depth, as the God who is in all things, who is transforming nature and making 
himself known amongst the poor, in the dirt and sweat of the earth. This 
transcendence does not fill space but rather permeates places; this would not 
be God as the ultimate geometer but the God who dwells with us. 
In the final chapter, I began by arguing that place is constitutive of the 
world; nature must be understood as platial ÔsoilÕ rather than as a spatiotem-
poral container. We are already involved in nature, it could not be what it is 
for us without our involvement in it. The nature of nature is not divorced 
from the nature of human beings but is bound up with it in a relationship of 
mutual implication. This is another way of saying that the world is given to us 
not as brute matter nor as a pure upsurge of being but as instituted, which is 
to say that the soil of nature gives rise to the genuinely human, which both 
exceeds it as the advent of something genuinely new, but which does not take 
flight from nature and create a world divorced from it (this is the situation of 
HusserlÕs sciences in crisis) but rejoins nature, transforms it, and is sedi-
mented within it. We are returned, in the logic of institution, to Merleau-
PontyÕs basic, incarnational insight. I am thoroughly entwined with the 
world, and I emerge from that intertwining; it does not emerge from me and 
my junction with the world. The classical Christian understanding of the 
incarnation affirms the significance of a particular human body, born in 
poverty and killed by torture, as the centre of human history. The Cartesian 
ontology makes a nonsense of this; but for Merleau-PontyÕs ontology the 
Incarnation of God in Christ is the icon of incarnation as a general structure 
of the world; it is the blooming of a transcendence always already present at 
the depths of the world. Incarnation is not the insertion of divinity in the 
world, the insertion of consciousness in nature, but the flowering of what is 
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contained within the depths of nature, which is not simply ÔnaturalÕ but which 
is neither opposed to nature, which is rather its completion. 
It is this flowering of grace, of the divine, which confirms nature as soil, 
just as the emergence of man makes nature nature. There is a ÔmysteryÕ en-
countered where I wrestle with problems from which I cannot distance 
myself; such a situation arises in my encounter with the world of intersubjec-
tivity and of history. These mysteries, which arise in my perceptual encounter 
with things, form the basis for a sacramental conception of the world. It is in 
interrogation that the invisible logos of things is encountered in the world, 
that transcendence is revealed in the depths of matter. 
This transforms our idea of nature insofar as there can be no bifurcation 
between nature and grace (or the supernatural). Rather, the appearance of 
logos in the perceived world makes our relationship to that world one of 
interrogation, and makes of nature a question and a fecund mystery. This 
interrogation opens the domain of metaphysics — not as the question of 
what is outside phusis, but as the question of what emerges within it, of what 
is unknown in nature. But this metaphysics must always begin with the 
perceived world and the ways in which it exceeds itself. This metaphysics 
would not found a necessitarianism or a rationalism but would come to terms 
with the mixing-up of logos in the world of contingency, its incarnate emer-
gence there. 
In this milieu, a God, to be made known, would need to come to expres-
sion within, at the depths of, the nature and history of which he would reveal 
himself as ground, to institute himself there as a sedimented sign and as a 
living tradition. The Ôfleshing outÕ of Merleau-PontyÕs ontology of flesh in 
relation to a concrete tradition is necessary for the bringing of that ontology 
to a fuller expression. This concretising of his thought does not have to be 
achieved in Christian terms, but it does make good sense in these terms, 
which fulfil Merleau-PontyÕs own sacramental anticipations, his incarnational 
logic, and his catholic mood by understanding the emergence of logos in 
nature in terms of the sacraments and the tradition of Christianity. The logos 
we have spoken of is obscure; what is crucial is that it must not be under-
stood as ÔpointingÕ to God outside the world. Meaning arises not where the 
world indicates God in the elsewhere; rather, as in sacraments, the appear-
ance of logos in the world is the actual incarnation of God among things. We 
might say that God is manifested there like a melody; in such moments 
nature sings God. 
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